**Reference Support - Psychology Test X - IAS (Mains) 2016**

**1.a. What do you understand by Emotional Labor? Discuss its effects on occupational stress. 10**

**Reference:**

Emotional Labor. During the past 50 years, the structures of the U.S. economy and the economies of other countries have changed dramatically. Once dependent on heavy manufacturing, the service sector now dominates the economies of the United States and many other nations. This shift undoubtedly has enormous implications for many organizational phenomena, but it has clearly changed the content of people's jobs. As a result, many employees are faced with a very different set of stressors than were their forefathers who worked in factories a half-century ago.

The term **emotional labor,** initially coined by Hochschild (1979, 1983), refers to the emotional demands that employees face on the job. Emotional labor can take many forms, but two stand out as being particularly relevant to the study of occupational stress. In the first form, employees are forced to confront negative emotions. Examples of this would occur when a grocery store clerk must interact with a dissatisfied customer or when a physician must interact with a grieving family.

In another relevant form of emotional labor, an employee may be forced to suppress his or her true emotional state in order to further the goals of the organization. Many occupations have "display rules" that tell the employee the appropriate emotion to display to customers or clients (Ekman, 1973). Employees who work directly with the public encounter this type of situation every day. A waiter at a restaurant may be having a bad day but must be pleasant to customers because his job demands it.

Research on emotional labor is still relatively new, but there is evidence linking it to stress-related outcomes. The most common stress-related outcome associated with emotional labor has been emotional exhaustion (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Jackson, Schwab, & Schuler, 1986). Higher emotional labor requirements are associated with heightened feelings of emotional exhaustion. Ashforth and Humphrey, however, point out that the relation between emotional labor and emotional exhaustion (and possibly other strains) may be quite complex. For example, if the emotional display rules of a job are congruent with how an employee is actually feeling, this may not be harmful. Being cordial to a customer will not be difficult for a salesperson who is in a good mood. Morris and Feldman (1996) also point out that the stress related impact of emotional labor may differ depending on (1) the frequency of emotional displays required, (2) the extent to which an employee is required to strictly adhere to display rules, and (3) the variety of emotional expressions required.

Emotional labor appears to be a very fruitful area for further occupational stress research, considering the large number of service sector employees. It also may be useful to broaden the scope of emotional labor research to include jobs outside of the service sector, because even these jobs may have differing emotional display rules that impact employees.

**1.b. What insights social role theory gives us about Indian caste system? 10**

**Reference:**

Most humans are people watchers. Observing others is a source of endless fascination, as evidenced by the international obsession with reality TV. It certainly seems logical, then, that beliefs about social groups would stem from watching the world around us. Social role theory, developed by Alice Eagly (1987), proposes just that. According to this theory, when people observe others they pay attention to the social roles others occupy, such as their occupations. In doing so, they come to associate the characteristics of the role with the individuals who occupy it. To understand how this works, consider first a basic principle of social perception, called the correspondence bias (Ross, 1977). This bias stems from the tendency to misjudge the demands of the situation: All things being equal, people give relatively little weight to how situational factors influence behavior; instead, they believe someone's actions reflect the person's personality traits. People who observe a woman nurse comforting a patient, for example, are more likely to conclude that she is a caring person than they are to conclude that situational factors (such as her job as a caregiver) led to the nurturing act.

Social role theory proposes that this bias leads to the development of stereotypic beliefs. Consider, for example, the widely held stereotypes that women are naturally kind and concerned about others and that men are naturally self-confident and assertive. According to social role theory, these beliefs developed from observations about women and men in the social roles they occupy. Women are traditionally in the homemaker role or in a lower status employee role and men are traditionally in the breadwinner role or a higher status employee role. As such, women are disproportionately represented in roles requiring the very traits people associate with women, such as kindness and concern for others, and men are disproportionately represented in roles requiring the very traits people associate with men, such as self-confidence and assertiveness. Because the situational influences on behavior (in this case, social roles) are not given sufficient weight, gender stereotypic beliefs develop. Perceivers conclude that all women are kind and warm and all men are assertive and self-confident. Eagly's research has focused mainly on the development of gender stereotypes, although the theory also has been used to examine age stereotypes, beliefs about nationalities, and perceptions of leadership ability (see Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000, for a review). Yet studying how social roles might help create these widely held stereotypes presents a problem because even young children have stereotypes firmly in place. Curt Hoffman and Nancy Hurst (1990) creatively skirted this problem by asking people to evaluate members of two fictional alien groups, the "Orinthians" and the "Ackminians." These aliens were described as either predominantly city workers or as predominantly child raisers.

Because their planet had no female or male sex, the association between human gender stereotypes and these categories was eliminated. Moreover, on their imaginary planet there were no differences between the traits describing city workers and child raisers. Results showed that the correspondence bias influenced responses: City workers were described by characteristics usually associated with that role (such as active and logical) and child raisers were described by characteristics usually associated with that role (such as helpful and patient). That is, people's judgments were based on the role the aliens occupied rather than on their actual traits.

**1.c. What is the out-group homogeneity effect and what are the reasons this effect emerges? 10**

**Reference:**

**The Outgroup Homogeneity Effect**

As we noted, the minimal group paradigm can be used to easily create an in-group and an outgroup, but people probably do not have well-developed stereotypic beliefs about such groups. That does not mean,

of course, that they have not developed stereotypes of naturally occurring groups. Research shows that not only do people have such stereotypes, they actually see in-groups and outgroups quite differently. People tend to see members of their own group as very different from each other and, at the same time, tend to underestimate the differences among members of other groups (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990). This differential perception is known as the outgroup homogeneity effect. To a perceiver, members of the outgroup really can "all look alike." Studies of cross-racial identification, for example, show that people have more difficulty recognizing members of a race other than their own (Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997). Moreover, the outgroup homogeneity effect goes beyond physical appearance. People believe outgroup members have similar traits and occupy similar social roles. One consequence of this differential perception is that evaluations of outgroup members tend to be more polarized and extreme than evaluations of in-group members (Linville & Jones, 1980). We next consider explanations for this cognitive bias.

Reasons for the Outgroup Homogeneity Effect. There are a number of reasons why outgroup members all appear similar, but ingroup members do not (Wilder, 1986). These explanations are not mutually exclusive; that is, more than one of them may play a role in perceptions of a particular outgroup. These reasons include: 1. People simply interact more with members of their own group and, therefore, have more information about them and their unique qualities. People can readily identify differences between and among members of their own social group. Blacks, for example, are likely to recognize that some Blacks are good at accounting, others at sports, and still others at writing poetry. People's willingness or ability to see these differences comes, in part, from the fact that they have more information about people from their own social group. Whites, for example, are much more likely to spend time with other Whites than they are to spend time with Blacks, and during that time, come to recognize their own group members' individuality. Would spending more time with outgroup members lessen the tendency to see them as all the same? Possibly. For example, the outgroup homogeneity effect emerges less consistently for gender (Brown & Smith, 1989) and age (Harwood, Giles, & Ryan, 1995). Perhaps this is because people know a lot about the other sex, even if they are not a member of that group; many of people's closest relationships, for example, are with a member of the other sex. Similarly, most people have older grandparents, aunts, uncles, or neighbors with whom they regularly interact. As we will see in Chapter 14, however, contact in and of itself does not always reduce stereotyping and prejudice.

2. Interactions with in-group members provide more information about their unique characteristics. Because people see ingroup members so frequently, they have more opportunities to notice others' individuality. This is particularly true because this extra time people spend with their own group members gives them a chance to see ingroup members in multiple roles and situations. Students who live in a sorority or a fraternity house, for example, see their Greek brothers and sisters studying, socializing, eating, and relaxing. However, they might see members of other student organizations only in formal settings, when their behavior seems more uniform because of the social norms operating in that situation. As we will see, ingroup biases are related to people's tendency to underestimate the extent to which situational factors affect another's behavior.

3. People are motivated to see themselves as unique and, therefore, look for ways to distinguish themselves from their group to maintain their individuality. No one wants to be seen as a complete conformist, with no individual thoughts or actions. Indeed, people are motivated to see themselves as unique individuals and pay attention to the ways in which they are different from the other members of their own group (Brewer & Pickett, 1999). This level of scrutiny is not necessary for outgroups—people already believe outgroups differ from them on important dimensions.

4. Ingroup versus outgroup comparisons are typically made at the group level. When people make ingroup and outgroup comparisons, they focus on how the groups differ (for example, the Sharks versus the Jets from West Side Story), thereby minimizing within group differences. In contrast, when people look within their own group (How I am doing compared to my classmates?), the focus changes to differences between individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Republicans, for example, usually are not called on to consider whether individual Democrats might differ in their opinion about a political issue.

More typically, political controversies are framed along party lines. For example, a Republican senator hoping to find out whether her party can maintain a filibuster (which can be used to delay a vote on an issue, but requires 60 votes to stop) will consider how individuals within the party might vote, carefully monitoring the differences among ingroup members. In contrast, she may assume that all Democrats will vote in the same way. The Ultimate Attribution Error. All of the reasons just discussed explain the same result: Members of other social groups are treated stereotypically. As a consequence of seeing people as members of groups rather than as individuals, perceivers often make biased judgments about an outgroup members' actions. One bias, known as the ultimate attribution error, occurs when people assume that their own group's negative behavior can be explained by situational factors, but similar negative actions by members of other groups are due to their internal stable characteristics (Pettigrew, 1979). This effect was demonstrated by Birt Duncan (1976), who asked White research participants to watch a video of one man shoving another. When the video depicted a White man shoving another person, participants concluded the actor was "horsing around." The picture changed dramatically, however, when the action involved a Black man shoving someone. In this case, the cause of the shove was more likely to be deemed "violent behavior" (see Figure 3.1). As the results of this study demonstrate, negative behaviors displayed by an outgroup member are attributed to personal causes— in this case, violent tendencies—whereas negative behaviors by an ingroup member are attributed to situational factors (for example, horsing around). Such assumptions lead to stereotypic beliefs about the outgroups (for example, all Blacks are aggressive). The ultimate attribution error is most likely to emerge when the ingroup and outgroup have a history of intense conflict or when the ingroup holds negative stereotypes of the outgroup (Hewstone, 1990).

If this pattern emerged for positive behaviors or desirable outcomes, the outgroup would actually benefit from the attribution; Whites, for example, would view the academic success of Blacks as due to their inherent intellectual abilities.

**F I G U R E 3.1**  Classifications of Harm Doers and Victims for Cross-race Pairings

Participants who saw a Black person shoving a White person saw the act as violent, rather than playing around. When the actor was a White person (shoving another White person), the action was seen as playing around, rather than violent.

Interestingly, the ultimate attribution error does not take this form (Pettigrew, 1979). Instead, positive behaviors by an outgroup are likely to be dismissed as due to special advantages (for example, their having benefited from affirmative action), luck, or unusual characteristics of the situation. These same behaviors by an ingroup, in contrast, are attributed to stable personality traits; Whites see their own success as due to their ability, for example. The result, then, is that the favored ingroup benefits from biased thinking whereas the outgroup is negatively labeled. In short, when it comes to pleasing members of another social group, outgroup members cannot win for losing. Evidence suggests the ultimate attribution error can occur in everyday life, such as in sporting events (see Box 3.2). The effect of this bias may be particularly strong, however, when the groups involved have histories of intense conflict (for example, Hindus versus Muslims or Chinese versus Malayans), when the evaluators are highly prejudiced individuals, or when emotions run high (see Hewstone, 1990, for a review).

The behavior of a single minority group member also may significantly influence how members of the entire social group are viewed. Whites who witnessed a Black person responding in a rude manner to a White person were later more likely to avoid sitting next to another Black person, compared with Whites who had witnessed the Black person behaving in a positive way (Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996, Study One). Such an instance of negative behavior also can affect Whites' overall feelings about Blacks. Research participants who overheard a staged phone conversation about an assault by a Black assailant later rated Blacks as generally more antagonistic than did participants who heard the same conversation about a White assailant. Moreover, those who believed the assailant was Black were more likely to express the belief that Whites have too little power relative to Blacks, in society (Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996, Study Three). That is, observing a single instance of a negative behavior involving a member of an outgroup led people to evaluate all members of that group

negatively. It also led to protective beliefs about the ingroup—in this case, that Whites were less powerful than they should be.

**1.d. Discuss the role of clinical psychologists in minimizing the psychological impact of weapons of mass destruction. 10**

**Reference:**

**THE ROLE OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS IN MINIMIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF WMD**

Military psychologists and others in operational settings can significantly minimize the psychological impact of WMD through active consultation with leaders and direct intervention with affected personnel. Most notably, psychological principles can be applied by leaders to reduce the impact of protective gear on operational readiness.

**Consulting with Commanders**

Military commanders should understand that discomfort and mild anxiety while wearing a gas mask is common, and efforts should be made by leaders and training planners to prevent severe problems from developing (Ritchie, 1992a). Stress inoculation techniques can be implemented in routine training by educating personnel about the normal physical and emotional "symptoms" to expect when wearing a gas mask and chemical protection suit. Frequent use of the gas mask is also essential for habituating personnel to the experience of functioning while wearing the protective gear. Stokes and Banderet (1997) suggest that military members wear gas masks daily for 1 hour while performing their duties and during structured recreational activities (e.g., cards and volleyball). The military services commonly include exposure to nonlethal gas (e.g., tear gas) as part of training. Military members are typically required to enter a gas-filled chamber with a gas mask on, engage in various physical activities while wearing the mask (e.g., push-ups and jumping jacks), and then remove the mask to build confidence in it as a protective device. These approaches can help reduce the normal, mild anxiety experienced by most people when wearing a gas mask, as well as help identify personnel with more severe symptoms who may need more specialized training or intervention. Psychologists may have to serve as consultants to commanders to encourage them to apply these approaches since some leaders may not be familiar with the importance of taking steps to prevent problems with the use of protective gear.

**Intervening in Severe Gas Mask Anxiety**

When severe gas mask anxiety is evident, education and training may not be sufficient. Focused training by a clinical specialist (e.g., a behavioral psychologist) may be required for individuals whose anxiety is severe enough to interfere with satisfactory job performance, who pose a safety risk to others, or who cannot tolerate wearing the mask for as long as needed. Standard systematic desensitization procedures (Wolpe, 1990), which have been well established with other anxiety problems, can also be successfully applied here (Oordt, 2001; Ritchie, 1992b).

The intervention protocol described by Oordt (2001) is based on well-established procedures for anxiety-related problems (Barlow, 1988; Wolpe, 1990) and is designed to teach individuals to manage uncomfortable symptoms enough to perform military operations. The intervention can typically be applied in 4 to 10 sessions and involves specialized training in self-regulation, conducted in four phases. Phase I focuses on education. Information should be provided about the human fear response,

emphasizing that it is a normal and adaptive response to the perception of inadequate airflow. Anxiety symptoms can be reframed as a sign that the body's "alert system" is fully functioning. The symptoms can be viewed as a "normal" reaction, occurring at an inopportune time. Participants should also be informed that they can learn to control these symptoms through simple relaxation techniques.

Phase II involves relaxation training. Teaching both a deep relaxation exercise, such as progressive muscle relaxation (PMR), and a briefer form of relaxation, such as diaphragmatic breathing, will provide a range of tools for managing symptoms and for progressing in later phases of the treatment (relaxation instructions can be found in Blanchard & Andrasik, 1985; Everly, 1989; and McGuigan, 1993). Diaphragmatic breathing is a brief relaxation exercise for use in exposure trials and in field exercises with the gas mask. Care should be taken to ensure that the individual is able to relax before moving to the next phase of training.

Phase III involves systematic exposure to progressively more feared stimuli, using standard systematic desensitization techniques (see Wolpe, 1990). A hierarchy must be established, in collaboration with the participant, of stimuli that provoke varied levels of anxiety, from mild to severe. A 100-point Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS) is used to rate items by asking, "On a 1 to 100 point scale, how much distress do you think you would feel when exposed to this item." In accordance with the recommendations of Wolpe (1990), items that are approximately 10 SUDS units apart should be selected. With gas mask anxiety, stimulus items will generally involve progressively more restricted breathing (e.g., progressively narrow breathing tubes such as a snorkel, soda straw, and gas mask) or a progressively restricted visual field (costume mask, dive mask, and gas mask). These items can also be endured for progressively longer times and with differing ease of removal (e.g., holding the mask on with one's hands versus using the straps).

The participant is then systematically exposed to the items on the hierarchy, starting with the least-feared item. Exposure to the item will be repeated until the SUDS rating is sufficiently low to not trouble the individual (usually less than 10). If the SUDS rating does not diminish with exposure, the stimuli should be considered too anxiety provoking and a lesser item should be found. The individual will then be exposed to the next item on the hierarchy, which if properly constructed will be at a lower SUDS rating than it was initially. This procedure continues through all the items on the hierarchy so that the individual is able to wear the gas mask fully strapped on for an extended period of time in the room where the training occurs.

When the participant is able to tolerate wearing the gas mask without significant anxiety, it is important to generalize the progress made to environments outside the training office. This component of training constitutes Phase IV. The individual is instructed to wear the gas mask on a daily basis for 30 minutes during sedentary activity (e.g., watching television). When this is achieved with minimal anxiety, the level of activity can be systematically increased (e.g., doing housework or walking up stairs) until the individual is able to do moderate aerobic activity while wearing the mask. If the individual is unable to generalize in this manner, coaching from the trainer and practice in reassuring self-talk may be necessary. The final test of success will come only when the participant has an opportunity to wear the gas mask in a training exercise or actual deployment. Regular exposure to maintain confidence may be necessary.

A similar approach can be applied to other protective gear, including the MOPP ensemble. Graduated exposure may involve gradually adding parts of the ensemble, increasing the duration of wear, and/or manipulating environmental conditions (e.g., heating up the room). Such approaches can also be applied

in a group setting. Group training increases efficiency and also may be necessary if protective gear is distributed to civilians who have not had previous experience with the equipment.

Obstacles that may have to be addressed include hesitancy to admit anxiety reactions, fear of negative impact on one's career, and stigma in receiving mental health services. Psychologists can address these concerns by normalizing anxiety symptoms, ensuring that leaders and their personnel are aware of the effectiveness of behavioral interventions; advising leaders to "advertise" that assistance is available and that help seeking is encouraged; and taking services into the workplace and reframing them as "specialized training" (as opposed to therapy).

Another significant obstacle is the intensity and duration of the intervention. A brief course of behavior therapy may not be brief enough once an imminent threat of chemical attack is present. For example, it would be impossible to provide this level of intervention to the general population in the event that gas masks were needed for the civilian population, as with Israel in 1991 (Golan, Arad, Atsmon, Shemer, & Nehama, 1992). Family members of the military or diplomatic personnel might also be vulnerable groups. More rapid interventions might include connecting an active air-supply system to the gas mask for certain medically at-risk individuals (Golan et al., 1992), using flooding procedures (i.e., wearing the gas mask until anxiety subsides), or holding mass relaxation training sessions for self-regulation in auditoriums or on television. It is still likely that the more severe and/or refractory cases will require individualized interventions as described above.

**THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGISTS IN MANAGING COMMUNITY REACTIONS TO A WMD ATTACK**

With the increased risk of chemical and biological weapons being used by terrorists on civilian populations, it is essential that attention be given to the likely psychological reactions of the general population in the event of an attack. In this arena, too, psychologists can play an active role by consulting with community leaders in preparing for and responding to a WMD attack.

**Key Issues in Preparing for a WMD Attack**

In advance of an attack, community leaders must consider and prepare for (1) effectively communicating with the public, (2) maintaining sources of emotional and practical support, and (3) dealing with fear and helplessness resulting from actions taken by leaders in response to the crisis. Decision makers must anticipate the effects of their actions on the public. DiGiovanni (2001) discusses key issues in the management of public reactions, including several suggestions to "consequence managers" preparing for and responding to a WMD event:

- Creating training scenarios that involve role players with emotional distress, psychiatric symptoms, and behavioral disturbances.
- Avoiding use of quarantine, when possible, and instead using public education about exposure to biological agents and requesting voluntary curtailment of travel.
- Ensuring that all officials are aware of the basic principles of risk communication when working with the media, including the importance of expressing empathy to the public and providing accurate and honest information.
- Developing a public education campaign on preparation for a chemical or biological attack.
- Educating and training of first responders (i.e., fire, police, and emergency medical service).
- Establishing a command and control center to coordinate services and use of personnel.

- Ensuring the security of communication systems.
- Planning for processing of the dead that is attentive to family wishes and customs.
- Maintaining medical records during a crisis.
- Educating medical staff on the effects of chemical and biological agents and appropriate treatment.
- Training professionals to provide debriefings (see Chapter 16, this volume, for more details) to rescue personnel.
- Ensuring adequate resources to maintain military medical readiness.

**Key Issues for Early Intervention after a WMD Attack**

In addition to preparing the community and the disaster response system for a chemical or biological attack, community leaders should ensure that proper personnel are trained and available for providing early psychological intervention to survivors. In 2001, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) convened a group of experts to reach consensus on the best practices for responding to the psychological needs of victims of mass violence. Their report (NIMH, 2002) indicates that expectations of normal recovery for survivors is a sensible working principle during the early phases. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to presume the presence of clinically significant disorder in the early post-incident phase unless a preexisting condition was present. The participating experts also suggest that the term "debriefing" be reserved only for operational debriefings and that survivors' participation in early intervention sessions should be voluntary. The review of the research suggests that early, brief, and focused psychotherapeutic intervention can reduce distress in survivors who have lost family members and that cognitive-behavioral approaches may be helpful in the treatment of acute stress disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and depression. The experts also note that there is no evidence that early interventions consisting of one-on-one reprocessing of the traumatic experience is effective and therefore should not be considered the treatment of choice (see Chapter 16, this volume, for a thorough description of disaster response).

**1.e. How do you see the role of media influences on adolescent body image? 10**

**Reference:**

One of the most feared effects of the media on adolescents is that they promote body shapes that are unrealistic and unattainable, encouraging girls in particular to adopt unhealthy diets, in many cases with pathological consequences. This is especially problematic during adolescence, both physically and psychologically. The last thing a growing body needs is a drastic reduction in nutritional intake, and adolescent identity, a fragile thing in the best of circumstances, is made more complicated by societal demands for thinness and physical beauty.

Most studies of body image support the argument that the modern Western ideal of the super-slim, low waist-to-hip ratio female figure is the result of cultural changes rather than a biological imperative (Thompson, Heinberg, Altabe, & Tantleff-Dunn, 1999). It is often argued that the thin ideal reflects the economic independence of the modern woman, for whom childbirth is an option rather than a prerogative, whereas the maternal figure ("child-bearing hips") was more popular in less affluent times. Inevitably the media have been strongly associated with promoting the contemporary ideal; indeed this is one of the few areas in psychology in which culture and media are treated as synonymous, with most researchers favoring a version of cultivation theory. It is the cumulative effect of images of thin women

in magazines, television, films, and the fashion industry that is said to promote body image dissatisfaction and eating disorders among teenage girls (Heilman, 1998; Henderson-King & Henderson-King, 1997). Indeed, so worried are policymakers by these apparent media effects that, in the United Kingdom, both the government and the British Medical Association have in recent times campaigned for media outlets and modelling agencies to use a wider range of female body sizes, although with no apparent success.

Several studies of media over time lend weight to the argument that the ideal female figure is becoming thinner. Garner, Garfinkel, Schwartz, and Thompson (1980) carried out an analysis of Miss America winners and Playboy centerfolds from 1959 to 1978 and found a significant trend toward thinner, lighter models, despite overall increases in the weight of American women in this period. The study was replicated 10 years later and the trend appeared to be consistent through the 1980s as well (Wiseman, Gray, Mosimann, & Ahrens, 1990). No equivalent data exists for the ideal male figure, although content analyses of television have suggested that far more female characters could be described as "thin" (69%) than could male characters (less than 18%; Silverstein, Perdue, Peterson, & Kelly, 1986).

This proliferation of thin female images has been blamed for rises in eating disorders and general body dissatisfaction in adult women; in one survey, the vast majority of American women wished they could be thinner (Thompson et al., 1999). But the desire for thinness is most problematic during adolescence, when the body is still growing. It is ironic that, at the age of 15, when crises of identity and anxieties about attractiveness are at their most acute, girls typically experience an increase in the distribution of fat around their hips and thighs, taking them further away from the contemporary cultural ideal (Dittmar et al., 2000). Consequently, low-fat dieting is an attractive option for teenage girls, a practice that is greatly encouraged by magazine advertising and feature articles (Andersen & Di-Domenico, 1992). In addition, teenage girls' magazines frequently convey information about slimming and binge eating, and other tactics used to counter the inevitable accumulation of body fat. Even where those articles may raise awareness of the dangers of these behaviours, they may inadvertently provide useful ideas for desperate readers.

Although it is generally agreed that by adulthood a healthy female should have 22% to 25% body fat, many celebrities and models have as little as 10% (Heilman, 1998). This does not stop them from being self-critical about their weight, however, and magazines often carry stories about celebrities' dissatisfaction with parts of their bodies. Indeed expensive cosmetic surgery among Hollywood actresses has become practically de rigueur at the start of the 21st century. If celebrities, with all their high-profile diets and beauty treatments, cannot find self-fulfillment through weight loss, then what chance does the ordinary teenager stand?

**Methods and Findings**

Research into media effects on body dissatisfaction and eating disorders shows a pattern similar to that on other topics. Laboratory studies are popular, in which participants are exposed to a series of slides of thin or neutral models and are then asked to rate their satisfaction with their own bodies. As with most laboratory studies of media effects, the results are mixed, partly because of the variety of different measures and participants used; Myers and Biocca (1992) failed to find any increase in negative body image, whereas Hamilton and Waller (1993) found that women with eating disorders overestimated their own body size after viewing thin models. Lavine, Sweeney, and Wagner (1999) discerned similar results for undergraduate women viewing advertisements in which women were portrayed as "sex

objects," suggesting that there may be factors other than body size that produce negative body image for media users.

In addition to the experimental research there are numerous studies using correlational designs that have also produced mixed results. Again, the variety of measures may be a contributing factor. When overall media use is recorded, typically in terms of total viewing time, there is usually little association with measures of body dissatisfaction, even among adolescent samples (e.g., Borzekowski, Robinson, & Killen, 2000). However, studies that have employed more specific measures of media use suggest that preferred content may be important. Harrison and Cantor (1997) found that magazine reading was the best predictor of body dissatisfaction among undergraduate women, whereas Tiggemann and Pickering (1996) noted that the best predictors for adolescent girls were magazine reading, soap opera viewing, and music video viewing. Borzekowski et al. (2000) also discerned a small effect for video viewing, which may reflect either higher instances of sexist portrayals in music videos or the fact that adolescent interest in music often acts as a springboard for a more general interest in fashion (Livingstone & Bovill, 1999).

**Theoretical Issues**

Two of the most important theoretical approaches that have been used to account for media effects on adolescent body dissatisfaction are social comparison theory (SCT) (Festinger, 1954) and identification. SCT occurs for media users when they compare themselves with images of people on screen or in the pages of print media. Heinberg and Thompson (1992) found that undergraduate females experienced greater body dissatisfaction in a laboratory study in which they were explicitly requested to compare themselves with thin celebrities. In a more general sense it could be argued that social comparisons are at their most problematic when there is a large discrepancy between the person's actual (or perceived) self and his or her ideal self, resulting in efforts being made to attempt to close the gap (Wood, 1989). It has been found that adolescent females begin to compare themselves with models in advertising by the age of 12 or 13 (Martin & Kennedy, 1993), the period when eating disorders are most likely to start appearing.

Given the disproportionate number of thin women on television and in magazines, constant comparison is likely to have an insidious effect. This is cultivation theory in action. However, as Botta (2000) argued, cultivation theory does not explain all media effects. The limited number of significant associations found between overall media use and body dissatisfaction have mostly been obtained in studies of White females, whereas studies of African American females have not established such an effect. Indeed, in general, African American women have much lower levels of body dissatisfaction, and less desire to be thin, despite being on average heavier than White women (Abrams, Allen, & Gray, 1993). Although in the past this might be attributed to differences in the body sizes of different ethnic groups in the media, Cusumano and Thompson (1997) noted a parallel increase in the number of very thin non-White models and actresses over time. Where body dissatisfaction does occur among African American women, it tends to affect those who identify most strongly with White culture (Makkar & Strube, 1995). This would seem to support SCT if not cultivation theory, with Black adolescents creating a wider gap by comparison with White images.

Wilcox and Laird (2000) attempted to explain the effect of SCT by looking at individual differences in response to idealized thin imagery. They found differences in the amount of body dissatisfaction between women who rely on personal cues to account for self-perception and those who use situational cues. Cues were elicited by asking participants to smile and then say how happy this made them feel, or

frown and say how angry this made them feel. Those who used personal cues (i.e., felt happiest when smiling) were more negatively affected by thin images; those who relied on situational cues (i.e., felt least happy when smiling) actually found that the thin images created more positive feelings about their own bodies. The authors maintained that this finding might explain the mixed results typically obtained in laboratory studies of media effects on body dissatisfaction. However, the methodology makes it hard to establish the extent to which self-perception is really a predictor of body image, except that it might involve a degree of emotional control that is important for dealing with external media influence (rather like self-monitoring, as discussed in chap. 7 in relation to advertising).

One of the problems with the studies relying on SCT is that they fail to consider the meanings that thin celebrities might hold for media users. Heilman's (1998) example of Kara the Kate Moss fan (discussed earlier in the chapter) shows how influential adolescents' selection of specific media figures may be in producing a desire for excessive thinness. Harrison (1997) measured undergraduate women's attraction toward celebrities of differing size, and found that an attraction toward thin celebrities predicted a number of eating disorder symptoms, including bulimia, anorexia, and general body dissatisfaction. However, the reverse effect was not found for heavier celebrities; the author suggested that many heavy television characters are generally less likeable and popular, older, and less stylish. Women who identify positively with thin characters seem to be those who are most influenced by their body shape.

One of the most difficult aspects of the media/body image association is that although studies continue to associate body dissatisfaction with various kinds of media use, there is no according decline in the popularity of those media. Indeed, the proliferation of dieting ads and thin celebrities seems to be reinforced by magazine sales, creating something of a two-way effect. Wilcox and Laird (2000) explained this in terms of individual differences—some readers are turned off (those who rely on personal cues), whereas others continue to support the media circus. However, their study lacks any information on participants' actual media use, so this hypothesis remains untested.

An alternative explanation is that adolescent females may not attribute their body dissatisfaction to the media at all, instead blaming their own biological make-up, their parents' genes, or specific instances of rejection or unrequited love. Thus they continue to read articles about thin celebrities, convinced that it is simply fate that prevents them from looking like those celebrities. However, there is a powerful current of opinion within the media as a whole that teenage magazines and, in particular, fashion models are responsible for the prominence of dieting fads and eating disorders. Nevertheless, even the belief that media effects are negative does not seem to dent the enthusiasm for such media among adolescents.

**Family Factors?**

Although there seems to be plenty of evidence supporting a media/body image link, the general consensus is that media play a supporting role among numerous other factors behind the rise in eating disorders. Chief among these is peer influence, which is usually cited as the most important factor. But what influences peer influence? Livingstone and Bovill (1999) found that 44% of 12- to 14-year-olds discuss magazine content with their friends. Much of that content involves fashion, appearance, dieting, and ultra-thin celebrities. Therefore, "peer influence" cannot be treated as entirely separate from media use. Also, some TV and video is watched with peers at this age, and thus joint consumption may need to be taken into account.

Another important factor in the media/body image debate is the interaction between family environment and media use. Studies of family influence on adolescent eating behaviour suggests that healthier diets are observed when families eat meals together, when parents and children have more positive relationships, and even when they shop together (de Bourdeauhuij & van Oost, 2000). As reported earlier, there is a growing trend for adolescents to spend much time alone in their private bedrooms, watching their own personal television sets, reading magazines, perhaps even surfing the Web, or just daydreaming about having an ideal body and attracting the most desirable partner. It is hard to control intake of fatty foods at the family meal table, where social forces operate to bind children into adult-oriented eating practices (Wiggins, Potter, & Wildsmith, 2001). When children eat alone, and are concerned by weight gain, they are much more likely to snack rather than eat full meals, and thus conceal their poor dietary intake from others.

**2.a. What has been the consequence of digital communications technologies on our personal space? Discuss its psychological implications. 15**

**Reference:**

**PERSONAL SPACE IN A DIGITAL AGE**

When a new technology is introduced, there will be contrasting predictions from proponents and opponents regarding its impacts on society. The negative response from those wedded to earlier technologies will be most apparent at the outset, before the bugs have been worked out of the innovation and displacements of people and activities occur. As the benefits of the new technology become evident and the early problems are resolved, oppositional tendencies diminish and a reasoned appraisal of overall costs and benefits becomes possible. There is a dystopian literature about the effects of computers on human relationships (e.g., Roszak, 1986; Stoll, 1995). There is a burgeoning literature on Internet addiction with symptoms checklists that enable people to judge if they are "hooked" or just casual users, along with online recovery groups (Young, 1998). "Technotherapists" offer counseling on methods for combating "technostress," citing ways in which people can limit the intrusion of cell phones, beepers, and remote e-mail into their lives (Weil & Rosen, 1998). Sprandel (1982) reported that "computer addicts" can lose touch with the real world, feel a loss of control, and feel dehumanized.

A survey of undergraduates found that they regard the computer as efficient and enjoyable but also desocializing (Kerber, 1983). College officials are concerned about the amount of time some students are spending on the Internet (DeLoughry, 1996). Others see it fostering solipsism (Levy, 1984) and reduced interest in the body and physical appearance (Travers, 2000). Virtual images can crowd out real-world interactions, distancing people from direct physical information about the world. In a detailed study of 73 households during their first years online, Kraut et al. (1998) found greater use of the Internet associated with a decline in participants' communication with family members in the household, a decrease in the size of their social circles, and increased feelings of loneliness. Some researchers report a change in modes of communication following interest in computers (Orcutt & Anderson, 1977), with heavy users becoming less social and less able to communicate effectively with other people and with reduced interest in interpreting nonverbal aspects of communication (Simons, 1985). In his book The Technological Society, Ellul (1964) maintains that new technology separates people from nature. Simons (1985) only half-jokingly suggests that computer documentation should include a warning from the U.S. Surgeon General: "Only to be set up near a window where you can

preferably see one tree" (p. 100). This proposal is consistent with research documenting the benefits of viewing nature (Ulrich, 1984).

On the opposite side of the argument, there are activists who see computer networks as tools for building community, overcoming alienation and anomie, and empowering the disenfranchised Agre & Schuler, 1997). There is a movement dedicated to socially responsible computing intent on building bridges between computer professionals and nontechnical people. The Berkeley Community Memory Project placed computer terminals in public locations in working-class neighborhoods (Farrington & Pine, 1997). The manager of an interactive online service compares himself to an innkeeper or resort manager, describing groups such as The Well or The Gate as villages, communities, and safe places (Coate, 1997). Kode is a wireless phone service, with connections to the Web and e-mail, oriented to teenagers worldwide.

This section considers the implications of a largely aspatial technology on human spatial interactions. People no longer need to live close to where they work or physically commute to work; they can telecommute and telework. They do not need to see or even know the people with whom they interact in an online group. They can physically be in one location, such as an airport or sidewalk corner, surrounded by people, and talk on a cell phone or send e-mail messages to someone else. In an online group, they find people with similar interests, drawing from a wider pool than exists in their own neighborhoods (Sproull & Faraj, 1995). Relative to face-to-face communication, online communication lacks cues from facial expressions, eye contact, body language, and interpersonal spacing. Some people change their personas online, especially if they can remain anonymous, becoming more assertive and willing to say what might cause an irrevocable rupture in face-to-face interaction. Physical appearance, age, and dress have less meaning in online interactions, but this may change as two-way viewing is integrated into computer technology. Although the video-telephone is not yet commercially successful, Kraut and Fish (1997) found that many customers appreciate its enhancement of the social aspects of communication. Heath and Luff (1993) provide an excellent discussion of interactional problems in existing video-mediated communication and how these are being resolved. Bolt (1984) believes that future computer interfaces will become even more like face-to-face conversations, responding directly to user gestures, movements, and gaze, as some virtual reality transmitting devices are able to do.

As with other design-related terms appropriated by computer users (e.g., rooms, architecture, portals, exits, habitats, and furniture), personal space possesses a metaphorical meaning in virtual space related to privacy and regulation of the intensity of interaction. It is important to remember that, at some point, this virtual world intersects with the real world. All messages are composed and read in real settings where the principles of environmental influence and interpersonal spacing still apply. Individuals interacting electronically may eventually meet face-to-face. The manager of an online group notes that members like to see each other socially, and the groups sponsor potlucks, parties, and other social events for members in which the virtual and real personas collide. A Senior Net book club reading Chaucer decides to meet in England for a tour and more-personal discussion. The face-to-face meeting will influence subsequent online communication (Coate, 1997). Because of the newness of the technology, most of these issues have not been addressed by researchers.

**CELL PHONES**

The cell phone has removed the requirement of a fixed location to receive messages. One can be in a public place with several other people each of whom is engaged in an independent conversation with others not present. Those nearby, unable to shut out the various cell phone conversations, feel as if

their space has been invaded. Some professionals use cell phones to communicate on a regular basis with clients at work or on vacation. The "office in the saddle" consists of a car, a briefcase, and a cell phone (Weigel, 1998). New technologies are linking the cell phone to the Internet in the form of a Wireless Web that is likely to encourage more, albeit weaker, interactions. Courts are currently adjudicating issues of cell phone privacy, considering whether this new mode of communication over public airwaves carries an expectation of privacy and whether intercepted conversations (a type of invasion and capture) can be made public by others.

There is little or no published research on how cell phones affect human spacing. It would be feasible to conduct both field and simulation studies on this issue. A desire for increased personal space may be one of the motivations for using a cell phone in a public place. Observations can be made in public locations at times of low density to see how close people sit in relation to those engaged in cell phone conversations. Simulations can be conducted on preferred conversational distance from someone holding a cell phone, with the control condition involving an object of similar size and shape. Informal invasions I have conducted in public locations suggest that sitting close to people talking on cell phones increases signs of discomfort, reduces conversational length, and hastens departure.

**THE INTERNET**

With digital media, a distinction must be made between surfing the Web, which is interaction with media rather than specific individuals, and conversation through e-mail and chat rooms, which are conversations with individuals who happen not to be physically present. Surfing the Web is a virtual rather than real encounter with other people, although it can be used to find people's location and thereby lay the basis for subsequent physical or e-mail contact. In contrast, e-mail can be a real, although aspatial and asynchronous, interaction with another person. There are many testimonials to the closeness e-mail brings to physically distant family members, friends, and colleagues. For the homebound and their caregivers, the Internet offers the possibility of virtual encounters with family, friends, support groups, and work sites. This has produced an explosion of interest in computers among older adults in the United States. Many senior centers and retirement homes offer computer instruction, access to computers and peripherals, and provide electronic lists of health-related support groups and Web sites. A senior with Parkinson's or diabetes is no longer isolated and dependent on infrequent medical appointments for information and advice. Virtual encounters leap over distances between distant family members. There is no evidence that they replace actual encounters between people who would rarely see one another under any circumstances. Common sense would suggest the reverse; that virtual encounters between distant individuals will increase the likelihood of spatial contact at some future time.

On the debit side, there are reports of individuals in the same office or household leaving messages for one another on e-mail rather than having a face-to-face conversation. Electronic mail can discourage telephone calls that provide real-time contact with additional voice cues available for interpretation. It also facilitates telecommuting that reduces face-to-face contact among office workers (Simons, 1985). The Web is a spatial in that the participants' locations are irrelevant, but it "houses" spatial environments, or at least environments that resemble and act like spatial environments. The Palace is a client/server program that is the subject of an online case study (Suler, 2000). It is a visual, spatial, and auditory environment whose most heavily populated site is "the main mansion," which consists of approximately 30 rooms through which visitors can move freely and converse with one another. They can secretly communicate even if others are "present" in the room using a technique called "whispering" or communicate with distant people using a Palace version of ESP. One moves from room

to room by clicking on an icon. Visual space can be transcended by passing through walls or through the ceiling. The laws of gravity and physics do not apply in hyperspace. Yet the palace remains both a visual and a spatial environment, an indication of the interactive multimedia environments that can be created and used for graphical multiuser konversations (GMUKs).

Internet technology is developing so rapidly that it is too early to gauge its effects on the amount and quality of social interaction. Now is the time to collect the naturalistic baseline data. How many people do we interact with each day and for how long, and what is the content of these interactions? The logistics, expense, and privacy implications of data collection make this a daunting task, probably not practicable on a large scale, although Kraut et al. (1998) came close to this detail in a study of 73 households in a single city. Research has not addressed context effects on Internet use. Important questions of workplace quality lie at the heart of this issue. Does it matter that messages are sent or received in a bare cramped cubicle or in a well-lit spacious, attractively furnished office? To what degree are the flat keyboard and flickering screen of a TV monitor the only significant realities for the office worker? These questions can be answered experimentally by comparing messages composed in different types of settings. Following Maslow and Mintz (1956), one would predict shorter messages in an ugly setting along with subtle content differences. Do previous virtual encounters with another person reduce the distance between them in subsequent face-to-face interaction? An affirmative prediction can be made following the well-documented finding that friends converse at smaller distances than do strangers. How are message senders and receivers affected by the proximity of other people, including those who sit or stand too close for comfort? Will messages typed by those whose space has been invaded show signs of discomfort and tension, not only in behavior but also in message content and length, including fewer positive and more negative terms and more typing errors? My prediction is that typing on a keyboard, like reading, is a silent, self-absorbed activity that would be only minimally affected by the close presence of other people. The absorption in the virtual encounter would protect the individual against the effects of a spatial invasion. It is hypothesized that an airport traveler typing on a laptop will be less likely to show discomfort or move in the event of a spatial invasion than a person without a laptop and that reading would have the same protective effects as the laptop in a public environment by providing a psychological escape from unwanted social proximity.

**INVASIONS OF CYBERSPACE**

In an aspatial technology, there can be aspatial invasions. Hackers are cyberspace invaders who attack not only corporate and government security but also personal-computer files and sometimes take personal identities. There are also serious concerns about the protection of e-mail messages that can be read and stored by operators at both ends of a system. Most system operators have the right to read messages, and government agencies can intercept and read them. In 1986 the United States Congress passed the Electronics Communication Privacy Act to address some of these issues.

Domain names are territorial markers in cyberspace. It takes only a small fee to buy a domain name and hold it for two years. The U.S. Congress passed the Cybersquatter Act to prevent a person appropriating domain names that steal the identity of another person or company. There is also legislative concern with computer viruses inserted to deliberately overload a system and " invade" a computer network. Recipients of some of the most notorious viruses, such as the 2000 "I love you" message that originated in the Philippines, felt overloaded (I personally considered it humorous to receive multiple "I love you" messages from highly placed university administrators), whereas individuals whose computers were taken over by the virus and who became the inadvertent source of further messages felt personally affronted. Is Milgram's (1970) list of responses to potential stimulus

overload among city residents applicable to digital overload? Little research has been done about the psychological consequences of these and other cyberspace intrusions that are virtual in their electronic format but very real in terms of costs and consequences.

**OVERVIEW AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS**

Problems of definition continue to trouble those who review research studies on personal space. This seems less of a problem for researchers who employ operational definitions. My own view is that personal space should be reserved for the emotionally charged zone around the individual's body. Analogies to a soap bubble or snail shell can be misleading since the shape of this zone is more like an hourglass than a circle, with longer distances in front and rear than at the sides. The term personal space seems particularly suited for interpreting the results of simulated invasions, especially when the approach is arbitrary and unnatural, such as a side or rear invasion with the subject facing ahead. It is difficult to call the chosen distance in these cases "interaction space" since the unusual arrangement was not selected by the actors.

A different term is required for the space between two or more interacting people, what Goffman (1971) labeled interactional space. I would be content to use Hall's zone system or Lewin's field terminology, although I prefer a parsimonious term like interaction distance. Clearly this concept has wider applicability than personal space, especially in social psychology, which is concerned with group interaction. My recommendation is as follows: When the measurement involves the space surrounding a single individual's body, the use of personal space seems appropriate. This preserves an index term in psychological data bases with an extensive background literature. When the measurement involves the space between two or more interacting individuals, then interaction distance should be used. With this nomenclature, personal space is a mental construction, similar to body image in its subjectivity and individual centeredness. In contrast, interaction distance is an objective concept, measured in terms of distances between two or more people.

The lack of functional theories attempting to explain why people maintain distance from others (or why people seek privacy, comfort, reduced arousal, or equilibrium, to cite several of the current social-psychological theories) has hindered consilience in keeping separate the research with humans from the larger body of work on animal spatial behavior. There need to be more studies of spacing among acquainted and related individuals. Research on spacing of strangers has applied value in an increasingly urban world, whereas research on familiars will provide theoretically useful information about species-typical behaviors. Hopefully the framework presented in Table 40.2 will have some heuristic value. Comparing preferred interaction distances between pre- and post-pubertal siblings and between them and same- and opposite-sex parents will test certain aspects of Wilson's consilience model. There is a developing literature r elating interaction distance to attitude toward touching. The taboos surrounding haptic research in which people touch one another at the experimenter's direction suggest another interesting, albeit difficult and risky, test of consilience in this area.

There is a developing research literature on interpersonal spacing in human services fields such as nursing, psychotherapy, social work, and family counseling. Much of this research is found in dissertations and unpublished presentations. There is also a proliferation of how-to books describing appropriate spacing in various interpersonal encounters. Some of this is directed to protection from lawsuits, but other books deliberately recommend the aggressive appropriation of space in areas of sales, management, and dating as a form of impression management. There continues to be a flourishing cross-cultural literature stimulated by Hall's proxemic theory.

Is has been interesting to observe personal space enter the popular culture. Airlines advertise more of it in their seating, homeless shelter residents complain that they have too little of it, and corporate training manuals warn employees to respect each other's personal space. Whether this usage is good or bad for research and theory building in this area is debatable. What is clear is that the concepts of personal space and interaction distance have lasted four decades and show no signs of disappearing even in a digital age when communication is increasingly aspatial. The verdict is still out as to whether the Internet is a technology like the telephone that increases social participation (Fischer, 1992) or is more like television in reducing it (Brody, 1990). Probably the answer will be that under some circumstances, the Internet can enhance interaction and, in other cases, it will reduce it, and an overall conclusion independent of context is of little value.

**2.b. Borderlines share characteristics with other personality disorders. List these other disorders and explain the distinction between each and the borderline. 15**

**Reference:**

**CONTRAST WITH RELATED PERSONALITIES**

Given its history, it is not surprising that the DSM borderline overlaps a variety of other personality disorders. The first diagnostic criterion, frantic efforts to avoid abandonment, resonates with the dependent and histrionic personalities. The dependent desperately needs an instrumental surrogate, without which feelings of panic quickly rise to the surface. Histrionics need an instrumental surrogate as well, but they also need to feel physically attractive, to be the center of attention, and to believe that they themselves are idealized by their companions. Abandonment is thus double jeopardy for histrionics, being both a separation and a commentary on the insufficiency of their attractive power. The avoidant could be included here because avoidants need a mate who is willing to face a world where they feel shamed, defective, and incapable.

As to the second diagnostic criterion, dependents, histrionics, narcissistics, and negativists are particularly prone to idealize romantic encounters, and narcissists are particularly likely to devalue those who are no longer admiring, who withhold "narcissistic supplies" for any reason. The dependent and histrionic are likely to have a poorly developed sense of self, and the histrionic, narcissistic, and negativistic personalities are beset with a highly unstable sense of self, the third borderline criterion. Narcissistic, histrionic, and negativistic personalities are particularly prone as well to emotional extremes, including anger. More pathological narcissistic and histrionic personalities are also likely to experience chronic feelings of emptiness. Finally, borderline, schizotypal, and paranoid personalities exhibit paranoid fears, and borderline and histrionic personalities are prone to dissociative episodes. The highest overlap may be with the DSM-III-R self-defeating personality (Gunderson, Zanarini, & Kisiel, 1995), perhaps because their interpersonal chaos and self-destructive behavior certainly have the quality of setting borderlines up for painful experiences and failure.

However, contrasts can also be created with many of these same constructs. The regressive thought disorder of the borderline often resembles the schizotypal personality, but the borderline is famous for its unstable mood and its association with depression; the schizotypal is not. Moreover, the borderline disorganizes in connection with interpersonal themes, whereas schizotypal thought may seem eccentric about almost anything. Transient psychotic episodes in the borderline are thus more reactive to the character of external events. Both borderlines and histrionics are emotionally labile and attention

seeking. Both may sexualize their relationships, but the borderline more easily gives way to anger and more readily experiences feelings of emptiness and loneliness, which is typically repressed in the histrionic. Both borderline and paranoid personalities exhibit paranoid fears, but the paranoid makes a rigid impression and wants to be left alone. In contrast, the borderline seems labile and fluid and fears being left alone. Moreover, borderlines are often overtly self-destructive and sometimes self-accusing, whereas the paranoid accuses others. Both borderlines and anti-socials can be impulsive in self-damaging ways. However, anti-socials typically lack remorse for their actions and pursue impulsive gratification as an end in itself. In contrast, impulsivity in the borderline personality is more often used to assuage feelings of emptiness and worthlessness. Finally, both borderlines and dependents fear abandonment. However, dependents react to threats of separation by becoming more submissive and pleasing, whereas the borderline reacts with angry demands intended to coerce nurturance.

**PATHWAYS TO SYMPTOM EXPRESSION**

Each personality disorder exhibits a pattern of Axis I vulnerabilities that grows out of the logic of the construct itself. Because the DSM borderline personality has been defined by symptoms as much as by traits, much of its relationship with Axis I has already been implicitly discussed. Because borderlines both habitually distort the meaning of interpersonal events and regularly plunge their relationships into chaos and discord, borderlines often live with ongoing, diffuse anxiety. The perception of loss of support or abandonment sometimes leads to episodes of panic, perhaps accompanied by dissociative symptoms or paranoid ideation. When borderlines can reassure themselves that their attachments are somewhat secured, their symptoms are likely to abate. Dissociative symptoms may be especially prominent in females with a severe abuse history (Galletly, 1997). As you read the following sections, try to identify the connection between personality and symptom.

**Depression**

Depression and the borderline personality are so strongly associated that many see depression as more than just a lifestyle consequence, arguing instead that borderlines possess a biophysical disposition to depressive episodes, putting the disorder on the affective spectrum (Akiskal, 1981). Whatever the merit of this hypothesis, borderlines often present with a composite of depression, irritability, and hostility, accompanied by a variety of physical complaints. Moreover, they experience a crushingly low self-esteem, intensified by a pervasive sense of the self as bad and worthless, along with global feelings of inefficacy and helplessness. Intense guilt and self-condemnation may be felt at having driven others out of their lives, usually after efforts to control others with hostility. In a pathological attempt to secure shaken relationships, self-mutilation may be used as a means of appeasing vicious introjects (Benjamin, 1996), though it is also apparently used as an antidote to impending dissociation, a means of proving that "something is real."

**Other Disorders**

Other Axis I disorders may accompany the borderline personality. Individuals with prominent dependent and histrionic traits are especially likely to exhibit somatic symptoms. These establish an objective claim to long wished-for nurturance, thus bonding caretakers more closely to the borderline while reducing threats of abandonment and demands for competent performance. The chaotic families of borderlines often provide models for substance abuse (Feldman, Zelkowitz, Weiss, & Vogel, 1995), and parental substance abuse is a risk factor for the development of borderline pathology in children (Guzder et al., 1996). Any number of substances may be used recreationally with peers or as a means of self-

medication in the face of persistent anxiety or depression. Abuse becomes more likely for individuals who carry antisocial traits. Moreover, the presence of substance abuse predicts a higher level of borderline pathology, increased self-destructive and suicidal thoughts and behavior, and poorer clinical course (Links, Heslegrave, Mitton, & van Reekum, 1995). Finally, borderline personality disorder is often diagnosed in subjects with eating disorders (Kernberg, 1995; Steiger, Jabalpurwala, & Champagne, 1996), linked to specific features of family dysfunction (Waller, 1994), and found to predict weight preoccupation (Claridge, Davis, Bellhouse, & Kaptein, 1998).

**2.c. Elucidate the role of psychology in creating persuasive appeal through advertising. In your opinion, what are the cognitive and behavioral effects of advertising? 20**

**Reference:**

Psychology and advertising have grown hand in hand across the last century, but although there is a clear "psychology of advertising" you are unlikely to find much reference to it in mainstream psychology textbooks. As with other aspects of media, the general consensus seems to be that psychology will only address the issue of advertising when it becomes too much of a problem to ignore, as in the case of advertising aimed at children. However, academic psychology owes some of its history to the interests of advertisers; the topic of persuasion, for a start, only entered into psychological discourse during the 1920s following the needs of marketing (Danziger, 1997). It has since spawned a vast theoretical literature in social psychology.

At the start of the 20th century, early advertisers were quick to seize on the scientific credibility of psychology, and psychological ideas manifested themselves in many early ads. Perhaps the most obvious use of psychology can be seen in propaganda advertising, notably war recruitment posters. In the United Kingdom and United States, conscription was advertised using a figure (Lord Kitchener and Uncle Sam, respectively) pointing at the viewers of the poster and addressing them directly ("Your country needs YOU!"/ "I want YOU for U.S. army"). In these, the principal tactic of persuasion is direct eye gaze, along with the finger point, creating in the viewers an illusion that the figure in the poster is making contact with them. There is little doubt that such images make an explicit appeal to the individual viewer, and it is hard to imagine a similar campaign working today (imagine the U.K. prime minister or U.S. president in such a pose!). It is not surprising that advertisers quickly realized the importance of developing more subtle methods of persuasion. Freudian theory and studies of subconscious awareness in general gave advertisers an excellent opportunity to sneak their appeals in through the psychological backdoor. An early example of an ad that used associationism along with guilt creation as its persuasive tactics is the famous World War I recruitment poster whose text reads "Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War?" In the picture, the father sits in his armchair staring sadly into the distance while his son plays soldiers on the floor and his daughter, to whom we attribute the question, sits on his knee. In this ad, the viewer is invited to identify with the father as a feared "possible self" (Markus & Nurius, 1986). These tactics are still in frequent use, particularly in the field of health promotion.

As early as 1908, a distinct "psychology of advertising" had begun to emerge in the United States, with a series of books by Walter Dill Scott and other authors. Visual perception, memory, comprehension, and credibility were among the topics studied, and psychological tactics became increasingly attractive to advertisers during the depression of the 1930s (Maloney, 1994). The earliest academic research on advertising studied either the effectiveness of advertising from the marketing perspective (i.e., how to bolster the impact of ads), or the impact of advertising on the general public. The latter was closely bound up with research into the effects of propaganda. Many early studies of the psychology of radio

(e.g., Cantril & Allport, 1935) were concerned that the medium would be abused for political ends, and in some respects they may have been right—the continuous barrage of advertising for luxury goods ever since could well be regarded as propaganda for the glories of capitalism.

After World War II, as advertising developed a science of its own, its link with academic psychology became increasingly remote. Advertising agencies recruited their own research teams, importing scientific methodology and creating their own scientific jargon. For example, the term brand image, which has crept into the popular consciousness, was first coined in a 1955 paper by Gardner and Levy. This concept marked a growing awareness that the study of advertising should not be confined to the short-term effects of buying behaviour but on longer-term effects of impression building, and the elements of ads that shape it. Although advertising research teams have often been held back from advancing academic research by the short-term demands of their clients (e.g., stifling data that fail to show their products in the best light), the expansion of marketing and business science has allowed research to flourish. Today, academic journals such as the Journal of Advertising and the Journal of Advertising Research carry scientific papers on all aspects of the discipline, although they are aimed more at the business analyst than at the psychologist.

**COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIOURAL EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING**

Academic research into the effects of advertising tends to fall into two groups of effects produced by ads: perceptual effects, such as low camera angles to make the speaker seem authoritative (a tactic now abandoned by political advertisers); and attitudinal effects, which examine the short- and long-term impact of an ad on the consumer's impression of the brand and product. More generally, research has focused on the effectiveness of ads in shaping consumer behaviour. This is a somewhat different approach to media effects from the research discussed so far in this section of the book, largely because the research is driven more by the interests of businesses than by the interests of the state. Compared to research on sex and violence in the media, most research on advertising rarely queries the cumulative effects of continuously viewing ads on human behaviour (although see Comstock & Scharrer, 1999; Condry, 1989).

**Perceptual Effects**

Most of the research on perceptual effects of advertising have drawn on the information-processing approach of the 1950s that tended to view memory and attention as discrete cognitive processes, leading to something of a debate about their relative importance (Olshavsky, 1994). Condry (1989) argued that attention is the key issue for television advertising, because it is in the sponsors' best interests that viewers are glued to the screen so that they will not miss the advertisers' messages. Although this may seem an obvious point, the nature of attention is complex, and there are more subtle factors mediating between attentional processes and the effectiveness of advertising. McGuire (1985) attempted to create a model of advertising effectiveness that explains this process in terms of a hierarchy of cognitive effects.

This is a classic information-processing model presenting cognition as a linear process, with early attention essential for later processing. The "message" is unambiguous—nowhere is "interpretation" included in the process, so it appears to be a simple case of absorbing and understanding a clear statement about the world.

The idea that advertising may work at a level below full consciousness has long been a feature of mainstream psychology itself. Most psychology graduates will have encountered the concept of subliminal advertising, perhaps in relation to the study of iconic memory (Sperling, 1960). Iconic memory is the term given to the storage of a fleeting visual stimulus, typically a grid of nine letters presented on a screen for a brief period (50 milliseconds or so). Experimental research has suggested that our retention of such displays is better than we realize; when asked to recall a specific line from the display at random, we are able to recall more than we consciously perceive. These findings would seem to support the belief, still widely held in the business world, that advertising messages can be injected into the memory through exposing audiences to brief snatches of persuasive text in the middle of television or cinema programming. Most authors trace the origins of subliminal advertising to a 1950s study by advertising expert James Vicary (reported in Life magazine) in which he claimed to have flashed the messages "eat popcorn" and "drink Coca-Cola" onto a cinema screen for 1/3000th of a second every 5 seconds during film showings. Over 6 weeks this led, it was claimed, to an 18% increase in sales of popcorn and over 50% increase in sales of Coke at that particular cinema. As a result of this report, the American government outlawed the practice of subliminal messages in advertising, and the ban has remained in place ever since. However, there has never been any evidence that the original study actually took place as reported, and there certainly has been no confirmation of the findings (Condry, 1989).

Despite the lack of scientific evidence, the concept of subliminal advertising has stuck within modern culture. Four books by the author W.B. Key in the 1970s and 1980s castigated the advertising industry for using such underhand techniques, involving much covert sexual imagery in shadows and reflections (Key, 1989). Evidence for the effectiveness of such imagery is decidedly mixed (Messaris, 1997).2 The willingness of the public to accept the myth about subliminal advertising may simply be an effect of general suspicion and distrust surrounding advertising (and media in general). However, there is evidence that subliminal-type effects may occur with material that is not directly perceived by viewers. Eagle, Wolitzky, and Klein (1966) carried out a study in which some participants were exposed to slides, one of which had the outline of a duck embedded in a tree trunk. When asked subse quently to list the animals pictured in the slides, no participants listed ducks.

However, when asked to write a story about a farmyard, a significant number of participants in the "duck" condition introduced ducks into their stories. More recently, tightly controlled laboratory studies using brief presentation of hidden (masked) words have allowed researchers to demonstrate unconscious activation of semantic processing (Draine & Greenwald, 1998). These results suggest that, if subliminal advertising is capable of influencing consumer behaviour, it is probably through the process of cognitive priming (see chap. 4 for a discussion of priming as a possible explanation of media violence effects). But this has not held back a brisk trade in audiotapes promising "subliminal learning," in which listeners can hear nothing but music or "nature noise" (waves breaking, birdsong, etc.). The manufacturers claim that just by listening to such tapes one can pick up unconscious information, sometimes while asleep, and use this information to master a new language, enhance memory ability, lose weight, quit smoking, boost self-esteem, or even reduce anxiety.

Needless to say, there is scant scientific evidence for anything other than placebo effects for such techniques, although in the case of psychological issues, such as self-esteem, one might argue that placebo effects are sufficient by themselves. Greenwald, Spangenberg, Pratkanis, and Eskenazi (1991) tested the claims of memory and self-esteem enhancement tapes in a double-blind experiment in which participants were unaware of the nature of the material on the tape (half were given memory-enhancing material and half self-esteem material). The manufacturers' claims were not supported by

the results. Memory scores were not improved after several weeks of listening to memory material, nor did self-esteem material significantly increase self-esteem scores. Nevertheless, participants who thought they were listening to self-esteem material believed themselves to have increased in self-esteem (and the same effect occurred for memory participants).

Subliminal advertising is a contentious area, although it seems certain that some of the success of advertising must, given the third-person effect, be attributed to unconscious processing. We can do little about our memory for advertising jingles and slogans, which is usually a function of simple exposure (Condry, 1989). If we hear a jingle enough times on television or radio it will inevitably seep into our unconscious through the reactivation of neuronal firing patterns. Furthermore, our exposure to ads is rarely governed by conscious, deliberate attention. This was demonstrated in a study by Bogart and Tolley (1988), who measured the behaviour and brain activity of 10 women as they read a newspaper. Ads were glimpsed only by accident; only a fraction of them were remembered, and then only if salient for the individual reader. Furthermore, processing of ads was unconnected to reading of the paper's editorial content.

Television and cinema advertising have been hugely successful because the ads have a captive audience, particularly in the cinema. Television audiences have rather more options open to them: According to one study, 80% of viewers are likely to leave the room during commercial breaks, and most people watching prerecorded material on video will fast-forward through them (Comstock & Scharrer, 1999). The increasing sophistication of television advertising over the years reflects the need to compete with programming for entertainment value. Nevertheless, research in this area suggests that program genre has a strong effect on cognitive processing of commercials. Both violent and humorous programs have been linked with low recall of advertising material (Bushman, 1998; Furnham, Gunter, & Walsh, 1998). In both cases it seems that emotional response blunts the degree of attention that viewers can pay to advertising, although Bushman only measured self-reported anger (overlooking the possibility that viewers might actually take pleasure from watching violent material!). The latest challenge for advertisers is how to maximize the effectiveness of advertising over the Internet. Nearly $1 billion was spent on online advertising in 1997—a threefold increase since 1995—and yet the lack of standardized measures of online advertising effectiveness means that this outlay is something of a gamble (Drèze & Zufryden, 1999). One problem is how to identify unique site visitors, because most programs only record the number of times a page is accessed, not who accesses it; whether that visitor has actually read the ad is even more doubtful. Nevertheless, businesses continue to shell out for Internet advertising because it is relatively cheap and can allow the provision of detailed product information (Leong, Huang, & Stanners, 1998).

From a cognitive perspective, Internet advertising is never likely to be as effective as cinema and television advertising because of the user control over the medium. Interactive advertising (in which the user can dismiss the ad at the click of a button) cannot use many of the persuasive tactics of traditional advertising—ads interrupt shows or films and have time to develop storylines and characters, or they sit on a page, slowly sinking into the subconscious while the reader peruses the story alongside. If the Internet has more value as an information medium rather than as an entertainment medium, advertising may eventually return to the hard-sell, product-oriented approach, away from the soft-sell, image-conscious trend of the late 20th century.

**Attitudinal Effects**

Theories of subliminal advertising work on the assumption that attention and perception are sufficient motivation for consumers to buy products, as though shopping is an activity conducted by solitary individuals in a state of trance. Most consumer decisions, however, are made on a largely rational basis, and many take place in a social context. In the history of advertising, advertisers soon felt the need to look beyond perception and memory toward socially oriented behaviour, particularly the study of consumer attitudes. Attitude research has a long history in psychology, based largely on the use of psychometric instruments such as the Likert scale (for which respondents are asked to agree or disagree with a series of statements by selecting a point on a continuum). This kind of research methodology has proved useful to advertisers in providing information about public impressions of products and brands. Increasingly, the "effectiveness" of an ad is measured by whether consumers like the product on offer and the advertisement itself, rather than whether the ad has actually inspired them to purchase the product. Instead of studying perceptual effects of ads, there has been increased interest in their emotional appeals, and the use of music and humor as effective devices. Although the incidence of these is lower than commonly imagined,3 there is some experimental evidence suggesting that music can enhance the popularity of an advertisement and its product (Middlestadt, Fishbein, & Chan, 1994).

One of the most heavily researched areas in the psychology of persuasion concerns the degree of personal involvement with the issue or product concerned, a term first coined by Herbert Krugman (1965). Petty and Cacioppo (1981) developed this idea in their Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion, in which they argued that if consumers are highly involved with a product (e.g., it means a lot to them, such as a car), they will devote more thought ("elaboration") to the message contained in the advertisement. Johnson and Eagly (1989) attempted to distinguish between value-relevant involvement (where the involvement concerns deep-rooted values and beliefs) and outcome-relevant involvement (concerning more immediate concerns, like passing a college exam). However, their distinction seems to be determined by the stimuli used in the literature, which in "value-relevant" studies tended to concern actual political and social issues rather than artificial scenarios. Petty and Cacioppo (1990) argued that the degree of involvement is likely to vary among individual consumers rather than among the products or issues themselves.

The focus on the role of advertising in self-concept and identity construction has shifted the emphasis in advertising away from product-oriented ads toward consumer-oriented ads, with a corresponding shift from perceptual features of ads toward discursive and narrative features. According to Comstock and Scharrer (1999), only 40% of televised ads are accompanied by music, and only 10% of ads contain humour. (sometimes characterised as the distinction between "hard sell" and "soft sell"). The effect of this contrast on the individual consumer was examined in a study by Snyder and de Bono (1985). They found that the hard sell and soft sell approaches had different effects on different people. Consumers who scored highly on a test of "self-monitoring"—in other words, those who are socially more self-conscious, and likely to adapt their behaviour according to the situation—had more favorable attitudes toward soft-sell ads. This happens, the authors maintained, because such consumers are more image conscious and thus respond better to advertising eliciting moods and associations rather than to hard-sell advertising with more factual information about a product. Low self-monitors, on the other hand, prefer hard-sell ads that describe the benefits of the product; such consumers take a more pragmatic approach to life, and are less concerned with image.

This study demonstrates how different groups of consumers respond differently to the same ads, even though the difference between the groups was simply their scores on a psychometric test. When we compare real social groups such as those differentiated on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or age, we find equally important differences in response to advertising. For some time, businesses have based their

marketing strategies around consumer profiles—it is standard practice to select the target audience on the basis of demographic characteristics before deciding what sort of ad to commission. In advertising, such profiling is known as psychographics—a picture is built up of the typical consumer, and the ad is designed to appeal to his or her assumed personality characteristics (Condry, 1989).

This means that all kinds of assumptions are poured into advertising—about the best way to appeal to men rather than women, older rather than younger adults, or different ethnic groups. As Jhally (1990) asserted, advertising is less about how people are acting than about how they are dreaming:

It reflects the aspirations of the consumer rather than his or her current situation. This is sometimes expressed as the difference between one's current sense of self and an "ideal self," which is one of a number of "possible selves" that a person might generate at any given time (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Therefore, an ad for life insurance aimed at married couples might invite viewers to identify with a happily married couple in a comfortable and stylish home, surrounded by attractive children, a contented family pet, and so on. This situation represents the ideal future selves of the people who are most likely to take out a substantial insurance premium. The World War I conscription ad with the slogan "What did YOU do in the Great War, Daddy?" represents the negative future self of the guilt-ridden conscientious objector, an equally powerful persuasive tactic.

Appealing to consumers' sense of self requires a good deal of speculation, perhaps drawing on psychodynamic theories of selfhood and fantasy, but there is evidence to suggest that the role of consumer goods in modern life is more central to our psychological life than is sometimes assumed in psychology. In one remarkable study, 248 American adults were asked to grade items on a continuum from "self" to "not self": Male respondents ranked cars higher than their own bodily organs and their religion in relation to "self" (Cook, 1992). The salience of such items for the way we construct our identity (and, perhaps, our psychological well-being) cannot be overestimated.

Like cognitive/perceptual approaches to advertising, attitudinal studies of advertising can only speculate about its effectiveness. Rather than measuring participants' memory for commercials, or awareness of specific features, attitudinal studies rely on measures of liking for ads, liking for products, how much money participants might be willing to spend on the advertised product, or how likely they think the ad might affect their consumer behaviour. All these measures are indirectly related to actual consumer behaviour. Indeed, even the sales response to a specific advertising campaign tells us little about the behaviour of the individual consumer. It might be possible to study this through ethnographic research (observing buying behaviour over a period of time), or perhaps through a diary study in which the respondent lists all the programs he or she watches, newspapers and magazines he or she reads, and every product he or she buys over a period. Such studies would be cumbersome and subject to inaccuracies, but they might tell us more about the psychological effects of advertising in real-world settings.

**RHETORICAL EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING**

A third approach to research on the effects of advertising is to ignore the consumer altogether and focus on the way advertising is created, particularly the use of rhetoric. Such research is frequently regarded as non-psychological because it does not involve real participants. In the long run, this is a fair comment, because it makes little sense to discuss the effects of an ad without actually examining those effects on consumers. Media scholars have begun to appreciate this point and are increasingly taking an ethnographic approach to studying audiences (Ruddock, 2001). Nevertheless, we need to understand

the materials before we can examine their effects. One of the biggest flaws in the psychological study of advertising is the use of artificial stimuli (often quite unlike real advertising) and of findings obtained using these stimuli to generate theories about real-life behaviour.

Early advertising relied on a very simple strategy of persuading the consumer: It provided information about the product in simple language. Figure 7.1 contains an advertisement from a 19th century magazine for a "revolving refrigerator" (an ingenious piece of 19th-century technology from the days before dry ice and CFCs). There is a picture of this fascinating product and a lengthy description of its attributes. Such a useful, and undoubtedly expensive, product required very little soft sell. Indeed, were it 4The price of this item is conspicuous by its absence, heralding a rhetorical strategy that has been used ever since! By contrast, the "pain paint" ad in Fig. 7.3 contains far more pricing information than a reader would possibly need, in keeping with many 19th-century ads that were often little more than long lists of prices. not for the manufacturers' details, this copy could have passed for a short feature article. Contrast that ad with another from the same period, for an equally exotic product known as Wolcott's "pain paint" (Fig. 7.2). This has AD stamped all over it, opening (like many ads of the time) with a piece of blank verse, followed by prose, slowly building a consumer "need." The product itself is introduced midway through the verse without elaboration, and a full description is delayed by a series of barbs aimed at rival products until the reader is practically begging for information.

Medical advertising has always been something of a conundrum. On the one hand, the public are invited to trust their doctors and the findings of medical science, yet drug companies and other manufacturers need to push their wares too, especially those for minor ailments that do not require sufferers to contact their physicians. Thus, cures for headaches, colds, and indigestion still proliferate on commercial television. These ads usually feature appeals to science, and phrases such as "clinically proven to . . ." and "tests show that . . ." are employed along with other signifiers such as white lab coats and test tubes. Increasingly, ads for consumer goods such as certain foods, toothpaste, and washing powder also draw on the discourse and imagery of science.

Outright deceit in advertising has long been regulated by the state; in the United Kingdom the Trades Descriptions Act was passed by the British government in 1968. One way for advertisers to avoid legal action is to issue disclaimers, usually as unobtrusively as possible. Indeed, many television commercials contain little text other than a disclaimer. This usually takes the form of small print at the bottom of the screen toward the end of the ad, such as "Can only aid slimming as part of a calorie-controlled diet" or "Offers apply only to. . . ." The fact that the product does not by itself deliver the promises it claims or seems to claim is rendered irrelevant when the information appears, by which time the rhetorical force of the ad has done its work. This is particularly true for ads targeted toward children, who may not notice or even understand the disclaimer; according to Harris (1999) this applies to 36% of children's ads.

Much of the research on advertising rhetoric has restricted itself to the analysis of verbal appeals to consumers. However, ads differ tremendously in the amount of verbal information they contain: A magazine ad will contain more text than a television ad; a billboard on a railway station or in a train will contain more text than a billboard by a roadside, simply because of the time most viewers have to read it. Increasingly, advertisers work in a visual domain, and so studies of rhetoric have had to examine the manipulation of nonverbal information. Naturally, this is harder to determine, because visual rhetoric is more reliant on analysts' interpretative skills.

In the 1960s, French theorist Jacques Durand was one of the first authorities to carry out a systematic study of visual rhetoric in advertising. He identified four types of rhetorical figure that might be present in an ad: figures of addition, suppression, substitution, and exchange (Dyer, 1982). An example of addition might be using several pictures of the same product to create different effects; an example of suppression is a missing element, such as the product itself; a figure of substitution is likely to involve a metaphor or visual pun; whereas a figure of exchange is often an ironic juxtaposition or paradox. Durand argued that almost all these figures (22 in total) could be used to describe the rhetorical effect of an ad, and that this demonstrated a lack of creativity involved in advertising, although this argument may only be relevant to ads in the historical period in which his typology was put together.

**Product Endorsement**

Advertising rhetoric can only be taken so far before consumer cynicism sets in. Although appeals to the authority of science can persuade a reader that a particular cold remedy or even a brand of toothpaste is worth buying, many products require a little extra recommendation. Most of us might buy a product on the recommendation of a friend, and advertisers have increasingly drawn on ready-made friendships to promote their goods: "parasocial" relationships between the public and well-known celebrities (Alperstein, 1991; Giles, 2002b)

The use of celebrities to promote advertised goods is known as product endorsement. In 1990, 22% of magazine ads used celebrity endorsements, along with 20% of television commercials (Fowles, 1996). Typically, the celebrity performs a dual function: On the one hand, as a familiar face, he or she is seen as a reliable source of information, so we use the trust built up through our existing parasocial relationship with that person to evaluate the product; on the other hand, the celebrity is seen as a neutral and objective source of information. Celebrities have an existence beyond that of the commercial itself, or the financial lure of the manufacturer, and so perform the function of rubber-stamping the advertisers' claims. Thus, in one study, a viewer described how she had bought baby food on the advice of Joan Lunden, a former host of Good Morning America (Alperstein, 1991). Does celebrity endorsement work? The previous example would seem to suggest that it does, albeit for certain products allied to certain celebrities. At a more general level, the results are mixed. In a study of the "persuasiveness" of over 5,000 television commercials, celebrity endorsement was not found to enhance the communication of the advertising message (Hume, 1992). Indeed, the presence of a familiar face may overwhelm the message itself; when American footballer Joe Montana appeared in a commercial during television coverage of the Super Bowl, 70% of a viewer sample correctly recognised the star but only 18% recalled that he was promoting Diet Pepsi (Fowles, 1996). The star–product connection may need to be established over the course of more sustained advertising campaigns, such as the Walker's crisps commercials on U.K. television starring former England soccer star Gary Lineker.

One way in which celebrity endorsement may work is to transform the image of the product through its association with the star. Walker, Langmeyer, and Langmeyer (1992) examined viewer associations with a number of products that were advertised using different celebrity endorsers. They asked participants to rate the products along a number of "semantic differential" scales (good–bad, kind–cruel, etc.), and found that the same participants rated the same products differently according to the celebrity promoting them—hence the product VCR was evaluated differently when Madonna promoted it than when Christie Brinkley promoted it. Fowles (1996) interpreted this effect as a "flow of meaning" from endorser to product.

When there are no celebrities willing or available to endorse a product, advertisers may decide simply to create a new character, whose persona is permanently associated with the product. Such examples abound in television advertising, from the Energizer Bunny to Kellogg's Tony the Tiger and, perhaps most infamously of all, cigarette-smoking icon Joe Camel. These characters can carry the message of the advertisement far beyond the confines of the original text.

**Intertextuality and Brand Awareness**

Experimental research on the effects of advertising tends to rely on responses to isolated commercials, typically involving imaginary or unfamiliar products. These studies tell us how much information might be attended to, or remembered, in the first moments of a campaign for a brand-new product from a new manufacturer, but can tell us little about the influence of advertising in general. An advertisement is not a single, independent event; it is a text woven into the cultural fabric, cueing memories of other advertising and product characteristics. Brand awareness is built up through years of viewing and interpretation, and advertising goes way beyond the mass media, into our homes and other immediate environments (e.g., designer-label clothing). The message contained in a specific advertisement is therefore hard to isolate from the everyday experiences of the consumer.

Links between advertising can be seen as a form of intertextuality (Kristeva, 1980). This has the effect of stretching the meaning of an ad into other textual forms, so campaigns can build up meaning through different media. A recent example in Britain was a campaign to promote pet insurance by the insurance group Royal & Sun Alliance, who launched a flyposter campaign featuring a crude black-and-white photograph of an Airedale/collie cross under the slogan "Where's Lucky?" There was no mention of the manufacturers' name, let alone any product information; the posters were designed to simulate, in large scale, private handbills for lost pets. Shortly afterward a television commercial appeared with full company information, enabling viewers to complete the puzzle.6

One might argue that such a link is so tenuous as to be pointless. If it is so hard to decode an advertisement, why do clients spend so much money on the campaign? Goldman (1992) maintained that advertisers actually see the intellectual effort involved in interpreting complex advertising as a selling point. The original "Where's Lucky?" posters were remembered because of, not in spite of, their lack of information. Linking them up with the subsequent television commercials requires extra cognitive work that eventually pays off in terms of recall and recognition. This relates to Cacioppo and Petty's (1982) "need for cognition" theory, which stipulates that differential effects of advertising are associated with individual preferences for "thinking." From this perspective, armchair philosophers are more susceptible to peripheral (subtle) routes to persuasion because they are prepared to invest more cognitive effort in processing the material (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986).

The same logic can be applied to the long-running billboard campaign for Benson and Hedges' Silk Cut cigarettes. United Kingdom restrictions on cigarette advertising in the early 1990s persuaded the tobacco company to employ more subtle suggestion in their posters. The company replaced depictions of the product with symbols, such as ripples of purple silk, often juxtaposed with cutting instruments. The only verbal text was the obligatory government health warning. Such visual texts would be indecipherable if studied in isolation, but we use our brand awareness, and our media sophistication, to make sense of them. Although Freudian semioticians may speculate about the luxurious imagery triggering unconscious desires, the function of the Silk Cut campaign seems to be more about defiance in the face of advertising restrictions than about encouraging people to smoke. One other form of intertextual advertising is product placement, by which manufacturers pay large sums to television or

film companies so that their products can be visible during a show or movie. Thus, a leading star becomes a celebrity endorser by swigging from a specific can of lager; at the same time, the visibility of contemporary consumer goods enhances the realism of the movie. One experimental study of product placement studied attitudes toward smoking following exposure to a clip from the film Die Hard (Gibson & Maurer, 2000). In one condition, the film's star Bruce Willis was seen smoking; viewers in this condition liked the character more if they were smokers themselves, but less if they were nonsmokers. Thus, the product placement had little effect in this case but to reinforce existing behaviour patterns. Once again, it seems unlikely that exposure to one single instance of a product will have much impact on long-term behaviour.

## ADVERTISING AND CHILDREN

Although children watch television at various times, the programming that they view alone tends to be specifically aimed at children. In the United States particularly, most of the advertising during this segment consists of ads for food, particularly sugared food (Harris, 1999). During the run up to Christmas, increasing numbers of ads concern toys and games. Such practices are believed to put pressure on parents to yield to what the media have dubbed "pester power." This has led to calls for legislation to regulate advertising in Europe and the United States. Indeed, the Swedish government has outlawed television advertising of products aimed at children under 12, and recently in the United States 50 psychologists signed a petition calling for a ban on the advertising of children's goods.

The practice of advertising to children has been hotly debated by psychologists, media and communication experts, and the advertising industry itself, and researchers are sharply divided over some of the issues involved. Critics of advertising to children argue that children have not developed the cognitive sophistication that enables them to tell advertising apart from other forms of programming, and that even children as old as 12 may misunderstand the nature and function of advertising.[7] Others maintain that children are more sophisticated than cognitive psychologists sometimes think, and that a ban on television commercials is unlikely to have much effect against other forces promoting relentless consumption in contemporary society.

### Stage Theory of Consumer Development

Valkenburg and Cantor (2001) identified four stages that children pass through in their development as consumers. During infancy (0–2 years), children become interested in brightly colored television programming (which includes commercials), and by 18 months start asking for products they have seen advertised on television. In one Dutch study, 40% of parents of 2-year-olds claimed that their children had recognised an advertised product in a store display.

[7]There is some doubt over the validity of the Swedish research that motivated the government's decision to ban advertising to children under 12. Allegedly, the study's author claimed that the policy was based on a misinterpretation of his data, and that he suggested only that some 12-year-olds did not understand advertising (Oates, Blades, & Gunter, 2002). During the preschool period (2–5 years), children are at their most vulnerable to television advertising. They still have a largely literal understanding of television, believing that objects depicted on television are real. They find it hard to resist tempting products, which leads to tantrums in stores when parents decline to yield to their requests (the feared "pester power"); in this study, 70% of parents of 5-year-olds reported experiencing conflict over such issues.[8]

In the third phase (5–8 years), children become more sophisticated consumers of media and have developed strategies for negotiation with parents over purchasing. By the end of this phase, they have begun to display independence in terms of purchasing. This independence increases during the final phase (9–12 years), as children become more critical media users and are attracted toward more adult forms of entertainment. At this stage, peer influence is more important than individual media use, and adult styles of consumption such as brand loyalty, begin to appear.

This model is loosely based on Piagetian notions of cognitive maturation, in which child development is determined by the growing brain rather than by social interaction. There are several issues that remain contentious within this cognitive approach. The first concerns children's ability to discriminate between advertising and other forms of programming. Valkenburg and Cantor argued that discrimination does not take place until the third phase, although some years ago research by Hodge and Tripp (1986) suggested that commercials were the first television genre to be successfully identified, at around the age of 3, and other researchers have found that children at that age were able to distinguish advertising from the surrounding programming (Butter, Popovich, Stackhouse, & Garner, 1981; Levin, Petros, & Petrella, 1982).

A second bone of contention concerns children's ability to understand the nature and function of advertising. The cognitivist argument is based on research conducted on television processing in general, which portrays children's understanding of television as a simple matter of distinguishing between events on television as "fantasy" and events in the immediate environment as "reality." However, most of the research on children's understanding of advertising has focused on their ability to understand the economic principles involved in advertising itself, rather than semantic aspects of individual commercials. Young (1990) coined the term advertising literacy, defining "understanding" as both the recognition that advertising has a specific source distinct from other television programming, and a recognition of advertising's persuasive intent. A meta-analysis of studies (Martin, 1997) demonstrated a clear positive correlation between age and comprehension of persuasive intent, although this was less clear when ads were isolated from surrounding programming, suggesting an inability even among older children to identify "advertising" as a genre distinct from television itself (a study by Kunkel, 1988, also shows that children are confused by intertextual devices like celebrity endorsement).

   8Using a different approach (a 4-week diary study), data collected by Isler, Popper, and Ward (1987) suggest that instances of pester power may be exaggerated. In this study, parents reported very few instances of their children placing undue pressure on them to buy goods, either inside or outside stores. (It could be significant that this study was published in the Journal of Advertising Research rather than a psychology publication, and it would be interesting to see a contemporary replication.)

How much "understanding" do children need to display before they are considered mature enough to cope with the wiles of advertisers? Goldstein (1999) asserted that there is no "magic age" at which such understanding can be said truly to take place, and that in many cases adults would fail the tasks that researchers give to children. For one thing, there is no "reality" of advertised products that can be distinguished from the claims made by advertisers. Lay consumers of all ages are unable to tell whether 8 out of 10 owners say their cats prefer Whiskas, unless they are researchers equipped with cat food sales preference data.

Arguments that cognitive maturation is the main determinant of advertising awareness also fail to explain how young children differ in terms of the products they request. If the effects of advertising are

a simple matter of automatic responses to stimuli, why don't boys ask for Barbie dolls (Goldstein, 1999)? Evidently, young children are identifying with protagonists in commercials, if only on superficial characteristics such as gender. But this indicates the selective processing of advertisements, a task well beyond what Valkenburg and Cantor have predicted for 2- to 5-year-olds. Clearly, cognitive maturation plays a part in children's media interaction, inasmuch as children have to develop the perceptual skills to identify formal features of television. However, children rarely watch all television alone; a parent or sibling is never far away from the screen, and the interaction between coviewers will have considerable impact on how children respond to advertising.

**"Pester Power" and Modern-Day Consumption**

As mentioned earlier, a particular worry among parents in recent years is the phenomenon of "pester power," by which repeated appeals on television lead children to make prolonged demands on parents for products that the parents may not be able to afford. In conditions of real poverty, as in most of India, parents are simply unable to give in to such demands, with the result that many children actively resent advertising for falsely raising expectations (Unnikrishnan & Bajpai, 1996).

The effectiveness of advertising to children was examined by Pine and Nash (2001), in a study relating television use and gift requests to Father Christmas. They found that the amount of commercial television that children watched predicted the number of goods on the children's list; the more time spent watching TV, the more gifts were requested, particularly the number of branded goods. This was strongest in children who watched television alone, suggesting an effect of parental mediation. Little correspondence was noted, however, between specific ads and gift requests, except for established toys like Barbie and Action Man. The authors concluded that the effect is probably more general, producing a consumer oriented, materialistic culture among children. To reinforce this view, a comparison was carried out with data collected in Sweden, where advertising to children is banned, and letters to Santa contained significantly fewer requests for branded goods.

Although such data may point to a clear advertising/pestering link, one must bear in mind the possibility that consumer demand culture in a specific family may be linked to the amount and nature of television viewing. As with media violence, we can never rule out motives for viewing the material in the first place. Another factor is peer influence; parents may be familiar with their children's viewing patterns but not with the conversations they have with their friends, and thus overestimate the influence of television (Goldstein, 1999). At the same time, much peer talk may be related back to media; it is almost impossible to disentangle the two influences. This points to a difficulty with studying at a purely individual level the effects of advertising to children. Historical and social factors are essential considerations for a developmental media psychology. Gunter and Furnham (1998) and Turow (2001) identified a number of factors related to the changing nature of family interaction that have important implications for the children and advertising debate.

First, children do not demand only children's products, such as sweets and toys. A ban on advertising such goods would not rule out children's influence over parental purchases of family goods, such as holiday destinations and the family car. Modern-day children occupy a different position in the family regarding decision making—they have more power over parental choice.

Second, as Turow (2001) pointed out, modern homes and technologies have led to something of a splintering of the family; children spend increasing amounts of time alone, and these boundaries are exploited by advertisers, who emphasize the differences between members of the family rather than

the similarities. Important issues here concern the disclosure practices of the family, and other communication patterns. Do children discuss media with their parents? The proliferation of media makes parental mediation difficult to actually practice.

A third issue relating to modern-day consumption concerns the dynamics of modern families. Modern parents have fewer children and more spending power, so the number of products bought per child is continually rising. One only needs to witness the mountain of consumer goods that accumulates at Christmas and on birthdays to appreciate the way the child enters a continuous cycle of consumption. This is often exacerbated by the breakup of families, so that the children of divorced parents are often bought twice the usual number of presents, and estranged parents may invest yet more money in presents to compensate for their absence.

**FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN ADVERTISING**

Clearly it is time for psychologists to move away from the 30-second television commercial as the main source of study. McKee (2002) examined children's responses to print advertising, and found this medium to be even more subtle in its influence—at least in terms of the amount of information recalled and children's inability to identify ads from surrounding material. In one publication, a comic strip advertising Kellogg's Coco Pops was indistinguishable from an original strip on the opposite page. Like advertorials, such devices fool adults as well as children.

The mechanisms of advertising are so established in contemporary society that it is hard to see what a ban on advertising could achieve; in terms of children's programming, it is more likely to harm children's television by forcing specialist commercial channels out of business. Furthermore, it is difficult to regulate advertising because the links between media content and merchandising are too close. The BBC is an ostensibly noncommercial state channel paid for by viewing licences, yet shows such as Teletubbies and Bob the Builder generate substantial income for the Corporation from marketing to children in the United Kingdom and beyond.

On commercial television, some shows are even more blatantly created solely for the purpose of merchandising. One early example, He-Man: Master of the Universe, was a show that was specifically designed to market Mattel's He-Man toys in the 1980s. Invariably, modern feature films aimed at children are vehicles for toy manufacturers to market their products, a fact borne out by the arrival of official merchandise in the toyshops concurrent with such films' general release. Rather than waiting for the film to generate the demand for associated goods, the marketing opportunities are exploited as early as possible, so that a visit to the cinema is merely the first step in a chain of related purchases. Although a ban on advertising to children might send out a moral message, it is only the tip of the marketing iceberg.

As media technologies evolve, advertising will be forced to adapt. As suggested earlier, there are severe limitations for advertising on the World Wide Web, and it is likely that these limitations will force closer links between television and the Internet, perhaps leading to a fusion between text based services and the Web (this has already started happening on digital interactive television services). Advertisers will attempt to use more intrusive means of contacting consumers; recent concerns have been voiced over the use of "spam" text messaging on mobile phones, by which advertisers got hold of private numbers and sent out commercial messages to individual consumers. Such practices are costly, are currently seen as invasive, and in the short run are likely to do more harm than good to brand image. One other form of advertising that will undoubtedly increase as television becomes more interactive is the kind of

"whole industry" marketing that is associated with lifestyle television. In this, television programming serves to increase demand for certain types of good—such as gardening tools, cookery implements, and even houses—rather than specific brands or products.

**3.a. Do the documented effects of terrorism on the psychological and political levels support the utility of terror? Critically evaluate. 15**

**Reference:**

**Research on the psychological and political consequences of terrorism**

Although beliefs about the efficacy of terror are inevitably contested, there is also a research literature that may be considered. For the set of historical political conflicts in which terror has been used or not used, what were the outcomes for conflict protagonists? Do the documented effects of terrorism on the psychological and political levels support the utility of terror?

It would be helpful, from the target's perspective, if there were a clear answer in the negative. However, if there were such clarity in the historical context then norms would presumably not be emerging to favor terror across dozens of nations and conflict contexts. The answer, as usual when it comes to questions of population-wide processes and outcomes, is "yes and no."

**Psychological outcomes**

For individual members of the targeted groups, numerous studies have shown that terrorist attacks evoke acute and chronic distress (e.g., Lerner et al., 2003; Skitka et al., 2004; Slone and Shoshani, 2006). On a clinical level, exposure to terrorism has been found to increase rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; e.g., Fraley et al., 2006) and adolescent interpersonal violence (e.g., Even-Chen and Itzhaky, 2007). According to one study, interventions can weaken the negative effects of exposure to terror, but on the other hand participants' exposure to an intervention increased anxiety in the "control" condition, in which individuals received the intervention and were not exposed to terror coverage (Slone and Shoshani, 2006). This research draws attention to a vicious circle (from the targets' perspective) whereby preparing for terror may itself increase anxiety, in the absence of actual attacks. However, other research is more optimistic in qualifying the likely psychological influence of terrorist events. For example, a study of 70 000 employees found that despite anger and sadness about the 9/11 attack, the event had no consistent or significant impact on individuals' satisfaction or commitment at work (Ryan et al., 2003). In this sense, individuals are able to experience natural negative responses to acute stress without any failure of coping or generalization of the distress to other life areas. Similarly, research shows that individuals generally cope with terror through effective pro-social strategies, such as reaching out to and affirming their family and community ties (e.g., Goodwin et al., 2005; Huddy et al., 2002; Schuster et al., 2001). Positive emotions and heightened self-efficacy under exposure to terrorist events are promoted by common social bonds, such as religiosity (e.g., Fischer et al., 2006) and secure interpersonal relationships (Fraley et al., 2006). And on a behavioral level, in the study in which exposure to terrorism was linked to adolescent violence (Even-Chen & Itzhaky, 2007) it was the case that adolescents in high-risk areas showed lower levels of violence than those in low-risk areas. This pattern is attributed by the authors to the positive coping strategies that high-risk groups had evolved, and the resources they attracted from authorities (e.g., mental health professionals deployed after every attack).

Reviewing the impact of the long-standing IRA terror campaign on society, Silke (2003) concluded the impact was "surprisingly limited" (p. 200). Without meaning any disrespect to the victims of terror, whose suffering is intense and in some sense unquantifiable, terrorism in this light could be argued as a threat attracting far more resources and attention than is justified by the limited harm it inflicts on target societies (see also Lewandowsky and Stritzke, this volume).

**Political outcomes**

On a political level, claimed successes from terrorism are few, but include, for example, Hezbollah campaigns provoking the withdrawal of French and American troops from Lebanon following the 1983 bombings of the American embassy, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops in 2000 from south Lebanon (e.g., Goldberg, 2002). From a broader historical perspective, the success of religious guerrilla warfare as an anti-Communist strategy, as well as the training and arms Social psychological approaches to terrorism 139 provided to Islamic groups against the Russians by the Americans, have been identified by many as the proximal cause for the increasing levels of terror by Islamist groups from the 1990s onward (e.g., Loza, 2007). Even further back, the success of liberation movements from the 1940s to the 1990s, which used terror as part of an arsenal of tactics to gain self-determination (e.g., in Israel or in South Africa), may underpin beliefs in the legitimacy and effectiveness of terror for many modern groups.

In recent times, it has been well documented in the research literature that terrorism can produce a generalized increase in conservatism and xenophobia. Following the Madrid attack, an increase was noted in anti-Arab prejudice, anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, and attachment to traditional conservative values, while attachment to liberal values was found to have decreased (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede, 2006). American research also shows an increase in Whites' prejudice against Arabs as a group, as well as against Black Americans, both six weeks after the 9/11 attack and persisting one year later (Persson and Musher-Eizenman, 2005). Research concerning Israeli teens' attitudes following a terrorist attack (Bar-Tal and Labin, 2001) found increased hostility to Palestinians (some of whom had carried out the attack) but also to Arabs in general. Huddy et al. (2002) documented reduced support for civil liberties for over a year following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing as well as the 2001 New York attacks, though there was some evidence of a recovery over time. Similarly, in a national sample of Americans after 9/11 (Skitka et al., 2004), the anger evoked by 9/11 was associated with moral outrage and the derogation of "outgroups" to which participants did not belong; outrage and outgroup derogation were then linked to decreased political tolerance four months later. In the same study, the fear evoked by 9/11 in Americans also led to decreased political tolerance four months afterwards via two other psychological processes, ingroup enhancement (favorable evaluations of groups to which participants belonged) and perceptions of personal threat. Similarly, Todd et al. (2005) report that fear of terrorism was associated with pro-war attitudes in British and Australian samples during the first phase of fighting in Iraq. In this sense, the research suggests that terror attacks contribute to a spiral of mutual bigotry and violence.

Why might such a consistent pattern of xenophobia and conservatism be evoked? At least two theoretical models in current social psychological work can provide explanations. In his work on 'Right-Wing Authoritarianism', Altemeyer (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996) has argued that social threat always evokes authoritarianism (the psychological imperative to rally to the leader, defend traditional mores, and punish those whom leaders identify as deviants or threats). Accordingly, threat is proposed to fuel conservatism and xenophobia via increased authoritarianism, and some empirical research supports this threat–authoritarianism link (Doty et al., 1991). A similar perspective is provided by System Justification

Theory (e.g., Jost et al., 2004) which argues that people exposed to instability and injustice (e.g., the unexpected deaths of innocents at the hands of terrorists) have a psychological need to reaffirm their society's justice and stability. This ideological affirmation of the status quo serves to reduce anxiety, but also results in greater negativity toward socially disadvantaged groups who must be blamed for their misfortune, as well as enemies abroad who must be rejected and attacked, rather than understood or engaged. Both authoritarianism and system justification motives could be viewed in terms of innate evolutionary drives, or as social explanations based on culturally learned coping skills. For example, societies may explicitly teach children and adults to rally to the leader when attacked, or to view the world as just, so that the suffering of innocents occurs as the result of their unworthiness or the malevolence of external enemies.

Some have argued that societal threats, including terrorism, produce an affirmation of respondents' pre-existing values so that the political effect is one of polarization rather than a shift to the right (e.g., Greenberg and Jonas, 2003). Terror Management Theory has provided the most widely researched theoretical model of the processes underpinning polarization effects (see Pyszczynski and colleagues, this volume, for a review). For example, Johns et al. (2005) reported that Americans recalling negative instances of anti-Arab prejudice they had witnessed showed more shame and more motivation to distance themselves from the perpetrators when they identified more strongly as Americans. In this sense, highly identified group members are shown not just to be more reactive to threats to the group, but also more willing to repudiate reactions that violate group standards for behavior (see also Abrams et al., 2000). Yum and Schenk-Hamlin (2005) catalogued the coping strategies self-reported by college students, and found most were altruistic and pro-social (39%; e.g., comforting, blood donation). With respect to racial bigotry, the authors found four times as many participants reported they were motivated by 9/11 to advocate against prejudice (6%) as reported increased expression of racial bigotry (1.5%). Similarly, in the study described above, which found a link between terrorism and Israeli teens' anti-Arab prejudice, there was no association between exposure to terror and hostile attitudes to Jordanians (Israel had peaceful relations with Jordan). In this sense, research demonstrates both generalized and contained prejudice: both the likelihood of bigotry, and the mobilization against that bigotry by members of the targeted groups committed to upholding values of tolerance.

In line with this approach, in the national sample observed by Skitka et al. (2004), which found that political tolerance decreased after 9/11, it was also observed that for some respondents, fear was associated with an increase in political tolerance four months later, which was mediated by value-affirmation (along with an increase in pro-social behaviors such as donating blood). In other words, fear after 9/11 led some participants to recommit to their existing values, and these folks were more likely to report increased tolerance, which is consistent with the polarization hypothesis.

However, the magnitude of the shift to the right and towards xenophobic violence has been found to be larger than the activation and mobilization of the left and the forces of tolerance. For example, as noted above, in Skitka et al.'s (2004) national sample of Americans, fear was also associated with a decrease in political tolerance mediated by reported perceived personal threat and ingroup enhancement, and the overall relationship between fear and tolerance was negative. In general the research consensus seems to support the prevalence of increased prejudice, intolerance, and conservativism, as noted above (see e.g., Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede, 2006).

A second line of work suggests that terrorism elicits conservative authoritarianism not because of cognitive dissonance in response to threats to beliefs about a just world, but rather because liberal democracies are more vulnerable to terrorist attack, for a variety of reasons (Eyerman, 1998; Pape,

2003, 2005; cf. Wade and Reiter, 2007). Berrebi and Klor (2006) present data from Israel for the period 1990–2003 that show that opinion-poll support for right-wing parties increased after high incidences of terrorism, and that high incidences of terrorism were more likely when left-wing parties were in office. The authors argue that when right-wing parties are in power, a portion of terrorists who are sensitive to strategy do not engage in terrorism because the perceived likelihood of policy change is lower. In this case the strategic terrorists exert themselves to induce calm to change voters' perceptions that the terrorists are all extremists and promote a shift to left-wing governments. In contrast, it is argued that when left-wing governments are in power, both strategic terrorists and extremist terrorists maximize their violence in the short term, in the hope of ending the occupation and creating a long-term peace in the terrorists' interest. The opposite logic is applied by Bueno de Mesquita and Dickinson (2005), whose "signaling model" argues that terrorist groups try to provoke harsh government reprisals against the terrorists' constituents so as to mobilize popular support for their group (taking care to avoid blame for the reprisals, however). The efficacy of this signaling model in some cases, such as Ireland and South Africa, has already been noted. Presumably if the likelihood of reprisals is judged higher under a right-wing government, that belief would be associated with increased support for terror tactics during the right-wing parties' tenure.

Without accepting any particular causal model it seems clear that terrorism frequently has political consequences, and these often are expressed through right-wing empowerment and violent conservatism. However, it is important to stress that any attempt to argue for an inevitable link between terrorism and support for particular political parties would overlook the critical moderating effect of the historical context. For example, it seems likely that a second 9/11 at the time of writing (late 2007) would politically discredit US President Bush and the violent conservative response to terror, whereas the first terror attack arguably empowered him. Moreover, regardless of the empirical prevalence of violent intolerance over peaceful tolerance in the short term, it is clear that factors exist that promote resilience and rebalancing at the political as well as the personal level. It is one goal of this chapter to explore those processes, as I have noted.

Finally, few empirical studies have addressed attitudinal or behavioral support for terrorism as the dependent measures related to terror, despite the opinion of numerous counter-terrorism experts that reducing popular support is the most important tactic in eliminating terrorists (e.g., Crenshaw, 2000; Post, 2005). As discussed above, in many historical contexts it can be argued that lack of community support for terror constrained and eventually lowered the level of violence, for example in Ireland. In the only empirical study to date I have discovered, Tessler and Robbins (2007) report data from Jordan and Algeria such that controlling for other variables, citizens' support for terrorism was not related to religious orientation, views of Western culture, personal economic circumstances, or even support for political Islam. Young people were more supportive of terrorism than older respondents – a worrying trend, assuredly – and the proximal predictors of support were negative judgments about their own country's corrupt political structure and about US foreign policy. The authors interpret these findings as showing that neither poverty, nor religion, nor even political aims motivate terrorism: rather, people support terrorism when they perceive that internal and international politics are corrupt and responsible for injustice and inequality. In this sense, it is tactical normative beliefs that are the key driver, consistent with the present analysis.

**3.b. Have there been any changes in media portrayal of gender roles with changing times? Discuss the role of media in shaping gender stereotypes. 15**

**Reference:**

**GENDER REPRESENTATION IN THE MEDIA**

Studies of the representation of women in the media appear regularly in the communication science and gender psychology literature (Glascock, 2001; Gunter, 1995; Meyers, 1999; Signorielli, 1989a; Signorielli & Bache, 1999). The general picture sketched by this literature is that, after several decades of chronic underrepresentation and stereotyping of women, things are gradually improving, if only slowly. The overwhelming surplus of male characters in prime-time 1970s television was described by one author as "the symbolic annihilation of women" (Tuchman, 1978). Over the years 1973 through 1993, 68.5% of all characters in prime-time U.S. television were male, with only a fairly small decline over that period from 72% to 65% (Gerbner, 1997).

Not only were women still underrepresented in 1980s prime-time television, they continued to be represented by traditional stereotypes. Women were more likely to be married with children, or younger, and portrayed in a romantic or overtly sexual context. They were also more likely to be cast in traditionally "feminine" occupations such as nursing and waitressing. More worrying still, heavy television viewers were more likely to agree with sexist statements about women, even with demographic variables accounted for (Signorielli, 1989a).

Other analyses of media content have unearthed other issues that may compound the perpetuation of traditionally sexist portrayals of women. For example, Tuchman (1978) and others noted that women tended to be portrayed as passive victims waiting to be rescued by heroic male figures (e.g., Lois Lane by Clark Kent's Superman). Goffman's famous (1979) study of gender in advertising examined subtle ways in which women were cast in submissive roles by certain photographic angles and the use of passive postures. More often than men, female models were seen to be lying down, touching objects, or gesturing submissively toward a male model. Glascock (2001) carried out a content analysis of prime-time television in the late 1990s and found that the underrepresentation disparity continued to lessen, although at a fairly sluggish rate, with women appearing as main characters in fiction 40% of the time (compared with the 28% reported in Tedesco, 1974). There were more notable gains, however, in the ways in which women were portrayed in 1990s television. The range of professional roles was much broader than in earlier analyses; like men, the most common role was that of a police officer, and notable numbers of female lawyers, journalists, and doctors were recorded. Female characters were displaying less traditionally "feminine" behaviours too; indeed, they made significantly more negative comments than did male characters, although this figure may reflect the large number of sitcoms, in which female characters traditionally hold the upper hand over males.

**MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF MEN**

Men have received rather less attention than women in terms of their media representations over the years. This is largely because the underrepresentation of women on television—particularly older, lower-class, and ethnic minority women—has traditionally provided the impetus for research on gender representations.

Furthermore, it has long been assumed that the typical viewer of media products is male. As film critic Laura Mulvey (1975) argued, the cinema has traditionally been based around the perspective of the "male gaze," and thus most cinematic content has been designed in terms of what is most likely to appeal to men, particularly heterosexual men. It is only recently that the male body has been overtly eroticised in the media. The same argument could be made for advertising, where until recently only

household and domestic products were aimed at women; now the employment situation has changed, and with women playing a major role as consumers, advertising is aimed at them almost as much as at men.

Nevertheless, the rise of feminism, and the changing role of women, have brought about an interest in the ways that men are represented in the media, and in contemporary images of masculinity. Connell (1995) provided a useful breakdown of three different types of masculinities that are present in modern Western culture. They are hegemonic masculinity, conservative masculinity, and subordinated masculinity, and are described in the sections that follow.

**Hegemonic Masculinity**

This form of masculinity is based on the political idea of hegemony (Gramsci, 1985), which contends that the dominant culture in any society is based on the values of the ruling class. Because—in most societies across time and space—men have tended to have an unequally large share of political and economic power, their values are likely to have been more culturally influential than have those of women. A further characteristic of hegemony is that the dominant culture serves as a vehicle for reinforcing the power of the ruling class; thus, in terms of gender, this category refers to masculinity that is intended to dominate (either men dominating women, or men dominating other men). Hegenomic masculinity manifests itself in a hierarchy of men based on the "hypermasculine ideal" of strength and toughness. The men who are most admired are those who are most capable of dominating others.

In media terms, this type of masculinity is most obviously represented in the form of Superman. His name itself suggests that the character is an embodiment of the hypermasculine ideal, and Superman represents power, control, success, strength, and aggression—all the attributes that are associated with men who are high in the hierarchy. A further quality of high status men is that they are sexually attractive to women; the notion of hierarchy is strongly reinforced in the Superman series by the fact that plain, reliable Clark Kent cannot attract the attention of Lois Lane until donning the identity of the all-powerful, charismatic outsider. The hegemonic function of Superman is most explicit in the original 1940s comic strip, where he is claimed to promote "truth, justice and the American way." Ultimately, hegemonic males are to be taken seriously; for instance, we do not see them represented in comedy.

**Conservative Masculinity**

Although Superman may represent "the American way," other figures represent a form of middle-class masculinity—perhaps as teachers or artists, or as political or philanthropic figures. Connell used the stereotype of the "new man" as an example of conservative masculinity. The "new man" was a 1980s cultural icon that represented notions of changing masculinities, moving from the hegemonic virtues of toughness and strength to a sensitive, nurturing ideal, embodied by images of men engaged in childcare or overt displays of emotion (e.g., weeping). Connell saw the "new man" as symptomatic of 1980s "therapy culture," in which stressed workers were encouraged to release their frustration through tree hugging, primal screaming, and other acts of emotional abandonment. The thinking man was portrayed as intellectually superior, possibly to women, and certainly to lower class men.

**Subordinated Masculinity**

This is a kind of alternative or outcast masculinity that is generally seen as negative. Homosexuality is an example; traditionally, gay men in the media have been the subjects of derision, or presented as a

problem for straight men to solve (e.g., how to deal with a friend who comes out). However, this is a very "straight" reading of gay representations; queer theorists, for example, might prefer to see this type of masculinity as "resistant." A pejorative representation of masculinity that would be universally seen as negative would be the "underclass" or "trailer trash" stereotype, epitomized in British television by the Harry Enfield comic character Wayne Slob, a shell-suitwearing monosyllabic oaf, slumped permanently in front of a television set surrounded by empty beer cans and takeaway packaging (also see the character Onslow in the social-climbing sitcom Keeping Up Appearances). A counterexample here might the Glaswegian comic character Rab C. Nesbitt, who has all the surface characteristics of subordinated masculinity but whose rapier wit recasts him as an urban philosopher.

**Representations of Men in Beer Ads**

Media representations research has employed both quantitative (content analysis) and qualitative analysis, although the emphasis has been on the latter. Rather than counting categories and instances, the study of representations is more to do with the cultural meanings that these representations hold for us. Perhaps a good place to investigate male representation is in advertisements for beer. Given that men are the main consumers of beer, and that beer consumption is a hugely popular male leisure activity, it would seem that beer advertisers will represent men in a way that is specifically designed to appeal to a wide variety of them. Strate (1992) looked at five distinct aspects of men in American beer ads:

**Activity.** "Work hard, play hard," is the message conveyed in beer ads. Men are mostly portrayed engaged in rugged activities, as workers (labourers, cowboys, etc.), as enjoying healthy outdoor leisure (sport, fishing, etc.), or as engaging anything involving risk or mastery. The message is that beer is a reward for hard work, either as a transition to leisure at the end of the working day or as refreshment between bouts of strenuous leisure activity. What is interesting about these representations is that they are markedly unrepresentative of male beer consumption in reality; inevitably, most alcohol is consumed in distinctly unhealthy settings. Instead, the representations convey the impression that advertisers feel will most appeal to male drinkers—that beer drinking is a rugged, healthy, masculine thing to do. The one exception to this rule is, curiously, ads in which men are portrayed watching televised sport. Perhaps these reflect advertisers' occasional attempts to target consumption at realistic settings rather than ideal, romanticized ones.

- **Settings.** The settings for males drinking beer in ads reflects a similar pattern, presumably dictated to some extent by the characters' activity. Therefore, most beer ads are set either outdoors, or in a bar, or in a living room with the television on.
- **Rite of Passage.** Beer drinking, and its associated bar culture are portrayed in ads as part of acquiring an adult lifestyle, so young drinkers are depicted as being initiated into these rituals.
- **Male-–Male Interaction.** Beer drinking is overwhelmingly portrayed as a group activity, reinforcing many male stereotypes: non-emotional, non-affectionate, humorous, irresponsible masculine bonding. Getting your round in is, Strate suggested, a substitute for (female-associated) displays of affection. Again it is notable that unacceptable—albeit common—images of alcohol consumption are avoided, such as lone drinking.
- **Male–Female Interaction.** When this happens—and it does not happen very often in beer ads—such interaction is purely sexual. At one time, if women were portrayed drinking beer, it was a green light for men to "chance their arm," although, for obvious reasons, such portrayals have died out. However, the presence of women in beer ads is still used as an opportunity for men to display their sexual attractiveness.

**Men as Buddies/Pals**

From the same text as Strate's analysis comes a study of male friendships in the media (Spangler, 1992). This analysis looks at archetypal masculinities and how men have coped with intimacy; generally there is a feeling that the lack of emotional intimacy in men's friendships stems from a fear of homosexuality (one argument is that sport is a substitute; e.g., hugging and kissing goal scorers in football).

Men in popular culture and the media tend to fall into three types: loners, who are often powerful, charismatic figures—Superman, as previously described, or Clint Eastwood as the "stranger in town" (spaghetti westerns, e.g., The Good, The Bad and The Ugly); close pals, but not equals; here we could cite Lone Ranger and Tonto as an example, in which the cowboy is clearly the hero, although, despite his title, is constantly in the company of his savior and friend (just like Batman and Robin); and duos—notably Laurel and Hardy, or Starsky and Hutch.

**The Family Man**

In a very thorough content analysis, Kaufman (1999) looked at the portrayal of men and women with children in TV ads. She compared ads in which children were present with those in which the person was alone, across different viewing periods. Generally, men were hardly ever portrayed with children without the mother also being present, although this pattern reversed slightly for ads shown during American football games (during which ads for sports equipment or games are most likely to be screened, and are more likely to show dad playing ball with the kids in the garden). The most interesting data from Kaufman's study concern the ages of the children who are depicted with their parents, and the activities in which they are involved. The male role in parent–child interaction changes as the children get older. Men are much more likely to be seen engaging in child care with infants than with school-age children, and not one instance was found of a male caring for a teenager. Table 10.1 displays the overall comparisons, but further analysis revealed that male child care in ads was invariably directed toward boys (the reverse is true for female child care). Men are also more likely than women to be engaged in educational activity with children, and also in eating and play, typically described as "quality time" (i.e., parents derive as much pleasure from the interaction as the children). Play was found to be a particular feature of father–child ads. A recent ad for Eurodisney showing on U.K. television at the time of this writing exemplifies this finding nicely: A father is displayed taking his two sons around the theme park; in the final scene, it is dad who is whizzing around on a ride while his sons look on.

These data suggest that although men are more likely to be portrayed with their families than in previous historical periods, their activities are restricted mainly to "quality time" and education. Perhaps it is a case of advertisers trying to convey the message that parenting can be fun. However, the "new man" of popular lore has not yet made it into the ads; "the father baking cookies is literally 1 in 1000" (Kaufman, 1999, p. 456). Women are still left to do all the dirty, less obviously appealing aspects of bringing up children.

**THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF MEN**

Although the research just discussed suggests that the arrival of the "new man" made less of an impact on media representations than sometimes thought, there do appear to be some trends away from the "hypermasculine ideal." Wernick (1987) claimed that the male image in advertising had "softened" since World War II ended, notably in the tendency for men to be presented as family members rather than

peer group members, and more frequently as the object of desire (the "sexual gaze"). Even where male images are embedded in traditional roles, there has been an increasing feminisation of certain aspects of masculinity; Denski and Scholle (1992) cited the example of heavy metal musicians—hypermasculine in many respects (the term "cock rock" has been frequently applied to the genre) but notably feminine in others, such as their long, coiffured, teased hairstyles and ostentatious displays of jewellery.

Although in most respects positive, for many authors the "feminisation" of men has had its downside in that it has led to traditionally female activities being undermined or trivialized. Segal (1990) and Harrower (1995) both cited examples of Hollywood films in which men take on traditionally female roles, such as Three Men and a Baby, in which three flat-sharing male friends suddenly find themselves responsible for bringing up an infant; Junior, in which—thanks to a gynaecological miracle—Arnold Schwarzenegger's character gives birth; and Mrs. Doubtfire, in which Robin Williams' exiled father returns to care for his children in the guise of a nanny. The authors maintained that in each of these films childbirth and childcare are portrayed as relatively easy tasks for males to accomplish given their apparent adaptive and transferable life skills.

A significant trend in the British media during the 1990s has been the development of a profitable market for men's magazines (see Stevenson, Jackson, & Brooks, 2000). Initially, titles like GQ, Arena, and Esquire were targeted at the smart, professional, educated, middle-class man; then along came Loaded and the alleged "dumbing down" of the genre as its success began to influence the content of its rivals (notably FHM and Maxim). These later magazines presented a new representation—the "new lad" (which can actually be traced back as far as a City Limits article in 1989). The "new lad" was originally conceived as a backlash against the "new man" and the growing influence of feminism; Stevenson et al. interpreted this as a "fear of the feminine"—certainly the content of modern men's magazines invokes something of a "men's club" atmosphere, complete with the ambiguous cover of irony (although Loaded's editors deny that they are employing irony; perhaps they are being ironic in doing so. . .)

What are the effects of these changing representations of men in the media?

Representations literature has often been criticised for making grand assumptions solely on the basis of content, rather than actually addressing audience response (Livingstone, 1998a). However, there is an increasing pressure on media scholars to investigate empirically the impact of media content on their audiences. In one recent study, Gill, McLean, and Henwood (2000) interviewed groups of men about their reaction to ads and magazine articles that featured eroticised male images or idealised male bodies. The authors discovered a wide range of responses; many interviewees saw such bodies as entirely unrealistic but also as threatening; others deemed them worthy of emulation; in some cases, even heterosexual males admitted to finding the images arousing.

Are media images a reflection of reality, or do they help shape it? This frequently asked question rests at the centre of media psychology, but really relies on how we define "reality," and how much influence with which we can really credit the media. Essentially, the question is a rerun of the "effects" debate around sex and violence, except that where issues such as gender and ethnicity are concerned the images are multiple and pervasive, almost impossible to avoid without opting out of media consumption altogether. Indeed, Craig (1992) argued that such is our dependency on media that the question is not whether media representations reflect reality, but whether they themselves constitute reality. Britain may not be full of men with rippling torsos and six-packs, but if we read enough magazines and watch enough ads, we may begin to feel that it is, and adjust our beliefs and behaviours accordingly.

**3.c. In what ways early experiences of alienation under normative social influence can catalyze the formation of powerful creative personalities? Explain with the help of suitable examples. 20**

**Reference:**

According toWebster's NewWorld Dictionary, conformity is ''action in accordance with customs, rules, prevailing opinion, etc.; conventional behavior.'' As this definition implies, people may be powerfully influenced by social forces. Social influence can be informational or normative. Informational influence leads individuals to alter their behavior to accord with new knowledge obtained from others, whereas normative influence leads individuals to alter their behavior to accord with the conventional beliefs or practices of others. Informational social influence can aid the creative process, by enhancing a person's perception. For example, thoughtful criticisms of an artist's work from other members of a workshop may help to sharpen the artist's vision. In contrast normative social influence often works against creativity, in part by producing inaccurate perception. For example, Asch's classic studies in the 1950s showed that participants will agree with an incorrect group consensus regarding the length of presented line segments, ignoring the clear evidence of their own senses. Because it has received the most attention I will focus on normative conformity, and its potentially negative effects on creativity. [See CONVENTIONALITY.]

Another important distinction in the conformity literature is whether or not conformists actually believe the normative opinions that they espouse. Some individuals may be sufficiently lacking in self-confidence that they endorse a group's incorrect opinion both inwardly and outwardly. This form of conformity is termed acceptance. Research has made it clear that individuals who do this are unlikely to be creative. Other individuals may toe the party line in order to avoid making waves, while still maintaining a private, countervailing opinion. This form of conformity is termed compliance. The potential for individual creativity is more likely to be maintained in the compliance case, although by withholding their true thoughts from others, such ''expedient'' conformers risk missing important feedback and information.

With more careful analysis the neat distinction between private acceptance and mere public compliance blurs. In most cases, normative influences concern more than simple perceptual judgments that have clear correct answers (e.g., the Asch line-length experiments). Group-level normative forces are most likely to play a role in the case of complex, many-sided issues, which have tangled ethical and doctrinal implications. Because of the ambiguity of many normatively informed issues, individuals may ''mistakenly'' accept a prevailing opinion without realizing that it does not accord with their own prior inclinations or creative interests. Also, individuals may come to unwittingly accept a normative attitude that they originally merely complied with, because of self-perceptual or dissonance reduction processes. In either case a danger is that over time people may lose, or fail to develop, the ability to discern their own values and interests. The inimical effects of such an occurrence will be discussed.

A final definitional issue concerns that of reactance. Those faced with strong normative pressure have a third option besides public compliance and private acceptance: they can resist, putting up a struggle against group norms. Although such counter-conformity can serve many useful functions, one danger is that the potential creator may become distracted by rebelliousness for its own sake. In other words, those who make a point of going against group opinion may, ultimately, be just as controlled by group processes and forces as those who passively go along with group opinion.

**II. WHY CREATIVITY AND CONFORMITY ''DON'T MIX''**

Most commentators agree that there are powerful conflicts between creativity-related and conformity related motives. Behavioral conformity typically involves a desire to be approved of by others, along with a corresponding fear of being rejected or ostracized by others. This desire is deeply rooted: given the importance of maintaining cohesive functioning within the small groups in which our ancestors lived, there is good reason to believe that evolutionary pressures selected for a strong motive to be approved of by ''the group.'' People's fears of being rejected by social groups if they do not conform are often justified—many experiments have demonstrated that those who persistently flout normative opinion are punished by, and finally excluded from, the groups of which they are a part. Interestingly, such results suggest that humans, besides having a built-in motive to seek approval by groups, also have a built-in motive to ''stifle'' those who challenge the status quo of their social groups. This tendency to resist others' nonconformity is also likely to be antithetical to creative accomplishment, insofar as it prevents individuals from thinking about the new ideas or possibilities suggested by others.

In an influential early (1962) chapter, Richard Crutchfield described conformist motivation as ego involved. Conformists are strongly focused on how they are perceived by other group members, and their primary goal is to protect or enhance their self-image and self-esteem. In contrast, creative performance tends to require strong task involvement—that is, an exclusive focus on the problem at hand, in combination with a desire to get to the bottom of things no matter where the search leads. Unfortunately, the ''search'' may often lead in directions which contradict or upset established beliefs, practices, or bureaucracies. In order to develop and market their new ideas individuals must often be willing to diverge strongly from group norms and accepted behavior, risking alienation and potentially drawing the group's wrath. Thus, one way in which conformist pressures may inhibit creativity is by reducing a person's willingness to follow through with a new idea or course of action. This may occur to the extent that a person's task-involved motivation is overwhelmed by his or her approval motivation.

A second potential negative effect of conformist pressures, already alluded to, is that they may cause people to lose touch with their own perceptions and thought processes. Creative activity depends on individuals' ability to access, and engage in open dialogue with, their own experience. Very often the first glimmerings of a new idea or approach are subtle and evanescent, at the ''fringes'' of consciousness. To the extent that individuals rely on others for guidance on how to think and behave, they may lose the ability to recognize and grasp such glimmerings within themselves. For example, one important first step in the creative process involves explicitly recognizing that there is a problem to be solved. Group mentalities are notoriously resistant to such recognition (e.g., when Kennedy's ''group-thinking'' advisors did not perceive the obvious flaws in the Bay of Pigs plan). Those who are overinvested in group approval may fail to notice their own nagging doubts or reservations regarding a course of action, or fail to recognize the seeds of a promising new idea when it occurs to them.

Thus far in this article, the negative effects of conformity upon creativity have come about because group minds tend to resist or discourage innovation. However, it is also possible for negative effects to occur even when groups openly welcome creativity. For example, art professors may encourage students to compose works which are unusual and original, and students may receive many kinds of social rewards for succeeding in this aim. However, a large literature indicates that cognitive functioning can be impaired to the extent that people become explicitly oriented toward such extrinsic rewards. Specifically, reward- or approval-oriented motivation has been associated with less cognitive flexibility, more shallow processing of new information, less integration of new information with preexisting knowledge, and less creativity in general. These decrements occur in part because thoughts of reward may intrude into actors' minds, distracting them and dividing their attention. In contrast those who can

remain intrinsically or task-motivated are more likely to maintain access to their own deeper cognitive resources, and thus are more likely to be creative.

To summarize, excessive concern for group norms and opinions is likely to inhibit a host of motivational, cognitive, and self-regulatory processes essential to innovation. Such concerns may reduce the quantity of one's motivation to pursue an innovative line of thinking, as when one fears rejection by the group, or such concerns may detract from the quality of one's efforts, when they involve excessive focus on receiving anticipated social rewards or avoiding anticipated punishments. It is worth noting at this juncture, however, that social groups need not necessarily pull for conformity. Some research suggests that group processes can even enhance individual creativity (such as group brainstorming techniques, or corporate climates which intentionally focus on change and encourage unconditional respect for each group-member's creative efforts). However, ego-involved motivations easily emerge even in the most egalitarian of social contexts, perhaps explaining why group contexts have a negative effect upon creativity on the whole.

### III. CONFORMIST FORCES WITHIN SITUATIONS

Research on the contextual determinants of creativity has focused on the impact of authority figures upon creative performance. In 1995, Sternberg and Lubart noted a variety of perplexities in this literature. For example, some research suggests that creativity is enhanced when authorities set limits, explicitly structure the task, set up competitions, spell out criteria for evaluation, and render judgment upon individuals' performances. However, other research indicates that external constraints, competition, and evaluation pressure all detract from creativity. Sternberg and Lubart suggest that these contradictory research findings are in part due to differences in the difficulty of the creative tasks employed in different studies, differences in subjects' prior experience with the tasks, or differences in subjects' initial arousal levels.

In addition to these possibilities, an important general factor determining when external constraints are detrimental may be the interpersonal climate in which they are administered. The theories of Amabile, Deci, and Ryan suggest that whenever constraints are viewed as controlling, they will tend to reduce task motivation and hence creativity. Presumably this is because a controlling authority's demeanor induces reactance or approval motives, or leads individuals to become overly focused on extrinsic rewards or punishments. As already noted, any of these foci can drain away cognitive and self-regulatory resources. In contrast, if evaluations and constraints can be delivered in a non-controlling, informative way, helping to better define the task while still supporting personal autonomy, an optimal context for intrinsic motivation and creativity may result.

Much research, conducted in both educational and work environments, is consistent with this conclusion. For example, teachers who conduct classes informally, welcome unorthodox views, allow students to choose what to investigate, and treat students as individuals are most likely to produce creative students. Similarly, ''open'' classrooms, in which students are allowed considerable flexibility and individualized effort is encouraged, tend to produce more creative students than do traditional classrooms which rely on drill, large group instruction, and carefully prepared curricula, and which emphasize exams and grading. Paralleling these findings, Amabile has identified manager characteristics conducive to creativity. Managers who set challenging goals and then grant employees substantial freedom and control over their work, who are not overly strict and can evaluate work non-threateningly, and who encourage new ideas are most likely to engender creative performance in their subordinates. In contrast, organizations in which there is defensiveness, a lack of freedom, and an unwillingness to risk

change do not function as creatively; in such contexts, conformity and rigidity are likely to ''rule the day.''

Normative forces work not only at the level of the group, classroom, or organization. Increasing attention is being given to cultural differences in conformity and the effects of such differences upon the creativity of citizens within various cultures. For example, recent research has examined aspects of Japanese, Turkish, Senegalese, Sudanese, and Israeli culture which may predispose citizens of those societies towards unthinking obedience and conventionality. Much will be heard in the future from this promising area of research. [See CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES.]

## IV. CONFORMIST FORCES IMPORTED INTO PERSONALITY

Besides studying social contexts which increase conformity and thus detract from creativity, researchers have also studied personality traits and styles related to conformity. In other words, conformity can be an enduring state of mind, not just a product of momentary situational influences. Such personality styles may develop when a child's efforts at independent self-expression are repeatedly punished or discouraged by parents or peers, or when love and affection are given only when the child conforms to rigid rules and regulations. This treatment may create an abiding insecurity and anxiousness regarding the approval of others, crippling the growing person's ability to be creative (although some have argued that early experiences of alienation can catalyze the formation of powerful creative personalities). Sulloway's 1996work indicates that birth order may also influence the acquisition of conformist traits. First-borns, being more naturally aligned with parents, are more likely to uphold the status quo. Although they tend to become high career achievers, they do so through relatively low-risk ventures and tend to resist important innovations in their fields. In contrast later-borns, having less power and receiving less attention, may be ''born to rebel'' against the familial status quo. Later, they may be more likely to make innovative contributions to their fields, and quicker to recognize and support legitimate paradigm shifts within their fields.

Little research has directly studied the relation of conformist traits to creativity. Instead, research has focused on the opposite pole, personal autonomy, considered one of the ''core characteristics'' of the creative personality. Autonomy refers to the preference for regulating oneself, instead of being regulated or controlled by social forces. Related personality traits include Independence of Judgment, Self-Directedness and Self-Determination, Self-Sufficiency, Self-Assertiveness, and Individuation. Such traits have been repeatedly shown to predict both momentary and lifetime creativity. This is because those high on these dimensions tend to (a) show less suggestibility and less need for the approval of others; (b) more courage and persistence in the face of criticism and pressure from others, and more willingness to express dissenting opinions; (c) more ability to maintain their task-involved or intrinsic motivation, and less susceptibility to ego-involved or performance motivation; and (d) more ability to maintain contact with and behave on the basis of enduring personal feelings and attitudes, rather than responding in a chameleon-like manner to momentary contingencies and norms. Although most of these findings are correlational, some experimental work has been conducted. For example, Crutchfield and his associates demonstrated in the late 1950s that those high in autonomy related traits are much less likely to conform to the (incorrect) group opinion in the Asch line-length paradigm, compared to those low in such traits.

One way of explaining the autonomy– creative relationship is to posit that autonomous individuals are more inclined to perceive potentially controlling social environments primarily in informational terms. This could give them at least two extra resources in their creative efforts. First, because they are not

heavily dependent upon others' approval, autonomous persons may be better able to take what is useful from the comments and opinions of their peers, while rejecting and discarding that which is not useful. That is, their autonomy may ''inoculate'' them against the danger of losing touch with their own perceptions as they make contact with others' ideas. Second, the ability to perceive potentially controlling events in informational terms is likely to help individuals to maintain their intrinsic or task-focused motivation, and thus maintain full access to cognitive resources. Individuals do in fact differ in the ability to shrug off potentially coercive input. For example, Deci and Ryan report that women are more likely to interpret ambiguous social feedback as controlling, detracting from their intrinsic motivation and perhaps creativity.

Another way of understanding the relationship between personal autonomy and creativity is in terms of an ''evolving systems'' model. Gruber's psycho-biographical studies reveal that important new themes and realizations tend to emerge slowly within the work of notable innovators, rather than occurring in moments of sudden insight. For example, although the first inklings of the theory of evolution appear in Charles Darwin's notebooks early on, the model matured slowly and required much of Darwin's life span to be worked out fully. This indicates that lifelong persistence and dedication to self-posed and self-defined problems may be crucial for the development of extraordinary creativity. Such long-term task-involved motivation is unlikely to be manifested in those who are easily swayed by popular opinions of the moment, and who take the cue for their work from current fads and trends.

A related perspective concerns the progression of an organismic integration process, occurring in a deeper way or at a faster rate within notable creators. Sheldon proposed an ''attunement'' hypothesis, in which autonomous persons are in better touch with the inner organizational tendencies that are inherent in developing life. Although such integrative tendencies are natural, they are also fragile, and may be forestalled to the extent that the person cannot detect his or her own authentic reactions amidst the din of social influence. Creative accomplishment may thus be viewed as a mere side effect of a more general integration process, which occurs automatically to the extent that people are fully ''in touch'' with themselves. This understanding of creativity is similar to that advocated by Maslow and Rogers, with their concepts of self-actualizing or fully functioning persons.

## V. CREATIVE PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT AS THE OVERCOMING OF CONFORMIST TENDENCIES

As suggested by the preceding, a number of theories posit that exceptional creativity occurs only after would-be creators have succeeded in psychologically differentiating themselves ''from the crowd.'' Most prominent among these is the psychodynamic model of Otto Rank, published in 1932. Rank proposed three types or stages of personality: a conformist, adapted type who takes his cues from those around him; a conflicted type, who has broken free of norms, but is confused and unhappy; and a creative type, who has gone through both of the latter stages to emerge with a powerful creative voice of her own.

A substantial body of research supports Rank's conception. For example, MacKinnon used the typological model to characterize the three groups of architects examined in the well-known IPAR studies. The nationally renowned creative architects in this sample were agood fit to Rank's ''creative'' prototype; the less renowned associates of these architects fit the ''conflicted'' prototype; and a control group of ordinary architects well fit the adapted or ''conformist'' prototype. Consistent with Rank's developmental assumptions, notable innovators often report an early sensitivity to controlling influences, which results in early rebellion against the status quo. For example, Hammer, in his extensive 1984 study of adolescent artists, found that the most gifted among them were experiencing profound conflict and emotional turmoil, and were also engaged in a retreat from their peers. These efforts at

detachment were motivated by an attempt to ''resist the corroding effects of overconformity.'' Similarly, Getzels and Jacksons' studies of highly creative and highly intelligent youths in the early 1960s showed that creative youths were more mocking of conventional aspirations and beliefs, and were much less popular with their teachers, despite the fact that their level of academic achievement was no less than the high-IQ group. Creative individuals may begin to resist conventional thinking at a relatively early age, in response to particular developmental crises or environments. For example, in 1966 Torrance identified a ''fourth grade slump'' in creativity, driven by children's increasing sensitivity to peer opinion at this age. A young child's ability to stand up to such early conformist pressures may represent a significant developmental achievement, and may serve as an important predictor of later creative achievement by that person. To be creative, one must sometimes ''defy the crowd''; perhaps the sooner this occurs, the better. As noted, however, those seduced into pursuing nonconformity for its own sake, rather than as a way of gaining the freedom to work, may yet be slaves to group opinion.

**4.a. Explain why power holders are likely to stereotype their subordinates. What would you do to reduce stereotyping by power holders? Explain why your solutions would be effective. 20**

**Reference:**

Susan Fiske and her colleagues (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin & Fiske, 1996; Goodwin et al., 2000) have postulated that having power over others, especially the power to control the rewards and punishments that others receive, facilitates stereotyping of the people subject to that power. For example, Stephanie Goodwin and her colleagues (2000) randomly assigned college student research participants to a high or low power role in evaluating a Hispanic high school student applying for a summer program. The researchers found that, compared to the low power participants, those with high power were more likely to view the applicant in stereotypic terms. Other studies have confirmed this power-leads-to-stereotype-use effect in a number of contexts (Goodwin et al., 2000) and for implicit as well as explicit stereotypes (Richeson & Ambady, 2003). Goodwin and Fiske (1996) have suggested that several factors influence the use of stereotypes by powerful people. First, because of their positions in social hierarchies such as formal organizations, powerful people are entitled to judge others and are often required to. This feeling of entitlement to judge leads to overconfidence in the accuracy of simple belief systems such as stereotypes, and belief in their accuracy leads to their use. Second, powerful people are motivated to maintain the power difference between themselves and those under them because higher power provides benefits such as higher pay and status. Stereotypes of subordinate groups, especially negative stereotypes, help power holders justify their positions in the social structure by portraying subordinates as being suited only for low power positions because they are incapable of doing higher-level work. Finally, people in power may stereotype subordinates because they have no motivation to individuate them. Recall that one factor that motivates individuation is depending on the other person for rewards. However, power holders are in the opposite position: others depend on them for rewards. As a result, power holders do not look for individuating information about subordinates and stereotype them by default, having no motivation to do otherwise. Not surprisingly, then, because low power people depend on high power people for rewards, low power people tend to individuate, rather than stereotype, the people who have power over them (Stevens & Fiske, 2000). As Laura Stevens and Susan Fiske (2000) note, forming individualized (that is, nonstereotypic) impressions of powerful people allows low power people to indirectly control the rewards they get by accurately anticipating what the powerful people want and helping them get it.

Because of either individual differences or situational influences, some power holders are weakness oriented whereas others are strength oriented and this orientation affects stereotype use. Weakness-

oriented power holders are motivated to avoid failure and so view subordinates in stereotypic terms when stereotypes indicate that the subordinates might not have the capabilities to do a task. The stereotype is then used as a justification for not allowing the subordinate to attempt the task. In contrast, strength-oriented power holders are motivated to achieve success and so view subordinates in stereotypic terms when stereotypes indicate that the subordinates do have the capabilities to do a task. Theresa Vescio, Mark Zanna, and David Butz (2003) compared these two types of power holders in a mock interview. Research participants selected questions to be used in interviewing female applicants for a stereotypically masculine job. As the researchers had theorized, compared to strength-oriented participants, those with a weakness orientation chose more questions designed to elicit weakness on the task, such as "Tell me about a time you struggled to complete a task involving spatial skills" and fewer questions designed to elicit strengths, such as "Tell me about a time when you completed a challenging mental problem and felt proud of your logic and reasoning skills." Thus, power holders are more likely to rely on stereotypes of subordinates when those stereotypes are consistent with the power holders' general approach to problem solving.

Power holders can inhibit stereotype use when they are motivated to do so, however. For example, Vescio and her colleagues (2003) found that power holders' stereotype use disappeared when receiving a reward depended on their subordinates' task performance. Because receiving the reward now depended on accurately assessing subordinate characteristics, power holders focused on individuating information about subordinates. Power holders also individuate subordinates when they feel responsible for their subordinates' outcomes (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996) or want to help subordinates with their problems (Overbeck & Park, 2001). Therefore, by appropriately motivating people who are in positions of power, organizations can reduce power holders' stereotype use (Goodwin & Fiske, 1996).

**4.b. What are the direct and indirect effects of online learning on distance education? Discuss the influence of perceived institutional presence on learning outcomes. 15**

**Reference:**

This research study provides some 'food for thought' on researching and practising online learning in a broader distance education system such as an open university rather than within a single unit of a course. Considering the different mixture of study participants, the analysis of data was carried out separately between students who can opt for using the OLE and students required to access the OLE on a regular basis. The analysis confirmed the assumption that students in compulsory OLE courses are generally more active users than students in an optional mode of the OLE. However, there were no significant differences between undergraduate and graduate students in web related behaviours such as log-in frequency, average time spent per visit, and self evaluation of level of activity in using the OLE as well as level of Internet skill. This finding appears to challenge some of the course coordinators' perspectives that the OLE can be used more effectively for graduate courses than for undergraduate ones due to the relatively more mature and serious attitudes that graduate students project towards course participation (Shin, 2002c). At present, however, it is difficult to determine which data are more valid and reliable; given potential impact of these findings on institutional policy, further investigation is required.

Another disputable point is the statistically unsupported relationship between student's engagement in the OLE and perceived learning outcomes, found in the analysis of the compulsory OLE courses. One possible explanation for this is that for the students who are required to access the OLE on a regular basis, what matters to their learning is not so much the sheer frequency of visits to the course site as a

measure of the quality of engagement in course activities. Given the usage of the compulsory mode, tutors or course coordinators may well try harder to engage students in the OLE than do the tutors and course coordinators in optional OLE courses. Future studies should take notice of this point, using more sophisticated measures of students' engagement in the OLE, either quantitatively or qualitatively.

When the use of the OLE was a matter of a student's choice, however, the effect of the OLE seems to be direct in relation to learning outcomes. This finding hints that students who are active in making use of the virtual component of learning materials or course activities may actually gain more from the course than students less interested in what the additional medium of instruction offers. But a subtle caution is needed in putting this observation into practice, for the finding was only true for the students in an optional mode of the OLE. This would imply that while it is important to encourage students to be autonomous in participating in the OLE, worrying too much about the possible low level of participation may be unnecessary.

The data also reveal information about individual student backgrounds that can result in varying levels of engagement in online learning, including level of previous education, previous online learning experience and level of competence using the Internet. Among these, self-assessed Internet skill was the strongest variable affecting both groups of students. Given this finding, the institution's current practice of providing students with the 'Online User's Guide' or 'OLE training video' is viewed as helpful to students in using the OLE (OUHK Working Group, 1999). Literature, too, stresses that ensuring a smooth 'learner-Interface interaction' with instructional media should be a prerequisite for distance students to effectively communicate with course content, instructors or peer students (Hillman et al, 1994).

Apart from the aspects related to the OLE, what may be noteworthy for distance education researchers are the observed significant connections between students' sense of institutional presence and the three indicators of involvement with distance learning (Figures 2 and 3). Put simply, distance students who have a stronger sense of availability of, and connectedness with, educational programme providers are likely to be more positive about learning outcomes, more satisfied with their learning experiences and more willing to continue being involved in distance learning than are students with a weaker sense of institutional presence. This finding backs the assertion that established 'studentship' can be crucial to distance students' academic success as well as course or programme completion, particularly for the students involved in an open university system (Shin, 2002b; Student Research Centre I ET OU, 1986). From this, practical lessons may be drawn such as that distance education programs or institutions need to be in continual communication with their students and should assure the students that their needs are taken care of despite the distance element. On the research side, too, the confirmed significance of institutional presence on various aspects of distance learning should compel researchers to attend to the 'totality of students' experience' rather than focusing on the use of individual technologies within a course (Gibbs, 2002, 101).

Given the growing expectations of online technology as a tool for providing distance students with a flexible learning environment, this paper reported a case of survey research exploring what effect online learning can bring to distance education. Admittedly, the term 'effect' was used rather loosely in this paper, mainly referring to the co-occurrence between two or more attributes or events, not in a strict sense of causality. The analysis of survey data from selected OUHK courses indicates that the effect of online learning can vary across individual courses, largely affected by the way in which the OLE is integrated into the course as a whole. For example, when the function of the OLE was supplementary, a direct relationship was found between the frequency of students' visits to the course site and their perceptions of learning outcomes. In compulsory OLE courses, however, the effect of students'

involvement in the OLE appeared to be rather indirect, mediated by their sense of institutional presence. In addition, the analysis suggests that it is critical for distance students involved in an open university to have a sense of belongingness to or connectedness with the institution as a whole. Replication studies are required to validate the results of the analysis, and it is noted that subsequent research is currently underway in the institution, involving a wider range of OLE courses including the Chinese OLE.

**4.c. Do people who have the most rewarding and satisfying relationships with their loved one suffer the most following the loved one's death? Or is it those with conflictual or ambivalent relationships who experience the most distress following the loss of a loved one? Substantiate your answer. 15**

**Reference:**

The death of a loved one is a ubiquitous human experience and is often regarded as a serious threat to health and well-being. Coming to terms with personal loss is considered to be an important part of successful adult development (Baltes & Skrotzki, 1995). In this chapter, we draw from our own research and that of others to explore how people are affected by the death of a loved one. In our judgment, such losses provide an excellent arena in which to study basic processes of stress and adaptation to change. Unlike many stressful life experiences, bereavement cannot be altered by the coping efforts of survivors. Indeed, the major coping task faced by the bereaved is to reconcile themselves to a situation that cannot be changed and find a way to carry on with their own lives. By learning more about how people react to a loved one's death, and how they come to terms with what has happened, we can begin to clarify the theoretical mechanisms through which major losses can have deleterious effects on subsequent mental and physical health. In our judgment, one of the most fascinating things about studying bereavement is the extraordinary variability that has been found regarding how people react to the death of a loved one. Some people are devastated and never again regain their psychological equilibrium; others emerge from the loss relatively unscathed and perhaps even strengthened (Elison & McGonigle, 2003; Parkes & Weiss, 1983). Yet at this point, we know relatively little about the diverse ways that people respond to the loss of a loved one, and why some people react with intense and prolonged distress while others do not. Do people who have the most rewarding and satisfying relationships with their loved one suffer the most following the loved one's death? Or is it those with conflictual or ambivalent relationships who experience the most distress following the loss of a loved one, as clinicians have frequently argued (see, e.g., Freud, 1917/1957; Parkes & Weiss, 1983; Rando, 1993). Among those who fail to show distress following the loss, is this best understood as denial, lack of attachment, or resilience in the face of loss?

Over the years, we carried out several systematic evaluations of common assumptions about coping with loss that appear to be held by professionals in the field as well as laypersons (Bonanno & Kaltman, 2001; Wortman & Silver, 1987, 1989, 2001). We identified these assumptions by reviewing some of the most important theoretical models of the grieving process, such as Freud's (1917/1957) grief work perspective and Bowlby's (1980) early attachment model (see Bonanno & Kaltman, 1999; Wortman & Silver, 2001). In addition, we examined books and articles written by and for clinicians and other health care providers that describe the grieving process (see, e.g., Jacobs, 1993; Malkinson, Rubin, & Witztum, 2000; Rando, 1993). Finally, we reviewed books and articles written by and for bereaved individuals themselves (e.g., Gowell, 1992; Sanders, 1999). The following assumptions were identified:

1. Bereaved persons are expected to exhibit significant distress following a major loss, and the failure to experience such distress tends to be seen as indicative of a problem (e.g., that the bereaved person will experience a delayed grief reaction).
2. Positive emotions are implicitly assumed to be absent during this period. If they are expressed, they tend to be viewed as an indication that people are denying or covering up their distress.
3. Following the loss of a loved one, the bereaved must confront and "work through" their feelings about the loss. Efforts to avoid or deny feelings are maladaptive in the long run.
4. It is important for the bereaved to break down their attachment to the deceased loved one.
5. Within a year or two, the bereaved will be able to come to terms with what has happened, recover from the loss, and resume their earlier level of functioning.

Because these assumptions about the grieving process seemed to be firmly entrenched in Western culture, we anticipated that they would be supported by the available data. However, our reviews provided little support for any of these assumptions. For this reason, we labeled them "myths of coping with loss."

Initially, studies in the field of grief and loss were plagued by major methodological shortcomings, including the use of convenience samples, low response rates, attrition, and the failure to include control respondents. There was a dearth of scientific evidence on important concepts like "working through" and recovery from loss. Hence, in our earliest papers discussing these assumptions (Wortman & Silver, 1987, 1989), it was difficult to evaluate the validity of some of them. Over the past few decades, however, research on bereavement has burgeoned. In fact, just in the last 10 years, approximately 5,000 articles have appeared on grief and/or bereavement. In addition to a large number of sound empirical studies, two editions of an influential handbook of bereavement have appeared in the literature (Stroebe, Hansson, Stroebe, & Schut, 2001; Stroebe, Stroebe, & Hansson, 1993). As a result of the accumulation of research evidence, as well as related theoretical developments in the field of bereavement, some shifts have occurred in prevailing views about how people cope with the loss of a loved one. In this chapter, we review these developments.

In the first section of the chapter, we provide a brief review of the most influential theories of grief and loss, some of which have contributed to the myths of coping, while others have helped generate new questions about the grieving process. In the second section, we discuss each myth of coping, summarizing available evidence and highlighting ways the myths have changed over time as research evidence has accumulated. In these sections, we also identify what we believe to be the most important new areas of research. In the final section, we discuss the implications of this work for researchers, clinicians, and the bereaved themselves. In so doing, we consider the efficacy of grief counseling or therapy. We also address the question of what physicians, funeral directors, employers, and friends can do to support the bereaved in their efforts to deal with the loss.

**Theories of Grief and Loss**

Many different theoretical formulations have influenced the current understanding of the grief process (for a more detailed review, see Archer, 1999; Bonanno & Kaltman, 1999; Rando, 1993; Stroebe & Schut, 2001).

**Classic Psychoanalytic View**

One of the most influential approaches to loss has been the classic psychoanalytic model of bereavement, which is based on Freud's (1917/1957) seminal paper, "Mourning and Melancholia." According to Freud, the primary task of mourning is the gradual surrender of psychological attachment to the deceased. Freud believed that relinquishment of the love object involves a painful internal struggle. The individual experiences intense yearning for the lost loved one yet is faced with the reality of that person's absence. As thoughts and memories are reviewed, ties to the loved one are gradually withdrawn. This process, which requires considerable time and energy, was referred to by Freud as "the work of mourning." At the conclusion of the mourning period, the bereaved individual is said to have "worked through" the loss and to have freed himself or herself from an intense attachment to an unavailable person. Freud maintained that when the process has been completed, the bereaved person regains sufficient emotional energy to invest in new relationships and pursuits. This view of the grieving process has dominated the bereavement literature over much of the past century and only more recently has been called into question (Bonanno & Kaltman, 1999; Stroebe, 1992–1993; Wortman & Silver, 1989). For example, it has been noted that the concept of grief work is overly broad and lacks clarity because it fails to differentiate between such processes as rumination, confrontative coping, and expression of emotion (Stroebe & Schut, 2001).

**Attachment Theory**

Another theoretical framework that has been extremely influential is Bowlby's attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; see also Fraley & Shaver, 1999; Shaver & Tancredy, 2001). In this work,
Bowlby integrated ideas from psychodynamic thought, from the developmental literature on young children's reactions to separation, and from work on the mourning behavior of primates. Bowlby maintained that during the course of normal development, individuals form instinctive affectional bonds or attachments, initially between child and parent and later between adults. He believed that the nature of the relationship between a child and his or her mother or caregiver has a major impact on subsequent relationships. He suggested that when affectional bonds are threatened, powerful attachment behaviors are activated, such as crying and angry protest. Unlike Freud, Bowlby believed that the biological function of these behaviors is not withdrawal from the loved one but rather reunion. However, in the case of a permanent loss, the biological function of assuring proximity with attachment figures becomes dysfunctional. Consequently, the bereaved person struggles between the opposing forces of activated attachment behavior and the reality of the loved one's absence.

Bowlby maintained that in order to deal with these opposing forces, the mourner goes through four stages of grieving: initial numbness, disbelief, or shock; yearning or searching for the deceased, accompanied by anger and protest; despair and disorganization as the bereaved gives up the search, accompanied by feelings of depression and hopelessness; and reorganization or recovery as the loss is accepted, and there is a gradual return to former interests. By emphasizing the survival value of attachment behavior, Bowlby was the first to give a plausible explanation for responses such as searching or anger in grief. Bowlby was also the first to maintain that there is a relationship between a person's attachment history and how he or she will react to the loss of a loved one. For example, children who endured frequent separations from their parents may form anxious and highly dependent attachments as adults, and may react with intense, and prolonged grief when a spouse or partner dies (see Shaver & Tancredy, 2001, or Stroebe, Schut, & Stroebe, 2005a, for a more detailed discussion). Because it provides a framework for understanding individual differences in response to loss, Bowlby's attachment model has continued to be influential in the study of grief and loss.

**Stages of Grief**

Another aspect of Bowlby's work that has been influential in determining how we think about grief is his idea that grieving involves stages of reaction to loss. Drawing from this work, several theorists have proposed that people go through stages or phases in coming to terms with loss (see, e.g., Horowitz, 1976, 1985; Ramsay & Happee, 1977; Sanders, 1989). Perhaps the most well-known of these models is the one proposed by Kübler-Ross (1969) in her highly influential book On Death and Dying. This model, which was developed to explain how dying persons react to their own impending death, posits that people go through denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and ultimately acceptance. It is Kübler-Ross's model that popularized stage theories of bereavement. For many years, stage models have been taught in medical, nursing, and social work schools, and in many cases, these models are firmly entrenched among health care professionals. Kübler-Ross's model has also appeared in articles in newspapers and magazines written for bereaved persons and their family members. As a result, stage models have strongly influenced the common understanding of grief in our society.

**Beyond Stage Models**

As research has begun to accumulate, it has become clear that there is little support for the view that there are systematic stages. In contrast, the evidence shows that the reaction to loss varies considerably from person to person, and that few people pass through the stages in the expected fashion (see Archer, 1999, or Attig, 1996, for a review). Several major weaknesses of stage models have been identified (Neimeyer, 1998). First, they cannot account for the variability in response that follows a major loss. Second, they place grievers in a passive role. Third, such models fail to consider the social or cultural factors that influence the process. Fourth, stage models focus too much attention on emotional responses to the loss and not enough on cognitions and behaviors. Finally, stage models tend to pathologize people who do not pass through the stages. If people do not reach a state of acceptance, for example, they may be led to believe that they are not coping appropriately with the loss. As a result of these and other critiques and an absence of empirical support, most researchers have come to believe that the idea of a fixed sequence of stages is not particularly useful (Stroebe, Hansson, et al., 2001).

More recent theoretical models, such as Neimeyer's model of meaning reconstruction (Neimeyer, 1997, 1999), have attempted to address these shortcomings by portraying grief as a more idiosyncratic process in which people strive to make sense of what has happened. For example, Neimeyer (2000, 2006) has maintained that major losses challenge a person's sense of identity and narrative coherence. Narrative disorganization can range from relatively limited and transient to more sweeping and chronic, depending on the nature of the relationship and the circumstances surrounding the death. According to Neimeyer, a major task of grief involves reorganizing one's life story to restore coherence and maintain continuity between the past and the future.

**Stress and Coping Approach**

Over the past two decades, a theoretical orientation referred to as the stress and coping approach, or the cognitive coping approach (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; see also Carver, this volume), has become highly influential in the field of bereavement. Stress and coping theorists maintain that life changes like the death of a loved one become distressing if a person appraises the situation as taxing or exceeding his or her resources. An important feature of this model is that it highlights the role of cognitive appraisal in understanding how people react to loss. A person's appraisal, or subjective assessment of what has been lost, is hypothesized to influence his or her emotional reaction to the stressor and the coping strategies that are employed. As Folkman (2001) has indicated, however, there is surprisingly

little research on specific coping strategies that people use to deal with loss and the impact of these various strategies.

To explain why a given loss has more impact on one person than another, stress and coping researchers have focused on the identification of potential risk or protective factors, such as a history of mental health problems, optimism, social support, or financial assets (see Stroebe & Schut, 2001, for a review). The appraisal of the loss, as well as the magnitude of physical and mental health consequences that result from the loss, are thought to depend on these factors. Those with fewer risk factors, and more coping resources, are expected to recover more quickly and completely. Originally, the model focused primarily on negative emotions that were generated as a result of experiencing a stressful life event. In an important revision of the model, Folkman (2001) has incorporated positive emotions, which are believed to sustain coping efforts over time.

**Toward More Comprehensive Models of Bereavement**

Stage models and the stress and coping model can be applied to bereavement, but they were not developed specifically to account for people's reactions to the loss of a loved one. Within the past few years, two new theoretical models have been developed: Bonanno's four-component model (Bonanno & Kaltman, 1999), and Stroebe and Schut's (1999, 2001) dual-process model. Not only do these models focus specifically on bereavement, but each attempts to integrate elements from diverse theoretical approaches into a comprehensive model. Bonanno's goal was to develop a conceptually sound and empirically testable framework for understanding individual differences in grieving. He identified four primary components of the grieving process—the context in which the loss occurs (e.g., was it sudden or expected, timely or untimely); the subjective meanings associated with the loss (e.g., was the bereaved person resentful that he or she had to care for the loved one prior to the death?); changes in the representation of the lost loved one over time (e.g., does the bereaved person maintain a continuing connection with the deceased?); and the role of coping and emotion regulation processes that can mitigate or exacerbate the stress of loss. Bonanno's model makes the prediction that recovery is most likely when negative grief-related emotions are regulated or minimized and when positive emotions are instigated or enhanced (Bonanno, 2001). This hypothesis, which is diametrically opposed to what would be derived from the psychodynamic
approach, has generated considerable interest and support in recent years.

The dual-process model of coping with bereavement (Stroebe & Schut, 1999, 2001) indicates that following a loved one's death, bereaved people alternate between two different kinds of coping: loss-oriented coping and restoration-oriented coping. While engaged in loss-oriented coping, the bereaved person focuses on and attempts to process or resolve some aspect of the loss itself. Restoration-oriented coping involves attempting to adapt to or master the challenges inherent in daily life, including life circumstances that may have changed as a result of the loss. Stroebe and Schut (1999, 2001) have proposed that each of these coping orientations is associated with certain advantages and disadvantages, and that by alternating between them, the disadvantages of employing one strategy too long can be minimized. They have suggested that early in the process, most people focus primarily on lossoriented coping but that over time, there is a shift to more restoration-oriented coping. They have also maintained that the model provides a way to understand individual differences in coping. For example, they pointed out that there is considerable evidence to indicate that women tend to be more loss-oriented than men (Stroebe & Schut, 2001), thus suggesting a possible explanation for gender differences in response to loss. As Archer (1999) has noted, one of the most important features of this

model is that it provides an alternative to the view that grief is resolved solely through confrontation with the loss.

Throughout the years, the theoretical models discussed here have influenced and, at the same time, have been influenced by the empirical work on coping with loss. For example, accumulating evidence regarding variability in response to loss led researchers to move away from traditional grief models and instead employ a stress and coping framework that can account for divergent responses to loss. In return, the empirical evidence that has come out of this effort to account for variability in response to loss has led to further theoretical development. For example, the most recent bereavement models have incorporated new insights about what questions are important to study and allow specific predictions as to how to address these questions. The following sections provide a review of the empirical work that in some ways has been the "engine" behind recent changes in our thinking about bereavement.

**Revisiting the "Myths of Coping"**

Over the past decade, bereavement research has continued to become more methodologically sophisticated, with many researchers employing powerful longitudinal designs to study the impact of loss. Some longitudinal studies have examined the reactions of the bereaved from a few months after the loss through the first 5 years (e.g., Bonanno, Keltner, Holen, & Horowitz, 1995; Murphy, Johnson, Chung, & Beaton, 2003; Murphy, Johnson, & Lohan, 2002). Others have focused on people whose loved one is ill, and have assessed relevant variables before and at various intervals after the death (e.g., Folkman, Chesney, Collette, Boccellari, & Cooke, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997; Schulz, Mendelson, & Haley, 2003). Still others have followed large community samples across time and studied those who became bereaved during the course of the study (e.g., Bonanno et al., 2002; Carnelley, Wortman & Kessler, 1999; Lichtenstein, Gatz, Pederson, Berg, & McClearn, 1996; Mendes de Leon, Kasl, & Jacobs, 1994). Most studies have relied solely on respondents' assessments of key variables such as depression. However, some have used clinical assessments, and a few have included nonverbal data (e.g., Bonanno & Keltner, 1997) or assessments from others (e.g., Bonanno, Moskowitz, Papa, & Folkman, 2005).

The vast majority of bereavement studies have focused on the loss of a spouse. In the past decade, however, important new studies have appeared on reactions to the loss of a child (e.g., Dyregrov, Nordanger, & Dyregrov, 2003; Murphy, 1996; Murphy et al., 1999; Murphy, Johnson, & Lohan, 2003); parent (e.g., Silverman, Nickman, & Worden, 1992); and sibling (e.g., Balk, 1983; Batten & Oltjenbruns, 1999; Cleiren, 1993; Hogan & DeSantis, 1994). In one study, reactions to various kinds of familial loss were compared (Cleiren, 1993; Cleiren, Diekstra, Kerkhof, & van der Wal, 1994). Most studies have focused on respondents who are heterogeneous with respect to cause of death. However, some have examined reactions to specific losses, such as parents whose children experienced a sudden, traumatic death (e.g., Dyregrov et al., 2003; Murphy, Johnson, & Lohan, 2003), or gay male caregivers whose partners died of AIDS (e.g., Folkman, 1997a; Folkman et al., 1996; Moskowitz, Folkman, & Acree, 2003; Moskowitz, Folkman, Collette, & Vittinghoff, 1996). A few studies have compared two or more groups of respondents who lost loved ones under different circumstances (e.g., natural causes, accident, or suicide; e.g., Cleiren, 1993; Dyregrov et al., 2003; Middleton, Raphael, Burnett, & Martinek, 1998; Murphy, Johnson, Wu, Fan, & Lohan, 2003). Consequently, it is now possible to determine whether the "myths of coping" hold true across different kinds of deaths that occur under varying conditions.

Of course, there are still some areas where relatively little is known. For example, the vast majority of studies on the loss of a spouse focus on middle-aged or elderly white women. This is ironic, since the available evidence (see, e.g., Miller & Wortman, 2002; Stroebe, Stroebe, & Schut, 2001) suggests that men are more vulnerable to the effects of conjugal loss than are women. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in how men grieve (see, e.g., Martin & Doka, 2000), and in gender differences in grieving (see, e.g., Wolff & Wortman, 2006; Wortman, Wolff, & Bonanno, 2004). There are very few studies on reactions to the death of a sibling, despite evidence that this is a profound loss, particularly for adult women (Cleiren, 1993). With few exceptions (e.g., Carr, 2004), there is also a paucity of studies that include Blacks or Hispanics. Hence, it is difficult to determine whether the findings reported in the literature will generalize to these or other culturally diverse groups.

**5.a. How would you explain learning disability? Briefly describe various types of learning disorders. 15**

**Reference:**

**Types of learning disabilities**

Learning disabilities can be categorized either by the type of information processing that is affected or by the specific difficulties caused by a processing deficit.

**By stage of information processing**

Learning disabilities fall into broad categories based on the four stages of information processing used in learning: input, integration, storage, and output.

**Input**: This is the information perceived through the senses, such as visual and auditory perception. Difficulties with visual perception can cause problems with recognizing the shape, position and size of items seen. There can be problems with sequencing, which can relate to deficits with processing time intervals or temporal perception. Difficulties with auditory perception can make it difficult to screen out competing sounds in order to focus on one of them, such as the sound of the teacher's voice. Some children appear to be unable to process tactile input. For example, they may seem insensitive to pain or dislike being touched.

**Integration**: This is the stage during which perceived input is interpreted, categorized, placed in a sequence, or related to previous learning. Students with problems in these areas may be unable to tell a story in the correct sequence, unable to memorize sequences of information such as the days of the week, able to understand a new concept but be unable to generalize it to other areas of learning, or able to learn facts but be unable to put the facts together to see the "big picture." A poor vocabulary may contribute to problems with comprehension.

**Storage**: Problems with memory can occur with short-term or working memory, or with long-term memory. Most memory difficulties occur in the area of short-term memory, which can make it difficult to learn new material without many more repetitions than is usual. Difficulties with visual memory can impede learning to spell.

**Output**: Information comes out of the brain either through words, that is, language output, or through muscle activity, such as gesturing, writing or drawing. Difficulties with language output can

create problems with spoken language, for example, answering a question on demand, in which one must retrieve information from storage, organize our thoughts, and put the thoughts into words before we speak. It can also cause trouble with written language for the same reasons. Difficulties with motor abilities can cause problems with gross and fine motor skills. People with gross motor difficulties may be clumsy, that is, they may be prone to stumbling, falling, or bumping into things. They may also have trouble running, climbing, or learning to ride a bicycle. People with fine motor difficulties may have trouble buttoning shirts, tying shoelaces, or with handwriting.

### By function impaired

Deficits in any area of information processing can manifest in a variety of specific learning disabilities. It is possible for an individual to have more than one of these difficulties. This is referred to as comorbidity or co-occurrence of learning disabilities. In the UK, the term dual diagnosis is often used to refer to co-occurrence of learning difficulties.

### Reading disorder (ICD-10 and DSM-IV codes: F81.0/315.00)

The most common learning disability. Of all students with specific learning disabilities, 70%-80% have deficits in reading. The term "Developmental Dyslexia" is often used as a synonym for reading disability; however, many researchers assert that there are different types of reading disabilities, of which dyslexia is one. A reading disability can affect any part of the reading process, including difficulty with accurate or fluent word recognition, or both, word decoding, reading rate, prosody (oral reading with expression), and reading comprehension. Before the term "dyslexia" came to prominence, this learning disability used to be known as "word blindness."

Common indicators of reading disability include difficulty with phonemic awareness—the ability to break up words into their component sounds, and difficulty with matching letter combinations to specific sounds (sound-symbol correspondence).

### Writing disorder (ICD-10 and DSM-IV codes F81.1/315.2)

Speech and language disorders can also be called Dysphasia/Aphasia (coded F80.0-F80.2/315.31 in ICD-10 and DSM-IV).

Impaired written language ability may include impairments in handwriting, spelling, organization of ideas, and composition. The term "dysgraphia" is often used as an overarching term for all disorders of written expression. Others, such as the International Dyslexia Association, use the term "dysgraphia" exclusively to refer to difficulties with handwriting.

### Math disability (ICD-10 and DSM-IV codes F81.2-3/315.1)

Sometimes called dyscalculia, a math disability can cause such difficulties as learning math concepts (such as quantity, place value, and time), difficulty memorizing math facts, difficulty organizing numbers, and understanding how problems are organized on the page. Dyscalculics are often referred to as having poor "number sense".

### Non ICD-10/DSM

- Nonverbal learning disability: Nonverbal learning disabilities often manifest in motor clumsiness, poor visual-spatial skills, problematic social relationships, difficulty with math, and poor organizational skills. These individuals often have specific strengths in the verbal domains, including early speech, large vocabulary, early reading and spelling skills, excellent rote-memory and auditory retention, and eloquent self-expression.

- Disorders of speaking and listening: Difficulties that often co-occur with learning disabilities include difficulty with memory, social skills and executive functions (such as organizational skills and time management).

Auditory processing disorder: Difficulties processing auditory information include difficulty comprehending more than one task at a time and a relatively stronger ability to learn visually.

**5.b. Critically evaluate the relationship between expectancy attitude, motivation and job behavior. 15**

**Reference:**

**Expectancy Theory**

One of the things that is unique about humans, at least with respect to cognition, is their ability to anticipate the future and adjust their behavior accordingly. Expectancy Theory is based on this uniquely human characteristic, and is focused on the cognitive processes that drive employees' decisions regarding where they will direct their efforts (Vroom, 1964, 1995). The basic premise of Expectancy Theory is that employees will generally direct their efforts toward behaviors or courses of action when:

1. There is a high probability that they will be able to perform the behavior if they try.
2. There is a high probability that the behavior or course of action will lead to some outcome.
3. The outcome that will result from the behavior or course of action has value to the person.

If any of these three conditions is lacking, a person is unlikely to direct his or her efforts toward that particular course of action.

According to Vroom (1964, 1995), the belief that one's efforts will allow one to perform a given behavior is referred to as **expectancy** and is typically denoted as effort-to-performance (E → P). Because expectancy is a belief about the future, Vroom proposed that this is a probability function and, as such, may range from 0 to 1. An expectancy of zero essentially means there is no way that a person's efforts will result in a given level of performance. In contrast, an expectancy of close to 1 indicates that an employee has considerable confidence that if he or she puts forth effort, a given level of performance can be achieved. Expectancy beliefs may be based on a number of factors: a person's innate ability, his or her level of training, or the existence or lack of significant performance constraints.

The belief that a given behavior or level of performance will be associated with a given outcome is referred to as **instrumentality** and is typically denoted as performance-to-outcome (P → O). Like expectancy, instrumentality is a probability function. For example, an employee may perceive the instrumentality for the relationship between a given level of performance and a pay increase to be zero if salary raises are across the board or are determined by collective bargaining. On the other hand, a high instrumentality would indicate a strong possibility that a given level of performance would be rewarded with a given pay increase. Instrumentality beliefs are based, to a large extent, on stated

organizational reward policies (i.e., the existence of merit pay), but are also based on the manner in which such policies are carried out.

The value of the outcomes that an employee may obtain is referred to as **valence.** According to Vroom, because of a number of factors, people differ on the value they attach to outcomes that can be obtained for different levels of performance. One person, for example, may place a high value on monetary compensation; thus, a high raise may have considerable valence. Another person, in contrast, may place greater value on feelings of mastery and praise from others. One interesting thing about valence is that it can take on negative values, and this has implications for predicting the direction of effort. Consider, for example, all of the things that may occur if an employee performs his or her job very well. Pay raises, praise from one's supervisor, recognition from others, and feelings of accomplishment are outcomes that most people would find at least moderately desirable. In contrast, those who perform their jobs well often end up having to perform a greater proportion of the work, and their higher salaries may encounter resentment from fellow employees. These outcomes would be considered by most people to be at least moderately undesirable.

## TABLE 8.3
### The Equation Representing How the Components of Expectancy Theory Interact to Determine Motivational Force

$$F = E \left( \Sigma\, I \times V \right)$$

F = Motivational force
E = Expectancy (E→P)
Σ = Summing over all possible outcomes
I = Instrumentality (P→O)
V = Valence

Vroom proposed that Expectancy, Instrumentality, and Valence can be combined, in equation form, to explain employee motivation. This equation is presented in Table 8.3. The variable that this equation predicts is labelled **force.** This simply represents the level of effort that an employee will direct toward a given level of performance. Readers should be clear that force is not the same as performance. A person may direct his or her efforts in a way that is consistent with Expectancy Theory, yet not perform well because of a lack of innate ability or perhaps performance related constraints.

For each possible outcome that can result from a given level of performance, instrumentality is multiplied by the valence. These values are then summed, and this sum is then multiplied by expectancy. Given this equation, force will be highest when employees believe that effort will lead to a given level of performance, and that the level of performance will lead to valued outcomes. Conversely, if any of these values are near zero, the motivational force will be considerably lower. For example, let's say an employee believes there is a high probability that effort will lead to a given level of performance, and that the outcomes that are possible are highly valued. If this employee does not believe that these outcomes are contingent on performance (e.g., instrumentality is low), then force will be low.

As another example, consider an employee who believes that effort will lead to a given level of performance, and that performance will lead to a number of outcomes. In this case, force may still be low if the outcomes have little value to the employee. The possibility of a promotion, or perhaps of praise, does not mean much to the employee. Finally, an employee could believe that performance leads to highly valued outcomes, but he or she does not believe that the effort will lead to performance (e.g., expectancy is low). For example, many marathon runners believe that setting a world record would lead to a number of highly valued outcomes (e.g., money, fame, feelings of accomplishment), yet do not believe they can achieve this level of performance, even with considerable effort. Since the development of Expectancy Theory by Vroom in 1964, it has become one of the dominant motivational theories in organizational psychology. As a result, considerable research has examined expectancy theory predictions.

Van Eerde and Thierry (1996) performed a meta-analysis of 77 studies that have tested Expectancy Theory predictions, and examined the correlations between expectancy theory components and outcomes such as performance, effort, intention, preference, and choice. The results of this study showed mixed support for Expectancy Theory. For example, although individual components such as expectancy and instrumentality were correlated with a number of outcomes, multiplying terms together, as suggested by Expectancy Theory, did not result in greater prediction. Another important finding from this meta-analysis was that correlations based on studies employing **within-subjects designs** were stronger than correlations from studies employing **between-subjects designs.** In a within-subjects design, Expectancy Theory would be used to predict a particular individual's choice among different levels of performance or different courses of action. In a between-subjects design, Expectancy Theory would be used to predict performance or effort from a large number of individuals. This finding supports the contention that the theory is useful in predicting how people will direct their efforts when faced with a number of different choices (e.g., Mitchell, 1974; Muchinsky, 1977).

In addition to direct empirical tests, Expectancy Theory has received indirect support from studies that have examined the impact of financial incentives (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; Lawler, 1990; Lawler & Jenkins, 1992). Although financial compensation will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 9, suffice it to say that considerable evidence has shown that financial incentives can be a powerful motivator. Although this in itself does not constitute direct support for Expectancy Theory, it is certainly consistent with many of its propositions.

**5.c. In what ways institutions and individuals actualize male dominance over women? What have been the changes in its nature due to women's increasing independence, autonomy and equality? 20**

**Reference:**

**The Construction of Male Dominance**

Violence against women has been a weapon in men's arsenal for centuries. But this truly is qualified by an equally compelling reality, that the where, when, why, and how of men's coercion in women's lives and its link to other oppressive strategies are contingent on the structure of sexual power in a given time and place and how it is contested. Aggression may be biologically based. But prevailing forms of violence are rooted in calculations of the relative benefits, risks, and costs entailed in using force in one situation but not in others. The constitution of women's agency is also historically specific and both motivates and constrains how abuse is delivered. Male domination is about what women are and have, not merely what men are or want.

Feminist texts highlight four components of male domination: institutional constraints on women's opportunities and behavior, patriarchal rule, or sex discrimination; "sexism," a cultural ideology that rationalizes these constraints by identifying them with female "nature"; marriage and the family as core sites for shaping gender stereotypes; and coercion, the proximate means by which institutions and/or individuals actualize male power over women at these sites.1 The following sections track how the changing interplay between these elements and women's developing agency was expressed in three historical constellations of abuse.

**Traditional Patriarchy: Personal Violence in the Context of Political Control**

In traditional societies, patriarchy is the governing political principle that organizes economic, public, and family life—the single thread that runs through law, custom, and religion to join the personal power of the husband over his wife to ruling networks of older, wealthier, and more religiously qualified men. Female subordination is a social fact established in women's families of origin, transferred to their marriage, and enforced across a broad political spectrum by a network of male-dominated institutions, such as the monarchy, the feudal estate, and the Church. Regardless of whether male elders govern through a centralized sovereignty or communally based networks centered in tribes, clans, or religious brotherhoods, women in this world have few alternatives to dependence on the significant men in their lives. The main line of formal authority in patriarchal society runs from the elders downward through the hierarchy of males. Women are effectively the property of men, the way cattle are, and their behavior and obligations in everything from how they dress and whom they marry to how they address their husbands are prescribed by public rules and enforced by public sanctions that remain the same whether their husband is a prince or a peasant. This fact—that women are equal in their subordination to men—helps compensate men for the rigid hierarchies through which their own inequalities, exploitation, and oppression are organized.

Women experienced varied degrees of subordination in ancient civilizations. 2 But for our purposes, the relevant fact is that while all men shared equally in the right to beat their wives and beatings or even killings could be expected or even required in circumstances where an honor code or a rule of obedience had been violated, whether women were beaten had no appreciable effect on their social standing and offered only very limited advantages to men. Where women are already subordinate, wife beating is supported by the patriarchy. But its specific dimensions are a function of situational factors specific to individual or familial circumstances rather than an overriding social logic. Whether women are beaten bears on the quality of their lives, but not on their relative freedom, because they have none. This is why women in traditional societies attribute abuse by their husbands or other family member, including mother-in-laws and a man's senior wives, to fate and bad luck.

The relationship between politics, economics, and domestic life changed during the Middle Ages in Europe, but without appreciably altering women's confinement to the family or the degree of their subordination to men. As far as women's obedience to their husbands was concerned, the major questions that excited public notice—hence official interpolation by Church or state—involved the content, context, and extent of their obligations, the means of their punishment (illustrated by the debate about "the rule of thumb"), and how to subdivide their loyalty to satisfy competing claims from male heirs or other men in their network.

This complex political network of obligation and protection remained largely intact until the beginnings of the industrial revolution in the sixteenth century. This is not to say that women were always passive

to their fate or that wife abuse was uniformly endorsed. Areview of court records for Essex County (Massachusetts) in the last years of the seventeenth century reveals that women were assailants in 21 of 108 cases involving some form of violent behavior and victims in 34, a rate that is virtually identical to those recorded among working-class women in London in the 1860s.3 Wife abuse was illegal in colonial New England, and community-based practices like the Cheverie or "riding the stang" were occasionally used to punish wife beaters. But women rarely brought complaints before New England courts because penalties were few and enforcement rarely extended to allowing a wife to leave or divorce an abusive husband. Moreover, as is illustrated by the "skimmington" in which Lucetta is murdered in Thomas Hardy's The Mayor of Casterbridge, women who cheated or disobeyed their husbands were the most common targets of these community rituals. So long as male dominance was secured by formal restraints on women's mobility, sociability, dress, and the like, disobedience afforded few benefits.

**The Industrial Revolution: Wife Torture, Inequality, and the Culture of Sexism**

Capitalism and the establishment of representative democracies in the West destroyed the institutional support for patriarchy and threatened its material base in women's domestic labor. Women's formal status as subordinates to men was replaced by a system of sexual inequality based in institutional discrimination and ideological separatism. The economic and political dimensions of this story can only be sketched. Towns had maintained local markets for centuries. From the sixteenth century on, however, the development of long-distance trade elicited a far-reaching network of horizontal economic relationships that challenged the political regulation of local commerce by the guilds and corporations and bypassed the vertical relationships of dependence that rooted personal domination by husbands in an estate system and self-contained household economy.

The mercantilist system gradually gave way to manufacturing, transforming trade in raw materials and finished goods from a source of wealth to a secondary source of domestic employment and subordinating what remained of household production. One result of this process was the growing separation between each family's individual economy, albeit oriented toward a commodity market, and the old supra-individual system of political authority on which the personal power of men depended. Moving production out of families eliminated an important economic rationale for domestic tyranny. It also opened a new space where personal life could flourish as voluntary and intimate that contrasted sharply with the coercive nature of the state and the depersonalized and competitive character of emerging markets in labor and other commodities. In the interstices between this new conjugal arena, private enterprise, and the state, a "public" formed, comprised of "private people come together" in the words of German sociologist Jürgen Habermas, to restrict state coercion and, in the name of individual rights, to allow the maximum amount of freedom for (and in) the private sphere of commodity production, exchange, and family life.4 The newly emerging classes of wage workers, merchants, and entrepreneurs aligned to support broadly based representative institutions through which they could influence public policy without playing a direct role in its formulation.

In theory, the new political culture of individual rights and liberties should have offered women credible alternatives to domestic subservience. It did not, at least not immediately. Although large numbers of single women were employed, until the late nineteenth century and in many countries well into the twentieth, women could not own and control property, enter contractual agreements, enter the professions, or vote, sit on juries, or hold public office. Husbands even owned the earnings of the proportionately few married woman who worked outside the home. Because individual rights were closely tied to property ownership and men owned the property, women were excluded from the benefits of citizenship. Industrialization widened the space separating home from productive labor,

made the receipt of wages the mark of "real" work (and so of manhood), and led to the declining visibility and status of women's contributions in the home. As the bourgeois family became the cellular module for organizing social life, women were burdened with satisfying needs for health, education, socialization, service, and support they had formerly met in conjunction with community networks.5

Sexism, "Wife Torture," and the Domestication of Violence The cultural configuration modern feminists dubbed "sexism" appeared alongside industrialization and democratization, helping reconcile women to their exclusion from commodity production and full citizenship by identifying femininity with deference and women's confinement to the home, effectively making necessity a virtue. At the core of this ideology was what historian Nancy Cott called the "canon of domesticity."6 If the laws of marriage made the social model of striving for wealth irrelevant for women in preindustrial societies, this canon went even further, prescribing self-renunciation and dependence as moral reference points for a wife's being, traits that were manifest in service to husbands and other family members. Domestic ideology reinforced the claim by liberal political philosophers that women's natural subordination made the family a nonviolent vessel for bonding, self-sacrifice, and the delicate psychic economy that undergirds civic virtue. This was contrasted with the self-interested and self-regarding autonomy that propelled men to seek their prospects in civil society and treat one another instrumentally, as means to personal ends. State regulation was essential to manage the potentially violent consequence of competition between equals in the market. But the stability of sexual hierarchies made violence improbable in personal life, placing it outside social concern.

Sexist ideology contributed to woman abuse in three critical areas. In depicting a range of traits that were presumably natural to femininity, it laid the groundwork for invidious comparisons between the ideal woman and real wives that inevitably found the latter wanting, particularly in the laboring classes where these traits were hardest to sustain, contributing to a barrage of criticism and "correction" by men and widespread feelings of inadequacy among women. Second, by representing women's economic and political marginality as a natural consequence of their biology and the atrophied persona developed within the domestic sphere as the essence of the truly feminine, the domestic canon obscured the social nature of their vulnerability to violence, isolation, and control in personal life. Most important, the canon helped "domesticate" the aggression borne in market competition and class exploitation by redirecting it toward women and children. Throughout the nineteenth century, strikes, riots, and crime were synonymous with industrial and urban life, a fact trade unionists, socialists, and communists attributed to glaring inequities in wealth and opportunity occasioned by capitalism. The prevailing gender ideology offered an alternative reading that rooted violence and other forms of social deviance in male character and psychology. Sexist imagery identified the domestic arena as a safety valve, where women's responsibility to "civilize the brutes" could extend to passively absorbing their hostility. As a complement to state repression of working-class militancy, such views also helped men rationalize wife beating, sexual promiscuity, and substance abuse as so many ways to "blow off steam," a rationalization that remains widespread. Popular accounts portrayed violence as a natural, inevitable, and largely irremediable aspect of everyday life in working-class homes. In Hard Times (1854), Charles Dickens's satire of utilitarianism, industrialization, and trade unions, class violence is displaced into secret violence within the home and the abused working-class woman presented as being best suited to the passive role ascribed to her by Victorian gender ideology. In the 1880s, English novelists George Gissing and Rudyard Kipling also portrayed class violence as a family affair rather than a social phenomenon, alternately depicting brutish men and passive women or putupon men and raging viragos. In encouraging men to domesticate their violence rather than direct it at public targets, gender ideology helped make women human buffers for the range of feelings excited by exploitation, the chronic failures of capitalism, and for personal as well as social frustrations.

"Wife Torture" as a Response to the Failure of Domesticity Robbed of their economic function as junior partners in household production but excluded from direct access to industrial employment, women's status relative to men was initially weakened by the rise of business enterprise, and they were forced to define their needs within a framework of material dependence on husbands and their wages. Sent off to seek their livelihood by day in the "jungle filled with wilde beasties," men increasingly relied on their wives to provide an emotional "haven in a heartless world" by performing a level of domestic work sufficient to free up time for their own rest, leisure, and self-development. The conjugal ideal was premised on an ephemera, however, because working-class families could barely survive let alone thrive on the low and sharply fluctuating family wage given to men. As the nineteenth century wore on, the contradiction at the core of women's role became increasingly glaring. Ever greater levels of self-exploitation were required to support the illusion of home as a space cleared of hard work and exploitation, the reality that gave birth to domestic economy. Violence mediated this contradiction and its complement, women's attempt to resolve it by seeking paid work outside the home. Sexism and the ideology of domesticity delayed women's quest for full personhood. But the material pressures for women to seek their future outside the realm of necessity and selflessness to which they were bound were too great, and the appeal of entering society as full persons too seductive to be countered by ideology alone. Violence was the next line of defense when sexist ideology failed to reconcile women to their marginal and subservient status in the face of expanding economic opportunities and political rights. Apart from the fact that violence made a mockery of the conjugal ideal, because wages frequently dropped below subsistence, and cycles of unemployment were continual from the eighteenth century onward, women could only keep their families afloat by taking an ever more active hand in domestic economy, policing their husband's drink, or confiscating his wage on pay day (as in the practice of "tipping up"), an aggressive stance that could make them appear more virago than lady-like.7 As parodied in Emma (1815) and other Jane Austen novels, the alternatives were to delay marriage or childbirth, refuse sex, enter "service," or endure a father's autocratic demands instead of a husband's. But once they partnered, women were expected to make up for material insufficiencies through sweat equity or to "go without," an expectation that was illustrated by the common practice of male favoring (making sure all men and boys are fed before women eat) whose effects included high rates of female tuberculosis in agricultural districts where men enjoyed relatively long life expectancy. Or women could supplement family resources by bartering or selling domestic skills such as wet-nursing or laundering. The ultimate option was to enter the workforce directly.

By adapting one or more of these paths, nineteenth- and early twentieth century women helped stave off impoverishment in millions of homes. But this also created myriad problems for the sexual hierarchy on which liberals pinned their hopes for family peace, stirring feelings of self-sufficiency, equality, and resentment in women and feelings of shame, jealousy, failure, anger, and dependence in men. Because these tensions were endemic to working-class family life in industrializing societies, when men responded to them with force, violence quickly escalated into a spiraling torrent of abuse, resistance, and recrimination. One result was the pattern of chronic and severe abuse in working-class families that Frances Power Cobbe identified as wife torture.

Writing in the 1860s about "Wife Torture in England," Cobbe argued that violence against wives was rooted in the mutually reinforcing systems of sexual inequality and gender stereotypes.8 Few men who beat women were held accountable, regardless of circumstance. But she drew on court cases and anecdotal information to show how differences in class circumstances elicited different types of abusive behavior. Men in "respectable" drawing rooms could depend on broadly defined gender norms to regulate a wife's behavior and so needed only an occasional "blow or two" to exact obedience. In sharp

contrast was the situation in the working classes, where material circumstances made regulatory norms less effective. Here, a class of viragos "gave as good as they got." In the "kicking" districts of Liverpool and London, unprecedented levels of violence were illustrated by routine beatings with "hob-nail boots." Cobbe offered a ready explanation for why the "persistent torture of women" in the laboring classes was so widely tolerated even by "good men" endowed with "higher sensibilities." Both groups shared the notion that a man's wife is his PROPERTY, in the sense in which a horse is his property (descended to us rather through the Roman law than through the customs of our Teuton ancestors). Every brutalminded man, and many a man who in other relations of life is not brutal, entertains more or less vaguely the notion that his wife is his thing, and is ready to ask with indignation (as we read again and again in the police reports), of any one who interferes with his treatment of her, "May I not do what I will with my own?"9 Brutality in the lower classes, Cobbe believed, provided the backdrop of fear that allowed regulation to proceed unchallenged in middle-class homes.

In addition to being pushed into the social world by the paltry wages men brought home, women were drawn to labor, commerce, education, and civic life by the possibilities for personhood that these activities represented. The ideas of sovereignty, autonomy, and choice—of being regarded as if they were free and equal—of gaining a political voice through association that was unencumbered by the weight of natural virtue, were all preferable, whatever the reality, to the all too real experience of domestic isolation and servitude, whatever the ideal.

**The Fight for Equality**

Men found ready support in the law for their use of violence to sustain domestic servitude amid women's attempts to support themselves and their families. Nineteenth-century laws allowed (even encouraged) them to exploit women who took gainful employment in what amounted to conjugal theft, whereas women were denied a similar right to support from men. In a widely circulated pamphlet, Cobbe observed, "The legal act by which a man puts his hand in his wife's pocket, or draws her money out of the saving's bank, is perfectly clear, easy, inexpensive . . . the corresponding process by which the wife can obtain food or clothing from her husband when he neglects to provide it, where may it be? Where is it described?"10

Along with John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, Cobbe was convinced that political inequality was the source of sexual exploitation in the home because it allowed men to make laws that reflected their limited experience and enhanced their personal power. Against this narrow self-interest, this generation of feminist reformers appealed to sex-neutral principles of citizenship, individual freedom, and equality before the law, hoping to expand the reach of public rights to encompass women. To ease Tory fears that women would use equality to enter the job market and undermine the values of home and hearth, Mill reassured them that domestic life would be more peaceful if women could choose it freely, which they surely would.11 Cobbe led the fight to criminalize wife torture and provide its victims with financial relief. But she agreed with Mill and Taylor that the problem of domestic violence would resolve only when the structural barriers were removed that kept women from enjoying the same political rights as their husbands, fathers, and brothers. Only when women were the legal equals of men (and no longer property de jure) would men cease to treat them as property de facto in the home.

The nineteenth-century women's movement addressed wives' status as male property and demanded a right not to be beaten alongside prohibition, which afforded greater access to male wages, the abolition of slavery, the right to divorce and own property, to work for wages, to child custody, birth control, independent citizenship, access to schooling and co-education, and the franchise. Because most white

men already had these rights, reformers pitched their appeal in the language of universal egalitarianism. As Mill put it in his classic tract on The Subjection of Women, The equality of married persons before the law . . . is the only means of rendering the daily strife of mankind in any high sense a school of moral cultivation. . . . Already in modern life and more and more as it progressively improves, command and obedience became exceptional facts in life, equal association its general rule. . . . We have had the morality of submission and the morality of chivalry and generosity; the time is now come for the morality of justice.12

These principles were realized piecemeal, as women's political power was enhanced by the expanding material base provided by female employment, social welfare legislation, and the heightened status women enjoyed on the home front during the world wars. An important marker of women's growing autonomy in determining the habits of their lives was that by the 1920s, women's historical disadvantage in life expectancy relative to men had been reversed in the United States and Europe.

The liberal faith that economic and political rights would free women from oppression ignored the independent influence of sexist ideology on the organization of personal life. But if the combination of capitalism and democracy has not eliminated women's second-class status in relationships or families, it has gone a long way toward ending their subordination to men, particularly in those areas where religious or community opposition to the spread of the market ethos into everyday life was swept aside by the separation of Church from state, neutralized by injecting a spiritual element into economic activity (the Protestant ethic) or was minimal to start. In the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and much of Western Europe, even the staunchest opponents of liberal reform now couch their arguments in terms of the Lockean values of individual freedom, social mobility, egalitarianism, and property rights rather than communal traditionalism.

The women's movement successfully exploited this sentiment, forming critical alliances with religious and moral conservatives in its fights for greater personal freedoms for women on issues such as birth control or the regulation of domestic violence. As important was the support U.S. women gleaned from business elites who appreciated their potential contribution to commerce and industry. After World War I, much of business regarded women's traditional service in domestic life in the same way most women did—as an obstacle to their transformation into the sophisticated purveyors of consumption, public service, and wage work required by a rapidly expanding economy. Those historian Stuart Ewen called the "captains of consciousness" in business and advertising urged the "new woman" to abandon frugality in favor of spending; substitute product loyalty for loyalty to home, hearth, or husband; replace homemade with store-bought goods; and seek self-expression through employment and purchasing.13 Whether the relationship between women's liberation and U.S. business constituted a "marriage," as Ewen contends, or merely a convenient flirtation, the alliance helped normalize women's emergence as worker-citizen consumers and remove the stigma inherited from images of militant suffragists and ax-wielding Prohibitionists. Business support for female independence was not unqualified. Deference, self-sacrifice, and other values implicit in women's default role as homemakers keep the social costs of reproducing the workforce down, apply downward pressure on all wages, and allow women to be treated as second earners who can be paid less than men for comparable work. Business shared the fantasy of many modern husbands, that women could simultaneously satisfy two masters, providing a ready source of inexpensive, qualified labor for expanding service, support, and production sectors by day while devoting the rest of their time to producing, raising, and civilizing families and sexually servicing men. Maintaining this balance proved difficult, however, because the market values of choice, independence, and self-interest critical to women's success as producer/consumers undermined the conjugal ideal of female deference and the identification of marriage and family life as the primary sites

for self-expression. In Cobbe's world as today, a significant subgroup of men have tried using coercion to mediate the tensions created by the clash of women's social commitments. But there is a critical difference. The female agency men confront today is constituted from a wealth of rights and resources that make violence alone increasingly ineffective as a sole means to secure control.

**Up to Inequality**

Booker T. Washington ended his autobiography Up From Slavery by describing his reception in Richmond, Virginia, the former capital of the Confederacy. Twenty-five years earlier, he had slept on the street in Richmond because of poverty. Now, he had delivered a message of "hope and cheer" to an integrated audience at the Academy of Music, a hall that "colored people" had not been allowed to enter until the night he spoke.32 With hindsight, given the continued de facto segregation of American blacks, some readers might think Washington's title was ironic.

The revolution in women's status might be similarly titled "Up to Inequality." As a result of their quantitative gains, women in democratic market societies are no longer bound to men or family life the way they were less than a century ago. But the picture of female equality presented in popular media is no more realistic than the earlier portrayal of women as domestic slaves. What is true is that women have become so much less unequal that a qualitative change in their status has occurred sufficient to prompt a corresponding shift in how men oppress them in personal life. Even this limited claim may seem suspect when we examine women's economic progress more closely or ask whether improvements in women's general position have carried over into their personal relationships with men. The relative shares of income, education, rights, and other sources of power men and women bring to the relationship have been altered. But differences are still substantial. For example, at least some of the reduction in women's relative disadvantage reflect the deterioration of men's position, not women's gains. In 25 of the states where the ratio of women's to men's earnings increased between 1995 and 1999, it did so in part because men's earnings fell (in constant dollars).33

The vast majority of women workers fall into three of the six categories into which employment is usually divided: technical, sales, and administrative support (40%), managers and professionals (32.2%), and service occupations (17.4%). Very small proportions of women work in skilled or unskilled blue-collar jobs or in agriculture, where men are heavily represented. Women slightly outnumber men in the higher paid occupations, including managerial positions, and enjoy relatively high status in areas of the United States, where these jobs are overrepresented. But they make substantially less than men in these roles. So, whereas 10% of male managers are in the top decile of all earners, women occupy only 1% of these top positions and only 6% are in the top two deciles.34 According to Catalyst, a foundation that tracks women's progress in the corporate world, just 93 (4.1%) of the top-earning executives in Fortune 500 companies were women in 2000, a proportion that has only improved slightly since then.35

The most dramatic inequalities persist in an area where women's gains have been widely publicized: the gap between male and female earnings. According to official figures, since 1960, women went from earning just 59 cents for every $1 a man earned to 76.5 cents in 2002. In 2004, median annual earnings for women working full-time year-round were $31,223. Men with similar work effort earned $40,798. Comparing weekly earnings, data that exclude the self-employed and does not reflect pay differences such as annual bonuses, the gender gap ratio has improved by more than 9 percentage points since 1990 and in 2005 stood at 81.0, an all-time high.36 Remaining gaps in Great Britain or other members of the European Union are even smaller. But what is less widely appreciated is that these ratios are derived by comparing the annual earnings of women and men who work full-time for a full year prior to the

survey. These comparisons are misleading because they fail to consider the actual differences in male and female earnings over time that result because women are far more likely to work part-time than men and so to have many fewer hours where they earn income and more likely to have years of zero earnings due to their disproportionate responsibility for family care. To get a more realistic picture of the resources they actually bring to the table, economists Stephen Rose and Heidi Hartmann compared men and women's earnings in their peak earning years (ages 26 to 59) using a 15-year time-frame (1983–1998) and irrespective of whether they worked full- or part-time or left the workforce for a period to raise children or care for sick family members. Over the 15 years, women earned an average total of only $273,592, while the average working man earned $722,693 (in 1999 dollars). Thus, the gap in real, disposable income between men and women is 62%, almost three times as large as the gap commonly cited for the United States.37 Had Rose and Hartmann's study included the added value of benefits, the resulting sex differences in earnings would have been even greater, because women continue to have much less access than men to high-paying, unionized jobs and so are less likely to have a variety of benefits than men, including health insurance and Social Security.

Despite these gaps, millions of women reject "bad bargains" and set up independent households each year. But the inequalities in income and employment highlight the enormous obstacles women continue to face in doing so and the possibility that they remain vulnerable to a reverse tipping point, when declines in average earnings or the increased costs of housing or other necessities reduce their political leverage, including their capacity to set up on their own or exercise other social rights that a younger generation of women take for granted. Nor is such a reversal improbable. Between 1996 and 2002 in the United States, as women's poverty actually increased in a number of states, their political representation dropped in a third of the states, the number of states with waiting periods for women seeking abortions increased from 14 to 22, and an additional 9 states implemented family caps, denying benefits to children conceived or born while a mother is receiving welfare, all direct blows to women's capacity to live independently. 38 Experience in India, China, the former Soviet Union, and much of Europe as well as in the United States make it clear that a combination of culture, sexist ideology, and religious fundamentalism continue to constrain women's capacity to translate their economic and political gains into increased bargaining power in relationships or families. But any weakening of these gains raises the specter that traditional sex hierarchies will be restored. In the United States, even where both partners work, the man can expect to average approximately $50,000 a year during his prime years of employment, whereas the woman can expect only $18,000. This gap is more than sufficient to support the differences in status that are exploited in coercive control. Any shift in the relative share of power in personal life that favors men exacerbates the imbalanced distribution of work in the home, further weakens women's autonomy, and makes them more vulnerable to sex segregation, other forms of job and wage discrimination, and to a further deterioration of the social rights that allow them to work full-time and/or set up independent households in the first place.

**Shifts in Housework**

Economic discrimination increases women's vulnerability to abuse. But far and away the most important vestige of their subordinate status is women's default consignment to domestic service.

As women's participation in the labor market increased, so did men's share of domestic work, rising from 20% to 30%. This change reflects a number of factors, including pressure from female partners and a growing sensitivity among men to women's burden. But more pragmatic motives are also at work. As one "new man" told sociologist Arlie Hochschild, "when my wife began earning more than me, I thought I'd struck gold."39 Men's increased contribution is still largely limited to work around the margins, doing

some combination of dishes, taking out the garbage, cooking "special" meals, mowing the grass, driving children to daycare and school, and changing the oil and light bulbs, with women doing everything else. Hochschild argues that the old gender division has simply been replaced by the extension of female exploitation to encompass paid employment as well as domestic service, what she calls women's "double shift."40 Neither business nor government compensates for this reality. Though employed women are twice as likely as working men to provide 30 hours or more care giving for parents or parents-in-law, far fewer employed women than men have sick leave, vacation leave, or flexibility in their hours.41

**Understanding Changes in Women's Status**

The persistence of significant sexual inequalities does not obviate the larger point. Survey data, interview studies, and behavioral evidence based on help seeking consistently indicate that the vast majority of women, victimized or not, view themselves as men's equals, support equality in intimate relationships, and reject abuse in virtually any form.42 By the late 1970s, a majority of American men also voiced their support for sexual equality in family affairs.43 Resurgent fundamentalism in the United States and state and federal passage of DOMAs (Defense of Marriage Acts) have not reversed the trend for fewer women (or men) to identify domesticity or
family life as the center of their personhood.

Women's activities in and around the home—housework, sex, consumption, child care, and other forms of personal service—comprise the only arena of female inequality that is susceptible to negotiation in personal life. As such, next to the money entering (or not entering) the home, it is the major source of interpersonal conflict as well as the major object of male control. For couples who are living together, the division of domestic work determines how space and time are allocated and utilized in personal life, including leisure, with important implications for social networking and job advancement. Much attention has been given to Harvard Professor Robert Putnam's plaint that more men are "bowling alone."44 But the fact that they are bowling at all or spending hours at the gym, on the golf course, at the local bar or pub, or watching football games is largely the result of women's vastly disproportionate assumption of home maintenance and child care. Apart from the value added to other activities by time "off the clock," there is mounting evidence linking both free time and the social networking it facilitates to health, mental health, and satisfaction with life. Domesticity adds little to women's social status. During the Reagan administration, Carolyn Graglia, David Gelernter, and other ultra-conservatives dubbed low-income, stay-at-home moms "welfare queens" and pressed for welfare reforms that moved them into wage markets. These same critics now rail against Betty Friedan and other feminists for denigrating women's traditional role in the home.45 Discounting housework undoubtedly affects the self-esteem of full-time homemakers. But the more salient issue is how their continued consignment to housework impacts working women, who now constitute the majority. Employed women who must also work the "second shift" report far higher levels of anxiety than nonemployed women, more health problems, and much greater resentment of their husband's relative privilege than women in the past.46

Although domestic roles remain a key site of female exploitation and stress, they are no longer the focal point of female identity. Nor does women's enactment of domestic roles isolate them from civic engagement as it did in the past or automatically bestow unfettered control over the most significant family assets or decisions on husbands or other partners. So long as women had few alternatives to heterosexual coupling, their only hope of staving off a tyrannical partner was to cling ever more tightly to the domestic canon by increasing their self-exploitation or sexual service or using their wiles, the "dishonesty" for which Dorothy Craig is vilified by her daughter. Today, at least in the United States and

large parts of Europe, millions of women package economic and social resources to support autonomy within or apart from dependent relationships to men, remaining single, forming same-sex relationships, divorcing, delaying marriage and/or childbirth, "supplementing" the relationship, pursuing a career, returning to school, taking two paying jobs, opening a business, or heading a family without husbands. In this context, homemaking is understood as a necessary burden rather than a trap or as something they trade for male protection and support. If things go badly in a relationship, women can always do for themselves or with other women what they did with or for him. It is the lost connection between women's status, domesticity, and dependence on men that coercive control is designed to reinstate.

**The Changing Face of Domination: From Domestic Violence to Coercive Control**

Political scientist Iris Young defines domination as a relationship of mastery in which the subordinate experiences herself as the subject of the unreciprocated authority of the other and life opportunities and resources are disproportionately allocated accordingly.47 Sentient beings become persons only because they are recognized as such. When personhood is set in a matrix of unreciprocated authority, subjectivity atrophies.

Young's definition applies most directly to traditional and preindustrial societies where power is parsed out across a pecking order of men, much in the way other forms of property are distributed. In these communities, whether women "know" the significant men in their lives can make all the difference in their fate. But there is no compulsion for anyone to know them, one reason they can be hit at will. The industrial and political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries freed men to exchange their labor for a wage, an unequal but reciprocal relationship in which they were known only in their role as producers. Liberal democracy extended the principle of reciprocity to governance, fashioning a people's voice out of the franchise and supporting political parties, newspapers, and a range of complementary institutions that comprised the sphere of public activity and opinion.

Reciprocity was extended gradually to women as they demanded social recognition, and it became increasingly apparent that economic development and the maintenance of working- and middle-class families required that their untapped labor power be exploited. There was no need to police relations in private life so long as traditional sex hierarchies were stable. But by the late nineteenth century, these traditional hierarchies were in disarray, largely due to the progress of capitalism, democracy, and the organized women's movement, and there was an increasing social investment in women as workers, consumers, and citizens. Women were being moved out of the sphere of unquestioned male control in personal life, but they were afforded little protection against the inevitable backlash. One result was that family life looked increasingly like the state of nature to which men only had originally been consigned, replete with stepped-up competition and physical and sexual abuse. Wife torture emerged in the gap between provocation and protection, as society competed with individual men for women's loyalty and labor but remained ambivalent about granting them full substantive equality.

The domestic violence revolution began in the 1970s amid the broadest renegotiation of the sexual contract since the emergence of modern industry. Spawned by the civil rights, peace, and student movements of the 1960s, the influence of the modern women's liberation movement extended far beyond its activist base. The movement's importance lies less its specific programmatic focus than in the extent to which it articulated the values women from all social backgrounds who used their new access to jobs, education, and politics to initiate divorce, demand contraception, abort unwanted pregnancies, delay marriage and childbirth, reduce the number of children they bore, form single-parent and same-sex families, enter the professions, and participate in civic life in unprecedented numbers. Violence had

provided men with an alternative to reciprocity, a way to prevent women from bringing equality home. But after 1960, women's access to resources reached a tipping point at which violence was no longer sufficient to enforce their dependence on individual men. The irony here is that the domestic violence revolution targeted an oppressive strategy—the physical abuse of women—that was already being supplanted across a broad front by coercive control.

In the 1990s, we find even the staunchest defenders of free market ideals echoing the fears voiced by traditionalists a century earlier—that if women are allowed to embrace the individualism at the center of the democratic and capitalist credos on a par with men, family life will implode. What they mean is that sexual hierarchy will collapse. These fears are justified.

**The Specificity of Coercive Control**

Coercive control was born in the microdynamics of everyday life. So there is no sure way to document exactly when men began to complement their use of force with a range of direct controls or when it became the oppressive strategy of choice. Around the time the first shelters opened in the early 1970s, a handful of feminist psychologists identified the condition in which their abused clients were living as hostage-like and called it "coercive control." Many in the first cohort of shelter residents talked freely about the importance of control in their lives on the rare occasions when they were encouraged to do so, suggesting that coercive control was already widely disseminated. Although there is nothing written about coercive control prior to the 1970s, every researcher since then who has asked about control tactics in personal life has found their deployment to be widespread. Cobbe, Mill, Taylor, and other nineteenth-century reformers may have missed a similar despotic regime, much in the way domestic violence was often missed, though this seems unlikely. Even in those periods when wife beating received no official attention or little popular support, there is an unbroken record of its occurrence in popular lore, legend, art, theater, legal records, and histories of marriage and families. But none of these sources mentions a regime of isolation, intimidation, or regulation that approaches coercive control in intensity or scope. This is almost certainly because men had no need for coercive control as long as women's daily regimen of obedience was fully regulated by religion, and custom or sexism was codified in the law.

Whether or not coercive control is new, its deployment today is designed to stifle and co-opt women's gains; foreclose negotiation over the organization, extent, and substance of women's activities in and around the home; obstruct their access to support; close the spaces in which they can reflect critically on their lives; and reimpose obsolete forms of dependence and personal service by micromanaging the enactment of stereotypic gender roles through "sexism with a vengeance."

**The Male Dilemma**

As women break free from their consignment to the Other to imagine and construct their sexual identities across the entire spectrum of social possibilities, male sexual identity also becomes unhinged from its fixed position in heterosexual life, making it possible for men to flexibly define their sexual persona as receptive and deliberative as well as authoritative. The transformation of women from men's personal servants to social labor is a critical moment in human progress, not least because it injects a huge mass of creative capacity into the development process, substantially reducing the overall burden of necessary labor for us all. The socialization of women's labor, in turn, enhances female autonomy in personal life and so the potential to create truly reciprocal partnerships capable of supporting traditional domestic functions far more effectively and efficiently than is possible in partnerships where

capacity is drained in a zero-sum game of power and control. From an evolutionary standpoint, this potential seals the fate of coercive control, much in the way that the expansive nature of industry sealed the fate of the traditional patriarchy or that the emergence of wage labor sealed the fate of chattel slavery.

In the name of sustaining traditional male privileges, coercive control suppresses the revolutionary potential of sexual reciprocity for both sexes: by downsizing the subjective capacities women inherit from their new social agency, men suspend their own capacity for reciprocity, trying to reconstruct from within relationships, de novo, the rigidities of power and control they once inherited with their biology. Each household governed by coercive control, each relationship, becomes a patriarchy in miniature, complete with its own web of rules or codes, rituals of deference, modes of enforcement, sanctions, and forbidden places, all devised with a particularity that is completely foreign to traditions of male dominance.

Its very invisibility on the public stage suggests that coercive control depends on at least tacit support from law, discriminatory structures, and normative consent. To this extent, male power in personal life continues to be "delegated." But its major features reflect the absence of such delegation. In coercive control, male dominance is constructed person-to-person through a series of particular constraints that are created, deployed, produced, represented, improvised, organized, found, contested, stolen, borrowed, usurped, or manipulated in unique relational contexts and for myriad proximate ends and effects. This process takes place through the simultaneous application of multiple technologies, drawing on force to exact obedience in one moment and on control tactics that are more spatially or temporally diffuse in the next.

In a world where even relative isolates are embedded in complex networks of work, consumption, service, and communication, abuse can only be kept secret on any substantial scale with the collusion of a range of actors, most of whom can be encouraged to see what is already in front of them with minimal prodding. Despite the belief that abuse happened "behind closed doors" in the past, it was almost always widely known to outsiders, neighbors, and family members, just as harms to children were well known, though intervention was infrequent. Present attempts to keep abuse hidden are a function of the changing normative status of violence in the home as well as of the extent to which egalitarian values of personhood have been extended to women and children. But even if coercive control is successfully hidden, its individualized nature has the paradoxical effect of depriving men of the consultation, role models, and social support on which their learning depends in other areas of activity, such as work or sports. Our culture is permeated with models of how to use violence to hurt or control others. But there are relatively few opportunities for men to learn how to encompass the increasing breadth and complexity of women's agency with control tactics in personal life. Without social support, men intent on deploying coercive control must rely on their wits, inventing and personalizing their tactical oppression as they go along, a process that is fraught with the potential for error, retaliation, and harm. As many abuse victims are quick to tell me, the "wits" available to men in these relationships are a limited resource.

To an outsider, the state of subordination produced by coercive control resembles the subjugation experienced by women in traditional societies. A victim's options appear fixed, subjectivity atrophied, her behavior dictated, her fate certain. But subordination feels very different when it is enforced on a personal level in a society that officially celebrates female equality and independence than in a society where women's dependence on men goes with the landscape. When a group of people that is formally free and equal is constrained, personal feelings of rage, shame, and failure are much greater than when

members of an already subordinated class are abused, an important reason why the anger suffered by victims of coercive control often seems disproportionate to the proximate harms they have suffered.

Many of the same facets of coercive control that make it so insidious also increase the risk to perpetrators. Women have been greatly emboldened by formal equality, dramatically increasing their capacity and willingness to initiate violence or to retaliate violently against oppression in personal life. Men may use coercive control to snuff out women's autonomy. But no amount of control mounted from personal life can eliminate the potential for retaliation in a world where women's agency has diffuse social roots. The tactical regime men employ to oppress women in personal life is chosen with the expectation that women will resist. This is why it often seems grossly disproportionate to what is needed to subdue a particular will. Like male violence, women's tactical resistance to dominance has also changed over time as their agency has developed. Women's absolute access to rights and resources as well as the differential access created by race, class, or cultural divisions determine whether women interpret their condition as a tragic but inevitable extension of how things are, as bad luck, as shameful, or as provocative in the extreme. Just as a victim's imago of her partner reflects a combination of his proximate power with the power added by sexual inequality, so does the exaggerated level of coercion and control men deploy, their "hypercontrol," reflect an image of women that combines their personal capacity for resistance or independence with their social agency ("women's lib").

Despite a certain tactical continuity in the use of force against women over time or across cultures, battered women confront historically specific constellations of sexual dominance and liberation, not male authority or opportunities for freedom in the abstract. The appearance of coercive control in the modern context has less to do with the immutability of male dominance than with the choice made by a large subset of men to defend their traditional prerogatives against the perceived threats posed by women's increasing economic independence, cultural autonomy, and political/legal equality. This choice is not an immanent feature of masculinity and certainly not the by-product of psychiatric disease. Most men decide to compromise their privileges in the face of female equality and accept a certain reciprocity, as unfamiliar as this may feel. Indeed, it is this fact that makes the behavior of the minority who deploy coercive control more outrageous. The sheer cacophony of images promoting individuality, self-help, decisional autonomy, opportunity, and equity among women in the United States has had two simultaneous and contradictory effects.

As law professor Martha Fineman points out, "as adherence to the historic family form has begun to wither away, the complementary power relationships embedded in the traditional family have had to be made explicit in order to be preserved."48 This is another way of putting the argument here: that once the material and political basis for the patriarchy was displaced and the illogic of privilege based solely on sex exposed, the preservation of male power required ever more deliberate and transparent strategic intervention in women's lives. But the diffusion of egalitarian and individualist imagery also leads us to expect that people's lives will be self-directed, blinding us to the types of microregulation that characterize coercive control. However shocked we may be by the harsh treatment of women by the Taliban, it is inconceivable to most Americans that millions of modern women in our midst could be suffering under regimes of intolerance that are no less totalitarian than those imposed by fundamentalist cultures. Even less conceivable is that the cause of this backwardness is inextricably bound to the nature of the equality we believe separates us from these cultures.

To make contemporary women their personal property, the modern man must effectively stand against the tide of history, degrading women into a position of subservience that the progress of civilization has made obsolete. But he must do even more. Because women in the liberal democracies enjoy rights and

resources that extend over a broad terrain, the technology of control men devise must be equally expansive in time and social space, reaching into the economic, political, and social realms to which women's freedoms have given them access, into their educational lives, their workplace, and their involvement with the public sector And men must do this without attracting public attention.

The appearance of coercive control against a background of formal equality is one of the more tragic ironies in sexual politics. But it would be a mistake to interpret this seeming contradiction as implying that either sexual equality is a sham or that the form of dominance described is merely ephemeral. Had women's sovereignty not threatened male hegemony, it would not have taken centuries to achieve. But this new tyranny is only possible because the same societies that now promise women full sovereignty continue to disadvantage them as a sex.