Progress in Organizational Justice: Tunneling Through the Maze

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Abstract

We review the literature on fairness as it applies to work organizations. In keeping with contemporary research, we distinguish between two types of justice. Distributive justice refers to the fairness of the outcomes received as a result of an allocation decision. Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures used to make allocation decisions. Two aspects of procedural justice are commonly studied, formal structures (e.g., voice) and the interpersonal treatment shown (e.g., dignity and respect). Both distributive and procedural justice are important determinants of work outcomes, although each is associated with a somewhat different set of criteria. Furthermore, procedures and outcomes interact to predict a variety of organizationally-relevant variables. Finally, we discuss recent research applying justice concepts to several organizational phenomena: strategic planning, staffing decisions, drug screening, organizational image, informal conflict resolution, layoffs, organizational citizenship behavior, and employee theft.
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One of the topics of greatest interest to scientists in the fields of industrial-organizational psychology, human resources management, and organizational behavior in recent years has been organizational justice—people's perceptions of fairness in organizations. Whether we're talking about the fairness of large-scale organizational policies, such as pay systems, or individual practices at the local level, such as determining priorities for vacation scheduling in an office, questions of fairness on the job are ubiquitous. As both scientists and practitioners have become sensitive to the importance of such matters, the literature on organizational justice has proliferated. Witness, for example, the large number of books (e.g., Cropanzano, 1993; Folger & Cropanzano, in press; Greenberg, 1996a; Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1993; Steensma & Vermunt, 1991; Tyler, 1990; Vermunt & Steensma, 1991), and conceptual articles (e.g., Brockner & Weisenfeld, in press; Folger, 1994; Greenberg, 1990a, 1993c; Lind, 1995; Lind & Earley, 1992; Tyler & Dawes, 1993; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith, in press) that have appeared in recent years. Further evidence of the topic's current appeal is reflected by the fact that organizational justice consistently has been among the most popular topics of papers submitted for consideration on the program of the Organizational Behavior Division of the Academy of Management during the years 1993-1995. From our perspective, attention to matters of organizational justice appears to show no sign of abating in the foreseeable future.

With the recent growth in contributions to the organizational justice literature, the need has arisen to gain perspective on the field—to assess where it has been and where it is going. Insofar as previous reviews of the literature have covered earlier periods, in the present review we will concentrate on work appearing between 1990 and 1995—a span during which considerable growth may have left observers of the organizational justice literature feeling somewhat uncertain as to its major issues and directions. We attempt to remedy this situation in the present chapter. Specifically, we intend to shed light on recent progress in the field of organizational justice by "tunneling through the maze" of ideas it has generated—highlighting
major conceptual and applied advances, and putting them in perspective. In doing so, we hope to help readers see light at the end of the tunnel that may encourage them to enter, and that will guide them in their journey toward understanding organizational justice.

Justice: Its Fundamental Nature in Organizations

Before starting this journey, it is important to specify our orientation. In keeping with social science tradition, our treatment of justice is completely descriptive in orientation—focusing on people's perceptions of what constitutes fairness, and their reactions to unfair situations. This is in contrast to the large body of work in moral philosophy (e.g., for a review, see Cohen & Greenberg, 1982) which is inherently prescriptive, specifying what should be done to achieve justice (for more on this distinction, see Greenberg & Bies, 1992). As such, when organizational scientists talk about justice, they generally are referring to individual perceptions, one's evaluations as to the appropriateness of a given outcome or process. Thus, as the term is used here, justice is subjective—as perceived by a person.

Questions about justice arise whenever decisions are made about the allocation of resources. For example, in organizations the manner in which profits are disbursed among investors or pay is distributed to employees may animate justice concerns. Indeed, the very fact that people work in order to receive economic gains (e.g., pay) and social benefits (e.g., status) suggests that organizations are settings in which matters of justice are likely to be salient (Greenberg & Tyler, 1987a). Given the centrality of these outcomes for work life, it should come as no surprise that fairness is something that individuals use to define their relationships to their employers. It is with this idea in mind, that Greenberg (1987) coined the term "organizational justice" to refer to theories of social and interpersonal fairness that may be applied to understanding behavior in organizations. In this connection it is important to note that concerns about fairness are not unique to organizations and that much of our understanding of justice is based on other settings and disciplines (for reviews, see Bierhoff, Cohen & Greenberg, 1986; Cohen, 1986; Greenberg & Cohen, 1982a; Tyler & Smith, in press). However, as we will illustrate in this chapter, organizations have proven to be a rich venue for studying matters of
fairness. Indeed, we have learned a great deal about organizations by studying justice and a great deal about justice by examining it within organizations.

In general, the study of organizational justice has focused on two major issues: employees' responses to the things they receive—that is, outcomes, and the means by which they obtain these outcomes—that is, procedures. It is almost tautological to claim that all allocation decisions are about outcomes. In fact, work settings may be characterized by the outcomes stemming from them. For example, performance appraisal results in some rating or ranking, a promotion decision culminates in a new job, a pay review results in a raise, a selection interview results in a hiring decision, and so on. Of course, outcomes also can be negative as well as positive. For example, decisions are also made about how to punish a poor performer, and whom to terminate during cutbacks. Allocations result in a certain configuration or pattern whereby some individuals get more and others get less. Individuals' evaluations of these outcomes are referred to as judgments of distributive justice (Leventhal, 1976a).

Although concerns about distributive justice are critical in organizations, and were the first form of justice to capture the attention of organizational scientists (see Greenberg, 1987a), they comprise only part of the story where organizational justice is concerned. Outcomes do not simply appear; they result from a specific set of process or procedures. For example, people may raise questions about how their performance ratings, promotion decisions, pay raises, or selection decisions were determined. Were these based on procedures that are themselves fair? As we will detail in this chapter, people's perceptions of the fairness of the procedures used to determine allocations—referred to as procedural justice—are of considerable importance in organizations. Indeed, there are many benefits that result from perceived fair procedures, and problems that result from perceived unfair procedures.

Insofar as the concept of procedural justice was introduced into the study of organizations during a period in which interest in distributive justice was waning (Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg & Folger, 1983) it quickly became the center of attention among justice researchers (Greenberg & Tyler, 1987). Not surprisingly, contemporary empirical work has emphasized
procedural justice. The balance of material in the present chapter reflects this trend: Although we review recent investigations of both types of fairness, procedural justice receives somewhat more attention. This skew reflects only the prevailing balance of attention in the literature, and not our judgment about their relative importance. Indeed, we have advocated the importance of both distributive and procedural justice in our own work (e.g., Folger & Cropanzano, in press; Greenberg, 1996a).

In the first half of this chapter we will review the latest advances in both distributive justice and procedural justice. We will discuss the basic concepts and review recent evidence examining these concepts within work organizations. Following a historical perspective, we will first examine distributive justice and then move to procedural justice. In the third section we will discuss recent evidence concerning the manner in which these two types of justice operate jointly to predict work outcomes. Then, in the second half of the chapter we will review organizational justice research focusing on applications. Specifically, we will describe evidence demonstrating the role of justice in various organizational practices and phenomena, such as strategic planning, staffing, drug testing, conflict-resolution, layoffs, organizational citizenship behavior, and employee theft. Throughout this chapter we will not only critically analyze the present state of knowledge, but also make recommendations for new directions that deserve to be taken in the future.

Distributive Justice

The concept of distributive justice can be traced back to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics: “that which is manifested in distributions of honour or money or the things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution” (Ross, 1925, Book V, p. 1130). However, it was Homans (1961) whose conceptualization provided the modern roots of attention to distributive justice. According to Homans’ “rule of distributive justice,” it is expected among parties to a social exchange relationship: (1) that the rewards of each will be proportional to the costs of each, and (2) that net rewards, or profits, will be proportional to their investments.

Extending this concept to the context of organizations, Adams (1965) proposed his theory of
inequity, according to which people are motivated to avoid the tension that results from states in which the ratio of one’s own outcomes (i.e., rewards) compared to one’s inputs (i.e., contributions) is unequal to the corresponding ratio of a comparison other. Complete historical overviews of these concepts are beyond the scope of the present work; for more information the reader is invited to consult Cohen and Greenberg (1982), Greenberg (1982), Törnblom (1990) and Tyler & Smith (in press). Following the lead of these earlier works, a distinction may be made between studies of how people judge and respond to unfair distributions (i.e., research focusing on recipients’ behavior) and people’s decisions about the allocation norms that should be followed (i.e., research focusing on allocators’ behavior). Several studies within each category have been conducted in recent years.

Reactions to Allocation Outcomes

The study of distributive justice in organizations today focuses primarily on people’s perceptions of the fairness of the outcomes (benefits or punishments) they receive—that is, their evaluations of the end state of the allocation process. In keeping with traditional equity theory research (for a review, see Greenberg, 1982), contemporary studies have found that people tend to be less satisfied with outcomes they perceive to be unfair than those they perceive to be fair. Such perceptions have been shown to result in poor performance (e.g., Cowherd & Levine, 1992; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993) and high rates of withdrawal behavior, such as turnover and absenteeism (e.g., Hulin, 1991; Schwarz, Koslowsky, & Shalit, 1992). In view of these costly consequences of perceived distributive injustice, and following from earlier conceptualizations (e.g., Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980), recent work has focused on understanding the processes by which individuals form judgments of distributive fairness.

This process is more complex than one may expect on an intuitive basis. It is not simply the case that people’s perceptions of fairness are determined exclusively by self-fulfilling motives—that is, the more one gets, the more satisfied one is (although this motive is potent, to be sure; Greenberg, 1983, 1987b). One’s absolute level of resources, in and of itself, is only one determinant of fairness (Summers & Hendrix, 1991; Sweeney, McFarlin, & Inderrieden, 1990).
Rather, individuals base their evaluations of distributive justice not only on what they receive, but as suggested by Homans (1961) and Adams (1965), what they receive relative to some standard or referent. Although the comparative nature of distributive standards is rooted in theory, confusion has long existed in the literature as to the choice of comparison standards (Austin, 1977).

This is especially true in organizations, where comparison standards are often social in nature. For example, people may evaluate the fairness of their own pay by comparing it to the pay believed to be received by someone else. There are also other referent standards that may be used. For example, people may compare the adequacy of the rewards they receive to their expectations, needs, or general societal norms. This practice is quite plausible insofar as the value of many organizational outcomes cannot be classified objectively. Consequently, these evaluations can be based solely on social comparisons. Consider, for example, an outcome such as pay. The fairness of a specific level of pay may be difficult to evaluate in the absence of information about job title, the pay of similar others, one's pay history, and the like. Only by reference to such standards can pay outcomes be judged as "adequate" or "inadequate." These issues are discussed in greater detail by Kulik and Ambrose (1992), and also have been the subject of recent research.

Illustrating the dynamics of referent standards, Sweeney, McFarlin, and Inderrieden (1990) measured pay satisfaction, actual salary, and various sorts of referents (including both social comparisons and personal expectations) in three large-scale survey studies. They found that although salary level was related to satisfaction, the various referents contributed substantial variance beyond objective information about the amount of one's income. Apparently, satisfaction with outcomes is determined not only by the magnitude of the outcomes received, but also by how these outcomes compare to referent standards.

The results of such comparisons have been found to affect important organizational outcomes. Consider, for example, Schwarzwald et al.'s (1992) field study of work attitudes and absenteeism among individuals being considered for promotion. After failing to earn new
positions, individuals had increases in absenteeism, and experienced lower feelings of commitment and higher feelings of inequity. The researchers reasoned that the promoted coworkers acted as referents. That is, individuals who were not initially disadvantaged now felt inequitably underpaid relative to those who had earned a promotion. Such inequities can have adverse effects on job performance. For example, Cowherd and Levine (1992) found that workers produced higher quality products when there was only a small pay differential between themselves and managers compared to when this differential was large. To the extent that large differences may have been perceived to be undeserved in view of relative work contributions, it follows from equity theory that people would withhold their inputs, thereby accounting for the results. This finding is consistent with several classic tests of equity theory reporting that inequitably underpaid individuals produce low quality goods (for a review, see Greenberg, 1982).

A limitation of these studies—indeed, of most distributive justice research—is that the investigators measured people’s referents and fairness perceptions at only a single point in time. This is problematic insofar as people’s choices of referents may be dynamic and adjust to changing conditions. This possibility was demonstrated in a longitudinal study by Stepina and Perrewé (1991). These researchers first measured employees’ comparative referents with regard to four job facets: compensation, security, job complexity, and supervision. Then, two years later these measures were readministered to the same participants. With regard to the security, job complexity, and supervision facets, referent choice was stable among those who perceived themselves to be advantaged relative to their referents. In contrast, those who believed themselves to be relatively disadvantaged were more likely to select a new (and lower) referent, thereby producing greater felt equity. However, for the compensation facet, consistent standards were used throughout the two-year period. People were less likely to alter their compensation referents and maintained the same points of comparison for the duration of the study. This stability existed even among employees who felt they were disadvantaged. Insofar as these
findings illustrate the dynamic nature of referent comparisons—at least with respect to some dimensions—care needs to be exercised in interpreting people's reactions to inequity.

We close this section by pointing to some unfinished business: drawing a distinction between outcomes that are unfavorable, and those that are unfair from a distributive justice perspective. An unfavorable outcome is one that is not as advantageous as it could be, whereas an unfair outcome is one that is lower than it should be compared to some referent. Indeed, receiving a low allocation of a desired resource may be considered quite fair to the extent that one's limited contributions so merit. Although this distinction is conceptually explicit, some researchers have been more careful about separating these two constructs than others (for discussions of this problem, see Flinder & Haunstein, 1994; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Lowe & Vodanovich, 1995). To take but two examples, both Cropanzano and Folger (1991) and Brockner and Wiesenfeld (in press) use the terms interchangeably. This practice creates considerable conceptual confusion insofar as it can become unclear whether certain predictions or findings apply to outcomes that are inequitable, or simply unfavorable. Accordingly, we encourage future researchers to be more careful about distinguishing between these two terms.

Reward Allocation Behavior

Thus far, we have discussed distributive justice only from the perspective of the person who receives the allocation. If that allocation is believed to be inappropriate relative to some standard, then the recipient is likely to experience distributive injustice. However, following the work of Leventhal (1976a), we also can consider distributive justice from the perspective of the individual making the allocation. Indeed, several recent studies (e.g., Kabanoff, 1991; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992) have examined the rules by which decision makers distribute resources.

Perhaps the easiest way to describe decision rules is to start with the case that is presumed to be philosophically "pure"—that is, a situation in which self-interest is eliminated, a condition of impartiality. To achieve this hypothetical state, the philosopher John Rawls (1971) proposed a thought experiment referred to as the "original position." Imagine that a group of people have assembled to plan a future society. They possess a rudimentary understanding of
human nature, interpersonal relationships, and so on. However, they know absolutely nothing about the future economy, technology, or challenges that their new civilization will face. The planners even lack knowledge about themselves and the other people with whom they will be sharing their new society. No one knows what their own social position, abilities, and even preferences will be. In other words, everyone in the planning group is working from behind a "veil of ignorance." It is impossible to be self-serving when one does not even know one's own interests! Under these conditions, Rawls (1971) believed that individuals would decide to divide benefits in a way that made the worst-off person as well-off as possible. In other words, things would probably be allocated based on a rule of equality, or perhaps even need (cf. Deutsch, 1975).

The conditions necessary to test Rawls' (1971) supposition can never exist in the real world. No one can actually set up a new society behind a veil of ignorance. However, the "original position" can be approximated in the laboratory. In two imaginative experiments, Lissowski, Tyszka, and Okrasa (1991) had Polish undergraduates perform an experimental task. Before beginning, the students had to agree on a payment rule; some individuals could be paid more generously than others. After (or if) the group had reached a decision, individuals were assigned to their payment condition by lot. The bulk of these groups were able to reach consensus regarding a payment rule. However, they did not behave as suggested by Rawls (1971). Instead, subjects selected a distribution principle that maximized the average income (not the minimum income, as Rawls suggested), while simultaneously maintaining a so-called "floor constraint." That is, individuals also retained a minimum income for the worst-off member of their "society." Similar results were obtained by Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavy (1987a, 1987b) using samples of American and Canadian subjects. Although this situation is artificial in the extreme, the findings underscore a key point: When allocators do not know what outcomes will benefit themselves, they take steps to ensure their own well-being, and that of all concerned.

The implications of this fact come into focus when we consider that people generally make allocation decisions with some specific purpose in mind—typically either normative (e.g.,
being fair) or instrumental (e.g., stimulating performance or maintaining harmony) in nature (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982b; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992). For example, Kabanoff (1991), James (1993), and Martin and Harder (1994) all maintain that people in North American organizations are likely to distribute economic resources based upon a rule of equity. That is, rewards are assigned on the basis of merit: Those who contribute the most, earn the most. Kabanoff (1991) argues that equity distributions are used to spur productivity (for additional evidence see also James, 1993). The basic idea is simple (and consistent with expectancy theory; Vroom, 1964): To the extent that better performers receive higher rewards, people desiring these rewards will strive to attain high levels of performance (cf. Deutsch, 1975, 1985).

However, the matter appears to be more complicated than decision makers may realize. Although research does suggest that equitable rewards can boost positive work behaviors, such as work performance (Greenberg, 1990a; Sheppard et al., 1993), this is by no means a forgone conclusion. The problem managers face is in ensuring that individuals on the low end of the pay scale will perceive their pay as equitable. Those who receive the allocations may not have the same perceptions as those who make them. If they do not, then it seems possible that an attempt to create equity from the organization’s perspective could create unfair resource dispersion from the perspective of disadvantaged employees. To the extent that this occurs, the performance-boosting benefits of “equity” (as defined by the persons assigning the outcomes) will simply not result. In fact, performance may even decline (cf. Greenberg & Cohen, 1982).

Evidence bearing on this point is provided in a noteworthy study by Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1992) examining “wage dispersion” (i.e., variability in salary) among university and college administrators. When wage dispersion was high, turnover was lower among individuals with high salaries and higher among individuals with low salaries. In a follow-up study among university and college faculty, Pfeffer and Langton (1993) found that as salary dispersion increased, research productivity dropped and faculty became less collaborative. Harder (1992) reached similar conclusions in a study of professional athletes. To the extent that the colleges and universities were attempting to achieve pay equity (and it seems unlikely that they would be...
doing otherwise), their efforts would appear to have failed. Not only did performance fail to improve, but in some cases it declined. This is not to say that equity is unimportant. In fact, Greenberg (1990a), Kulik and Ambrose (1992), Sheppard et al. (1993), and Cropanzano and Randall (1993) all review evidence demonstrating that equity can indeed lead to positive work behaviors. However, the equitable feelings that produce these benefits are based on the perceptions of the recipient, and these may not coincide with those of the decision maker.

Our discussion thus far has focused on only one organizational reward—pay. Although money is a critically important reward in organizations (Miceli, 1993; Miceli & Lane, 1991), it is not the only reward that is distributed. Indeed, in their classic resource exchange theory, Foà and Foà (1974) have described a variety of valued resources that may be allocated following different normative standards than those which may be used for distributing money. In keeping with this tradition, the allocation of non-economic outcomes has been studied in two in-basket experiments conducted by Martin and Harder (1994). Participants in these studies were managers who were asked to divide hypothetical rewards between recipients. Some of the rewards were financial (e.g., profits) and others were socioemotional (e.g., friendliness). The researchers found that different types of rewards were allocated following different standards. Specifically, whereas socioemotional rewards were most frequently divided equally, financial rewards were most frequently divided in accordance with people’s relative contributions (i.e., equitably). These findings suggest that although it may be considered distributively fair to distinguish between recipients with respect to financial rewards, considered to be deserved by virtue of meritorious contributions, socioemotional rewards are not considered suitable for distinction in this manner. Rather, socioemotional rewards deserve to be provided equally to all, regardless of their performance-relevant contributions. This is in keeping with research showing that allocators are reluctant to distinguish between recipients with whom they have friendly relations (for a review and conceptual model, see Greenberg & Cohen, 1982b).

Another variable shown to influence the making of reward-allocation decisions is national culture (for a review, see Gergen, Morse, & Gergen, 1980). As Greenberg (1982) concluded a
decade-and-a-half ago after reviewing cross-cultural differences in the use of justice norms. "cultural norms of various nations appear to make the equity norm more or less prevalent" (p. 424). Among the most reliable cultural differences found has been the tendency for people from collectivistic societies, such as the Chinese, to prefer equal allocations insofar as these promote group harmony, and for people from individualistic societies, such as Americans, to prefer equitable allocations insofar as allocations proportional to contributions promote productivity (Miles & Greenberg, 1993). Although such findings are consistent with Hofstede's (1980) conceptualization of culture, an emphasis on cultural differences diverts attention from the more immediate situational demands of a social setting. Recognizing this possibility, James (1993) and Triandis (1994) have raised the possibility that different cultures may value different transactional goals, and that these may be met by following different allocation practices.

Testing this notion, Bond, Leung, and Schwartz (1992, Study 1) had undergraduates from Israel and Hong Kong allocate rewards among members of a work group and indicate why they had made their allocation decisions. Interestingly, they found that the preferred distributions were largely based on subjects' expectancies that their decisions would produce positive consequences. In other words, the decision was not based on what was valued by their culture, but instead on the outcomes one could expect to obtain: Subjects followed either equity or equality, depending on their beliefs about the consequences of doing so. Cultural differences by themselves did a limited job of predicting allocation behavior.

Chen (1995) has suggested that this may be the case because cultural differences are subject to change over time, and that multiple cultural forces may make preferences for allocation norms uncertain. Moreover, cultural differences in sensitivity to various goals is dynamic in nature. For example, there have been recent shifts in goal priorities within both American and Chinese companies: American organizations have become more humanistic, and less likely to be driven purely by profit, whereas Chinese organizations (following reforms initiated in 1978) have become more profit-driven, and less driven by interest in achieving harmony. As a result of these changes, Chen (1995) predicted that employees of contemporary American organizations
would prefer equal allocations of material rewards whereas their Chinese counterparts would prefer equitable allocations. Chen had large numbers of American and Chinese employees of various companies, and at various levels, complete an in-basket exercise that allowed them to express preferences for various reward-allocation practices. It was found that allocation preferences were in keeping with the cultural shifts Chen described: Americans were more likely to make equal allocations of rewards, whereas the Chinese were more likely to make equitable allocations of rewards. Although these findings are completely opposite of those long noted, they illustrate the same dynamic in operation: People make reward allocation decisions that are consistent with the goals that are salient at the time, and these may well be reliably differentiated by culture. In fact, it is precisely because of this reversal that our confidence in the validity of this phenomenon is enhanced.

Procedural Justice

In the mid 1970s several theorists (e.g., Deutsch, 1975, Leventhal, 1976b; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) first called our attention to the idea that justice demands paying attention not only to the "ends" of social exchange, but also to the "means" whereby those ends are attained. As noted earlier, this idea has been referred to as procedural justice—the perceived fairness of the procedures used to determine outcomes. Thibaut and Walker's (1975) research comparing various legal systems led to the conclusion that procedures perceived to be fair are ones that give people a voice in the procedures affecting them. Around this same time, Leventhal (1976b, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980) proposed that fair processes involve more than just voice. He argued that procedures may be considered fair to the extent that they adhere to six criteria—they are: applied consistently, free from bias, accurate, correctable, representative of all concerns, and based on prevailing ethical standards. A few years later, Greenberg and his associates (e.g., Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg, 1987a; Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Greenberg & Tyler, 1987) articulated how the concept of procedural justice may be applied to the study of organizations. The subsequent work in this area has been considerable (for reviews, see Greenberg, 1990a,
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1996; Sheppard et al., 1993; Tyler & Smith, in press), and has seen a great deal of conceptual and practical development during the period covered by this review.

Perhaps the major reason for the popularity of the study of procedural justice in organizations is that fair procedures have been associated with a wide variety of desirable outcomes. For example, substantial evidence has demonstrated that procedurally fair treatment makes individuals more accepting of smoking bans (Greenberg, 1994a), pay systems (Miceli, 1993; Miceli & Lane, 1991), parental leave policies (Grover, 1991), and disciplinary actions (Ball, Treviño, & Sims, 1994). In fact, justice concerns appear to feature prominently in virtually all human resource interventions (for reviews see Folger & Cropanzano, in press; Greenberg, 1996a; Tyler & Smith, in press). Generally, people are more accepting of decisions that result from fair procedures than those that result from unfair procedures.

Furthermore, people who accept organizational decisions tend to cooperate with authority figures (Lind, 1995; Tyler & Dawes, 1993; Tyler & Lind, 1992). This occurs even among people who are harmed or inconvenienced by their organizations in some way—the very individuals whose favor may be difficult to court. For example, Tyler and Degoey (1995) found that the more strongly individuals believed that officials went about making water-rationing decisions on a fair basis, the more likely they were to cooperate with those decisions. Similarly, Greenberg (1994a) found that smokers more strongly accepted a smoking ban when they believed it was imposed by their company following fair procedures than when following unfair procedures. In another context, Schaubroeck, May, and Brown (1994) found that salaried employees reacted less negatively to a pay freeze when that freeze was implemented in a procedurally fair fashion than when it was implemented in an unfair fashion. Similarly, Greenberg (1990b) found that people were less likely to steal in response to pay cuts when these appeared to be the result of fair procedures than when they stemmed from unfair procedures.

Taken together, these findings illustrate that the effectiveness of organizational procedures may be enhanced by incorporating process attributes that are perceived to be fair.
However, the matter is more involved than this. Employees use their experiences with fair or unfair allocation procedures as information that reflects on the organization as a whole. As such, procedural fairness may be used as the basis by which people establish larger relationships with their employers, enhancing their loyalty toward the organization and their willingness to exert effort on its behalf (Tyler & Lind, 1992). In this regard, research has shown that compared to those who believe that their organizations' decision-making processes are unfair, those who perceive them to be fair exhibit higher levels of organizational commitment (Tyler, 1991), greater trust in management (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994), lower turnover intentions (Dailey & Kirk, 1992), a lower likelihood of litigation (Bies & Tyler, 1993), more generous citizenship behaviors (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Organ & Moorman, 1993), and to some extent, higher job performance (although the evidence for this connection is tentative, see Gilliland, 1994; Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991; Lee, 1995).

Clearly, procedural justice has wide-ranging beneficial effects on organizational functioning. In this light, we will examine the components of procedural justice in more detail. When people make fairness evaluations they appear to be sensitive to two distinct "focal determinants" (Greenberg, 1993b): structural determinants—those dealing with the environmental context within which interaction occurs, and social determinants—those dealing with the treatment of individuals. We will now turn our attention to each of these. Following this discussion, we will address the issue of why procedural justice produces the beneficial effects described above.

**Structural Aspects of Procedural Justice**

From a structural perspective a procedure may be considered procedurally fair to the extent that it is based on explicit formal organizational policies that people expect to lead to fair distributions (Greenberg, 1993b). The central issue investigated in this regard has to do with identifying the specific determinants of procedural fairness. Both Thibaut and Walker's (1975) findings about the importance of voice and Leventhal's (1976b, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980) list
of six criteria have proven useful in this regard, although these guidelines are highly abstract and general in nature.

In the past few years, however, several theorists have built upon these conceptualizations by proposing various structural determinants of procedural justice that are expected to operate in specific organizational settings. For example:

- Building on the empirical work of Greenberg (1986a), Folger, Konovsky, and Cropanzano (1992) proposed that three factors contribute to the perceived fairness of performance evaluations: adequate notice, fair hearing, and judgment based on evidence—each of which has been supported in empirical research (Taylor, Tracy, Renard, Harrison, & Carroll, 1995).

- In the context of strategic planning, Kim and Mauborgne (1991, 1993) identified such process attributes as bilateral communication, ability to refute, consistency, and the presence of a social account as determinants of fairness.

- In the domain of workplace drug screening, Konovsky and Cropanzano (1993), reviewed research suggesting that fair drug screening procedures are ones that are accurate, allow for corrections to be made, provide opportunities for voice, and that are administered with advance notice. With the exception of this last criterion, these other variables are all completely predictable from procedural justice theories.

- Gilliland (1993) identified nine procedural rules expected to enhance the fairness of personnel selection decisions: job relatedness, the opportunity to perform, reconsideration opportunity, consistency, feedback, selection information, honesty, two-way communication, and the propriety of questions. Although these are closely linked to procedural justice theories, Gilliland (1993) also identified two additional rules that may contribute to the perceived fairness of selection decisions, but which have not been previously identified by justice theorists: ease of faking answers, and the invasiveness of questions.
For the most part, these contributions have identified determinants of fairness consistent with Leventhal's (1976b, 1980) rules and the use of voice identified by Thibaut and Walker (1975). In keeping with earlier studies (Greenberg, 1986; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987), it would appear that these general determinants of fairness do apply in organizations although they may take different forms in different contexts. Moreover, it is also possible that some unique determinants of fairness manifest themselves in different organizational settings.

The notion that procedural fairness may be context-sensitive is not meant to imply that completely idiosyncratic criteria are used in different settings—that is, justice is not totally context-specific. Rather, it appears that many of the same general procedural guidelines are brought to all organizational environments although their relative weights and specific forms are shaped by the demands of the contexts in which they operate. In other words, general determinants of fairness may come to life by being altered to fit their settings. It is with this idea in mind that Greenberg (1996a) has recommended carefully tailoring measures of procedural justice to the specific settings in which they are being assessed: "What makes a set of questions appropriate in one context may not make them equally appropriate in another. Questions about justice should be carefully matched to the context of interest...." (p. 402). To the extent that research measures tapping justice perceptions are context-sensitive, our confidence in interpreting them may be enhanced.

Social Aspects of Procedural Justice

Following largely from the work of Bies and his associates (e.g., Folger & Bies, 1989; Greenberg, Bies, & Eskew, 1991; Tyler & Bies, 1990), interest in the structural aspects of procedural justice has been supplemented by the social aspects of procedural justice. The basic idea is that people are concerned with the quality of the interpersonal treatment they receive at the hands of decision-makers—what many researchers have referred to as interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986). In tracing the history of this concept, Greenberg (1993b) noted that interactional justice was originally treated as a separate construct, a third type of justice (e.g., Bies, 1987). Although subsequent research demonstrated the importance of interpersonal determinants of
fairness, the concept became increasingly difficult to distinguish from structural procedural justice. For one thing, both the formal procedures and the interpersonal interactions jointly comprise the process that leads to an allocation decision. Additionally, interactional and structural procedural justice had similar consequences and correlates (e.g., Clemmer, 1993). Indeed, some studies found them to be highly related to one another (e.g., Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991; Koper, Van Knippenberg, Bouhuys, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993). For these reasons, most current researchers now treat interactional justice as a social aspect of procedural fairness as opposed to separate forms of justice (e.g., Tyler & Bies, 1990; Tyler & Lind, 1992), and we will follow suit.

Following the lead of Greenberg (1993b) and Tyler and Bies (1990) we also will distinguish between two aspects of interpersonal treatment. The first is social sensitivity—the extent to which people believe that they have been treated with dignity and respect. The second is informational justification—the extent to which people believe they have adequate information about the procedures affecting them. Below we discuss each.

**Social sensitivity: The role of dignity and respect.** Although it is commonsensical to claim that people like being treated in an interpersonally sensitive manner, it represents a conceptual extension to claim that such treatment contributes to perceptions of fairness. Indeed, several researchers have found that treating people with dignity and respect enhances their perceptions of fairness and their acceptance of the outcomes associated with the discussion. For example, in their study of grievance resolution procedures used by coal miners, Shapiro and Brett (1993) found that fair decisions were believed to be made by adjudicating parties who demonstrated high degrees of knowledge, impartiality, and a willingness to consider the grievants' perspectives and feelings. Similarly, in a field experiment Greenberg (1994a) had company officials explain a pending company-wide smoking ban to workers in a manner that demonstrated either high or low levels of sensitivity to the nature of the disruption they were likely to face. As expected, he found that employees were more accepting of the ban, believing it to be fairer, when higher levels of sensitivity were shown.
Interestingly, it is not only perceptions of fairness that are enhanced by socially sensitive treatment, but a general reluctance to retaliate against harmdoers in response to unfair outcomes. For example, Greenberg (1994b) studied theft reactions following from underpayment. Although all underpaid people stole, those who were treated in a disrespectful manner stole objects that were of no value to themselves, but that were of value to their employers. In other words, disrespectful treatment, adding injury to the insult of unfair treatment, encouraged people to retaliate against their employers—seeking to harm them in exchange for harming themselves, even if so doing did nothing more than even the score between them symbolically.

It is important to note that the importance of social sensitivity as a determinant of justice is not limited to Americans. Leung, Chiu, and Au (1993) conducted a study in Hong Kong in which they examined observers' responses to hypothetical industrial actions such as strikes and sit-ins. Respondents were found to be more sympathetic to industrial actions when management had treated workers with a lack of consideration and respect. This research provides a useful cross-cultural addition to the burgeoning literature on the social determinants of fairness. More such cross-cultural work of this type is needed (cf. Lind & Earley, 1992), not only to determine the generalizability of existing phenomena, but also to determine the extent to which normative differences with respect to politeness and social sensitivity qualify existing conclusions.

Informational Justification: The Role of Social Accounts

In addition to fairness defined in terms of courteous treatment, research also supports the idea that fairness demands having access to information regarding the reasons underlying how outcomes are determined. For example, Daly and Geyer (1994) surveyed employees' reactions to a major facilities relocation. They found that individuals responded more positively when the move was adequately explained than when no such explanation was given. In a follow-up study, these same researchers found that adequate explanations were effective in maintaining workers' feelings of organizational commitment during periods of organizational decline (Daly & Geyer, 1995). The benefits of informational justifications for undesirable outcomes have been exhibited consistently in several additional empirical studies conducted in a wide variety of settings (e.g.,
Brockner, DeWitt, Grover, & Reed, 1990; Greenberg, 1993a, 1994a; Konovsky & Folger, 1991a; Schaubroeck et al., 1994). All of these studies demonstrate that providing people with information that justifies the need for negative outcomes enhances the extent to which they come to accept those outcomes as fair.

Recent studies have examined various characteristics of information that contribute to its perceived adequacy in mitigating reactions to undesirable outcomes. For example, in a laboratory study Shapiro (1991) assessed the perceived adequacy of three different types of causal accounts: an external attribution to an uncontrollable event, an internal attribution to an altruistic motive, and an internal attribution to a selfish motive. She found that the most effective excuses were external in nature, events over which actors had no control. By contrast, explanations that led to the belief that the actor was selfish were considered least adequate. In fact, explanations that are not particularly convincing might not only be inadequate when it comes to cultivating positive impressions, but may backfire, leading to negative impressions (Greenberg, 1996b).

It is not only the adequacy of information that contributes to its effectiveness in mitigating reactions to unfair situations, but also the medium by which that information is conveyed. In this connection, Shapiro, Butner, and Barry (1994, Study 2) compared the perceived adequacy of accounts presented in face-to-face verbal interaction and in written notes. They found that the added richness of face-to-face verbal interaction enhanced perceptions of the adequacy of messages compared to the same messages presented in written form. These findings are in keeping with earlier studies suggesting that communication media differ with respect to the degree of information they convey, and that richer media are considered preferable for communicating socially sensitive information (Lengel & Daft, 1988). In an era in which working people frequently interact by using such impersonal means as computers, fax machines, and satellite transmissions, Shapiro et al.'s (1994a, Study 2) findings are worthy of further consideration.

Not only might information presented via one medium be more effective than the same information presented via another medium, but also, the same explanation may be more effective
in some situations than in others. Brockner et al. (1990) examined this possibility using a sample of layoff survivors. Although survivors responded negatively when their coworkers lost their jobs, justifications attenuated these negative reactions. These mitigating accounts were most effective under two conditions: when the workers were uncertain about the way that their employer was allocating organizational resources, and when the layoff was especially important to the survivors. According to Brockner et al. (1990), uncertainty and importance created a high need for information, and social accounts are useful in this regard. On the other hand, when uncertainty was low and the layoffs were unimportant, survivors' need for information was lower, and the accounts given had less impact.

**Why Do Procedures Matter?**

As we have noted, research suggests that matters of justice involve more than just economic gain; they also involve the manner in which people are treated. The question of why this occurs has been the topic of considerable recent research. In general, two approaches have been suggested, both of which have received empirical support—the instrumental model and the relational model. We now will review the evidence for each.

**The instrumental model.** The instrumental, or self-interest, model of procedural justice accepts the traditional notion that economic incentives promote fairness. It simply claims that individuals may take a long-term focus when evaluating their economic gains. As a result, people may become tolerant of short-term economic loses so long as they expect that advantageous outcomes will be forthcoming in the future. Procedural justice is highly valued insofar as it suggests the existence of a system that will yield the greatest benefits in the long run. Thus, short-term failures can be overlooked when there is some promise of future gain (for reviews, see Greenberg, 1990a; Shapiro, 1993; Tyler, 1990).

There is a good deal of evidence suggesting that individuals value procedural justice, in part, for instrumental reasons. Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the instrumental model is that people evaluate processes more favorably when they lead to positive outcomes than when they lead to negative outcomes. This effect has been observed repeatedly (e.g., Ambrose,
Harland, & Kulik, 1991; Conlon, 1993; Conlon & Fasolo, 1990; Conlon & Ross, 1993; Flinder & Hauenstein, 1994; Krzystofik, Lillis, & Newman, 1995; Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993; Lowe & Vodanovich, 1995), although sometimes the effect sizes are small (e.g., Tyler, 1989; 1991) and exceptions occur (e.g., Giacobbe-Miller, 1995; Tyler, 1994).

If the instrumental model identified the only cause of procedural justice, then one would expect that process fairness would be entirely determined by short-term and long-term economic concerns. On the other hand, to the extent that noninstrumental considerations matter, then process characteristics should enhance perceptions of procedural justice even when no direct economic benefits are expected. To test this possibility, researchers have examined the impact of process characteristics (such as voice or advance notice) under conditions in which advantageous outcomes are precluded. For example, in a laboratory experiment conducted by Lind et al. (1990) undergraduate subjects were assigned performance goals, the successful attainment of which would lead to a desired reward. Some subjects were given an effective voice in determining their goal. For others, their voice had no effect on the outcome. Finally, in a control group subjects had no voice whatsoever. The lowest levels of perceived fairness were reported by subjects in the control group, for whom no voice was allowed. The highest levels of perceived fairness were found when voice was permitted and capable of influencing the goal. In this condition, voice is presumed to have both an instrumental effect—increasing the opportunity to meet the goal, and a noninstrumental effect—enhancing the belief that one’s input is welcomed. Most relevant to our point is that even when individuals could not influence their outcomes, they still reported greater fairness when they had voice than when they didn’t have voice.

Parallel findings were obtained by Cropanzano and Randall (1995). These researchers were interested in investigating the effects of advance notice on perceptions of procedural justice. Subjects were assigned to work on an anagram-solving task. High performance on this task would yield a bonus unit of experimental credit. Some individuals were disadvantaged due to a
change in the scoring procedure. When the change was announced in advance, perceptions of procedural fairness were relatively high. However, when the change was announced after the task was conducted, perceptions of procedural fairness were much lower. Thus, although the outcomes were identical in both conditions, the manner in which the change was announced had an effect on the perceived fairness of those outcomes. The noninstrumental, purely procedural variable, advance notice, raised procedural justice perceptions despite the fact that procedures had no impact on outcomes—that is, they had no instrumental effects.

Evidence of this phenomenon is not limited exclusively to the lab. Conlon (1993) examined defendants' procedural justice judgments after appealing parking violations. He found that both instrumental considerations (the value of the fine) and noninstrumental considerations (voice in the legal procedure) affected perceptions of process fairness, although the effects of the instrumental factors were substantially larger. Slightly different results were obtained in a field study by Shapiro and Brett (1993). These researchers assessed the reactions of coal miners to various grievance procedures. Like Conlon (1993), Shapiro and Brett (1993) found evidence for both instrumental and noninstrumental determinants of procedural justice. However, in this study the noninstrumental concerns explained the preponderance of variance.

Taken together, these investigations suggest that although instrumental concerns are important, people also formulate procedural justice judgments based on other considerations. However, none of the work reviewed thus far directly measured these "other concerns." Although these concerns appear to be important, without such direct measurement they cannot be explicitly identified. Fortunately, research has begun to address this issue by suggesting a complementary model of procedural justice.

The relational model. The relational model (formally called the group-value model) has been proposed as a supplement to the instrumental model (for reviews see Lind, 1995; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Dawes, 1993; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Proponents of the relational model agree that people join groups as a means of obtaining valuable economic resources. In this sense, the relational and instrumental models are consistent. However, the
relational model maintains that groups offer more than material rewards. Group affiliation is also a means of achieving social status and self-esteem, and these considerations are every bit as potent as the economic incentives emphasized by the instrumental approach. Even within the most individualistic cultures people need to be valued by some group or groups (Lind & Earley, 1992), inasmuch as this is an important means by which people acquire a sense of personal worth (Tyler & Lind, 1992). For this reason, people tend to be keenly aware of their positions within groups and the groups' potential for providing them with these valuable social rewards.

Tyler (1989, 1990) has argued that people have three relational concerns, and that these stem from people's desires for dignity and worth—neutrality, trust, and standing. Neutrality is something that a decision-maker expresses to an individual. If neutrality exists, then the decision-maker is free from tendentiousness and bias. He or she uses facts and not opinions and attempts to make choices that create a level playing field for all. Neutrality implies openness and honesty, and the absence of any hidden agendas. Trust refers to the degree to which people believe that the decision-maker intends to act in a fair manner. Employees generally wish to count on the trustworthiness of authority figures. Standing is something that an individual possess, but that is conveyed by the decision-maker. When a person's standing is high, his or her status has been affirmed, such as by implementing procedures with politeness and care.

Evidence for the relational model generally has been supportive: Procedural fairness perceptions are enhanced when these three relational concerns have been fulfilled (for reviews, see Lind & Tyler, 1992; Tyler, 1990). For example, there is good support for the relational model in the context of citizens' interactions with civil authorities (Tyler, 1989, 1994). However, only now is the evidence beginning to accumulate in organizational settings. In two field studies, Lind et al. (1993) examined the manner in which individuals reacted to court-ordered arbitration in response to a lawsuit. They found that when relational concerns were met, the litigants had greater perceptions of procedural justice. These feelings, in turn, led them to accept the arbitrated settlement. Although these findings support the relational model, it is important to note that they do not contradict the instrumental approach. In fact, Lind et al. (1993) present evidence
suggesting that outcome favorability may impact procedural justice judgments as well as the acceptance of outcomes themselves. Analogous results were obtained by Giacobbe-Miller (1995) in a study of labor-management disputes.

Brockner, Tyler, and Cooper-Schneider (1992) examined the relational model from a different perspective. They argued that if individuals are guided by relational concerns, then those who are the most committed to their institutions will be the most upset by violations of procedural justice. This would suggest an interaction between commitment and procedural justice such that procedural justice is more strongly related to various outcomes when commitment is high. When commitment is low, however, the effects of procedural justice should be weaker. Supportive results were obtained in two field studies, one dealing with layoff survivors (Brockner et al., 1992, Study 1), and the other examining citizen interactions with legal authorities (Brockner et al., 1992, Study 2).

In conclusion, evidence supports both the instrumental and relational models of procedural justice. Both perspectives provide important insight into the underlying reasons why procedural justice has been shown to be so important in organizations.

The Relationship Between Procedural and Distributive Justice

Thus far, our discussion of organizational justice has focused on the unique impact of distributive justice and procedural justice. However, from the time that the concept of procedural justice was first introduced to the social sciences, theorists have acknowledged that it may be related to distributive justice (Leventhal, 1976a, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), although the nature of this relationship was not systematically studied. Recently, however, theorists have focused on two possibilities that we will review here— that distributive justice and procedural justice operate independently, as main effects, and that they operate jointly, as interacting effects.

The Two-Factor Model: Different Effects of Different Types of Justice

In a review article, Greenberg (1990a) distinguished between the different consequences that procedural and distributive justice appeared to have: Procedural justice was linked to system
satisfaction whereas distributive justice was linked to outcome satisfaction. To a great extent, this distinction continues to hold today. Evidence suggests that distributive justice primarily influences one's satisfaction with the outcome in question or the results of some decision (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, in press). For example, the belief that one's pay is not suitable compensation for one's achievements results in perceptions of inequity that, in turn, produce low pay satisfaction (Harder, 1992; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993; Sweeney, McFarlin, & Inderrieden, 1990; Summers & Hendrix, 1991). By contrast, procedural justice primarily influences attitudes and behaviors that are relevant to the larger organization. Procedures, in other words, are central determinants of one's trust in management and loyalty to the institution or system that rendered the decision in question (Krystoflik et al., 1995; Lind, 1995; Tyler & Degoe, 1995). Continuing with pay as an example, evidence suggests that when pay decisions are made using fair procedures, people are likely to remain committed to their organizations—even when the decisions are unfavorable (Cooper, Dyck, & Frohlich, 1992; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Schaubroeck, May, & Brown, 1994; Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993). Sweeney and McFarlin (1993) have dubbed these different effects the two-factor model: Although procedures and outcomes are both important determinants of justice, they affect different factors.

Despite considerable evidence supporting the two-factor model (for reviews, see Lind & Earley, 1992; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Lind, 1992), the evidence is not unequivocal. Lowe and Vodanovich (1995), for example, suggested that the relationship of distributive justice and procedural justice to organizationally-relevant criteria may vary over time. They propose that perceptions of organizational outcomes are most strongly influenced by distributive injustices immediately after the injustices occur. As time elapses, however, this effect dissipates. Employees then adapt a longer-term perspective and alter their impressions of organizations so that these are more firmly based upon procedures. If this reasoning is correct, then support for the two-factor model should only appear as time has passed following defining-episodes of distributive injustice.
Lowe and Vodanovich (1995) tested these ideas using a sample of university employees who had undergone a restructuring of their job classifications, an event that triggered feelings of distributive injustice in many employees. Their survey, administered two months after the restructuring occurred (while respondents apparently were still feeling the sting), found that feelings of organizational commitment were more strongly linked to the unfavorability of the outcome than they were to the procedures whereby these outcomes were determined. Unfortunately, insofar as the investigators failed to administer a follow-up survey to assess the extent to which procedures became more important with the passage of time, their hypotheses were not completely tested. However, their idea warrants future research. Based on our earlier conclusions regarding the mitigating influences of explanations, these may be expected to be likely moderators of the time-sensitive effects Lowe and Vodanovich (1995) proposed. After all, as time passes it is likely that people will receive information that qualifies their interpretation of earlier events.

The Interaction Model: Conjoint Effects of Distributive and Procedural Justice

According to the two-factor model, procedures and outcomes predict different types of reactions, and therefore it speaks only to main effects. Additional research, however, suggests that procedural justice and distributive justice interact (for reviews, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, in press, Cropanzano & Folger, 1991). Following Brockner and Wiesenfeld (in press), this interaction can be described from the perspective of either the procedures or the outcomes (see left panel of Figure 1). One might say that procedural justice is more strongly related to work attitudes when outcomes are low than when they are high. Conversely, one also might say that outcomes are more strongly related to work attitudes when procedures are unfair than when they are fair. Brockner and Wiesenfeld (in press) examined the evidence documenting the existence of this interaction and offered several possible explanations for it.

Insert Figure 1 about here
Work-related attitudes. Notably, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (in press) suggested that the procedure-by-outcome interaction has been generally associated with organizationally-relevant outcomes. For example, in research conducted by Brockner, DeWitt, Grover and Reed (1990) and by Daly and Geyer (1994) the procedure-by-outcome interaction significantly predicted organizational commitment. However, less research has linked the procedure-by-outcome interaction to criteria that could clearly be considered personal, such as pay satisfaction. The work of McFarlin and Sweeney (1992) is an exception. These researchers found that the procedure-by-outcome interaction was significant for commitment, but not for pay satisfaction. Clearly, more research is needed before definite conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the procedure-by-outcome interaction. At this point, however, the available evidence suggests that the procedure-by-outcome interaction behaves the same as the procedural main effect described in conjunction with the two-factor model—that is, the interaction is more clearly related to attitudes toward the system or institution than attitudes toward one’s job.

It is important to note that the interaction effect has not been consistently obtained. Researchers either have not tested for it (cf. Brockner and Wiesenfeld, in press), or have found it to be nonsignificant in their research (Cropanzano & Konovsky, 1995; Lowe & Vodanovich, 1995). Nonsignificant interactions are particularly likely to occur in studies (e.g., Lowe & Vodanovich, 1995) in which sample sizes are too low to have adequate statistical power to detect interactions (cf. Stone, 1988). Interaction effects also might not be found in the case of certain dependent variables which may be sensitive only to the main effects of outcome. For example, in the context of workplace drug screening, Cropanzano and Konovsky (1995) found that some process characteristics (e.g., voice, advance notice) interacted with outcome negativity as expected whereas another (i.e., the presence or absence of a grievance system) did not. Such findings suggest that it may be misleading to ignore the possibility that all determinants of fair procedures do not have the same effects. As noted in our earlier discussion of context-sensitive variables, some determinants of procedural justice may have different effects than others.
Brockner and Siegel (in press) have offered a novel interpretation of the interaction effect. They claim that it is not procedures themselves that interact with outcomes, but that outcome favorability moderates the effect of trust: The relevant interaction is between trust and outcomes; procedures are not directly involved. Brockner and Siegel (in press) hypothesize that procedural justice is still important, but indirectly, insofar as it serves as the primary determinant of trust. Nevertheless, it is trust that takes part in the actual interaction. To date, the evidence for this idea is limited, but promising. For example, in a retrospective study Siegel, Brockner, and Tyler (1995) asked workers to recall problems they had with their supervisors. Consistent with Brockner and Siegel’s (in press) reasoning, outcome favorability interacted with both procedures and trust to predict employees’ acceptance of the supervisors’ decisions. However, the trust-by-outcome interaction accounted for considerably more variance. Moreover, when both interactions were simultaneously used to predict decision acceptance, only the trust-by-outcome interaction remained significant; the procedure-by-outcome interaction was not. Although it is premature to draw firm conclusions about the role of trust in determining the acceptance of outcomes, it does appear to be an important factor.

Self-evaluations. Thus far, we have seen that procedures and outcomes may interact to foster different reactions to different aspects of the work environment. As insightful as this work as been, none of it has examined self-relevant cognitions. However, in light of literature demonstrating the importance of self-esteem (e.g., Brockner, 1988) and self-efficacy (e.g., Gist & Mitchell, 1992) in organizations, attention deserves to be paid to what fair or unfair treatment leads people to think about themselves.

Several recent studies have examined how procedures and outcomes work together to influence self-esteem and perceptions of self-efficacy. For the most part, these studies find a different interaction pattern than the one previously described (see right panel of Figure 1). For example, in two laboratory experiments Koper et al. (1993), gave university students bogus feedback about their performance on a test of basic abilities. When the students were given positive feedback and the test was believed to have been graded fairly (i.e., carefully and
accurately), state self-esteem was relatively high. However, when the students were given negative feedback, the fairness of the test-grading procedure had little impact on their self-esteem. These studies suggest that procedures and outcomes interact to predict self-relevant cognitions such that outcome favorability exerts a stronger effect on state self-esteem when fair procedures are used compared to when unfair procedures are used. In a related field study, Gilliland (1994) examined the impact of procedures and outcomes on self-efficacy. He found that when people were not hired (an unfavorable outcome) using a test that was job-related (a fair procedure), their self-efficacy perceptions were low. However, unfair tests had less effect on self-efficacy than did fair tests. Gilliland's (1994) findings are generally consistent with the self-esteem research reviewed previously. As summarized in Figure 1, the interactions obtained by both Koper et al. (1993) and Gilliland (1994), measuring self-relevant perceptions, were different from those found in the earlier-cited studies measuring organizational attitudes.

Why might this interaction occur? Tyler and Degoey (1995) consider the question from the perspective of the relational model: When a process is fair, individuals see themselves as valued; when a process is unfair, they see themselves as less valued. For this reason, people should evaluate themselves more positively when procedures are fair, and less positively when procedures are unfair. This explanation implies that it is the fairness of the presentation, and not the favorability of the feedback, that determines self-esteem. One might posit from Tyler and Degoey (1995), therefore, that people's self-esteem will be raised even when feedback is negative, so long as a fair process is maintained. This hypothesis, however, has not received support. In fact, procedural fairness does not exhibit a positive relationship to self-evaluations in the case of negative feedback. Rather, evidence suggests that people receiving negative feedback evaluate themselves less positively when that feedback is considered procedurally fair than when it is considered procedurally unfair (Gilliland, 1994; Koper et al., 1993). In other words, people receiving negative feedback may feel better about themselves when the process used to assess their performance is considered to be unfair than when it is considered to be fair. Tyler and Degoey's (1995) reasoning cannot account for these findings.
Thus, we need a model that explains why people react favorably to feedback that is procedurally fair and positive, while also reacting unfavorably to feedback that is procedurally fair and negative. We can resolve this issue by considering the dimension along which the feedback is diagnostic. For Tyler and Degoe (1995) the principle dimension in question is the individual's relationship with the group. They maintain that procedures, more than outcomes, provide information about this relationship. However, performance feedback supplies information about other things as well. In particular, feedback also can suggest things about a person's skills and abilities. In the studies by Koper et al. (1993) and Gilliland (1994), subjects received some type of evaluative feedback, such as their basic abilities or their abilities to do their jobs. A fair process might lead individuals to more fully accept their feedback as valid. Thus, when the procedures are believed to be fair, the negative feedback resulting from these procedures will have greater diagnostic value. However, when a procedure is unfair, the value of the feedback resulting from it is circumspect, and may be readily dismissed. To state the matter more succinctly, information has greater force when it is based on fair procedures compared to unfair procedures. For this reason, fairly given positive feedback leads people to evaluate themselves more favorably, whereas fairly given negative feedback leads people to evaluate themselves less favorably. This analysis suggests that allocation procedures may trigger more than just the concern for personal dignity. They also may provide information about how people should evaluate their own abilities and skills.

Justice Research in Organizational Settings:

Toward Practical Applications

Greenberg (1990a, 1993c, 1996a) has argued that the major value of studying organizational justice phenomena lies in the insight it provides with respect to understanding and managing various aspects of organizational behavior. Specifically, he claims that general, context-neutral studies of fairness are less informative than those examining fairness issues arising in specific organizational settings (Greenberg, 1996a). There are three reasons for this. First, studying the perceived fairness of organizational phenomena is a valuable way of learning
about those phenomena themselves. Second, unique aspects of justice are likely to arise in specific organizational contexts. And finally, studying justice concepts in various organizational settings provides a good opportunity to assess their generalizability. Greenberg’s point is that studying justice in organizations not only sheds light on matters of justice, but also on organizations themselves. For this reason, he advocates applying justice concepts to a broad set of organizational phenomena.

When the study of organizational justice first emerged, Greenberg identified several aspects of organizational settings that stood to benefit from being analyzed through the lens of organizational justice (e.g., Greenberg, 1987a). Indeed, he conducted justice-directed post hoc analyses of such phenomena as performance evaluations (Greenberg, 1986b, 1986c), comparable worth (Greenberg & McCarty, 1990) and various human resources management practices (Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Folger & Greenberg, 1985). Today, researchers have not only accepted, but embraced the premise that “justice matters” in organizations, and they have conducted many investigations focusing on the role of justice in organizations. Indeed, the past few years have seen many significant applications of justice concepts to organizational issues. In view of the voluminous nature of this literature, we will review only the highlights of this work (for a more complete presentation, see Folger & Cropanzano, in press).

**Strategic Planning**

Earlier, we noted that among the benefits derived from using fair procedures is that they enhance employees’ acceptance of institutional authorities. This is likely to be especially important in the context of strategic planning, in which it is vital to organizational success that employees endorse their firms’ strategic plans (Miller & Cardinal, 1994). Recent research suggests that one important determinant of the acceptance of strategic plans is the extent to which employees believe that the plans were formulated and implemented in a procedurally fair manner. In general, research has shown that organizational changes that are believed to be based on fair procedures are better accepted than those believed to be based on unfair procedures (Novelli, Kirkman, & Shapiro, 1995).
This phenomenon is demonstrated clearly in a survey of subsidiary managers from multinational corporations conducted by Kim and Mauborgne (1991). These researchers were interested in determining the extent to which managers believed that their companies' headquarters used procedurally fair decision techniques during the planning process. They found, as expected, that perceptions of procedural justice were positively associated with feelings of organizational commitment, trust in the head office, social harmony, and satisfaction with the outcomes of the planning process. Moreover, the procedural justice effects were greater than the impact of outcome fairness. The same researchers later replicated and extended these findings in a longitudinal study. Kim and Mauborgne (1993) found that procedural justice was associated positively with perceptions of commitment, trust, and outcome satisfaction. They also found that these feelings, in turn, led managers to be supportive of the strategic plan.

A complementary approach was taken by Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza (1995). These researchers were interested in the strategic planning process used by members of intact management teams. They presented a hypothetical business case to team members who were participating in an executive training program. Consistent with the field research of Kim and Mauborgne (1991, 1993), Korsgaard and her colleagues found that perceptions of procedural fairness were affected significantly by two independent variables: allowing team members to influence the decision, and consideration of their viewpoints. These feelings of procedural justice, in turn, led to higher levels of trust, decision commitment, and group attachment. In sum, research has shown that fair procedures enhance employees' acceptance of their organizations' strategic plans.

Organizational Staffing

Historically, when industrial/organizational psychologists have discussed "selection fairness" they were referring to various psychometric properties of assessment instruments, such as concerns of differential validity, adverse impact, and so forth. This literature continues to be important (Arvey & Sackett, 1993). However, more recent work has begun to examine the test-takers' perceptions of fairness (Arvey, 1992), especially distributive and procedural justice (for
reviews, see Gilliland, 1993; Schuler, 1993a; Singer, 1993). Generally speaking, this work suggests that staffing procedures perceived as being unfair have pernicious consequences.

Gilliland (1993) maintains that selection tests incite concerns about all three aspects of procedural justice—structural characteristics (what Gilliland calls "formal characteristics"), explanations and interpersonal treatment. This work is important insofar as some selection methodologies are less likely to engender fairness perceptions than others (Gilliland, 1994; Singer, 1992). Perceived injustice, in turn, gives rise to a host of negative outcomes, such as poor work attitudes and lower job performance (Gilliland, 1994). For example, Gilliland (1994) found that workers who believed that they were selected by unfair means had poorer work attitudes and lower job performance than those who believed they were selected by fair means. Similarly, several studies by Singer (1992, 1993) found that individuals who believed that staffing procedures are unfair were less likely to accept a job than those who believed them to be fair. (It should be noted, however, that this effect may be stronger when job opportunities are considered sequentially than when they are examined in pairs; Bazerman et al., 1994, Study 2).

Fortunately, these consequences can be avoided by incorporating procedural justice into selection systems. In fact, research conducted over the past few years can serve as explicit guides as to how this may be accomplished. With this in mind, we will consider the fairness of several of the most widely used staffing procedures (see also reviews by Folger and Cropanzano, in press; Gilliland, 1993).

**Interviews.** Employment interviews, especially the unstructured variety, are used very widely (Harris, Dworkin, & Park, 1990). Studies have found that applicants view them as fair (Harland & Biasotto, 1993; Kravitz, Stinson, & Chavez, in press; Smither et al., 1993), although these results can vary depending on the content of the interview (Rynes & Connerley, 1993). Job applicants even expect to participate in unstructured interviews—in fact, they consider selection procedures unfair when interviews are not used (Singer, 1992, 1993). Although these findings paint an encouraging picture of the benefits of unstructured interviews, it remains problematic that unstructured interviews yield lower validity coefficients than their
structured counterparts (Latham & Finnegan, 1993). At the same time, however, applicants perceive unstructured interviews to be more fair than structured interviews (Latham & Finnegan, 1993; Schuler, 1993b). This probably stems from the fact that unstructured interviews provide greater opportunities for candidates to express themselves, thereby providing voice—a well-established criterion of procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Insofar as there are justice-enhancing benefits associated with unstructured interviews, and validity-enhancing benefits associated with structured interviews, it would appear wise to consider using both types of interviews in the selection process.

Assessment centers and work simulations. Both Gilliland (1993) and Singer (1993) suggest that perceptions of fairness are enhanced when a selection instrument is ostensibly job-related or "transparent" (Schuler, 1993a)—that is, when it has "face validity" (Mosier, 1947). Various work simulations and assessment centers have this quality (Finkle, 1976). Applicants can readily recognize the tests' relevance for the job and, therefore, should view these tools favorably. In fact, considerable research suggests that this is the case. For example, in surveys conducted by Rynes and Connerley (1993), Smither et al. (1993), and Kravitz et al. (in press), it was found that work simulations and job-sample tests consistently were among the most favored selection devices. Studies of assessment centers yield similar results (Davis, 1993; Macan, Avedon, Paese, & Smith, 1994). These findings are encouraging insofar as work simulations and assessment centers yield substantial validity coefficients (Thornton & Cleveland, 1990). Thus, work simulations appear to constitute a selection instrument that is both useful and fair.

Biographical inventories. If face-valid assessment tools are perceived to be fair, it follows that those with questionable face validity, and inherent opportunities for violations of privacy, would be considered unfair. This appears to be the case in studies of biographical inventories. Indeed, Smither et al. (1993) found that biographical inventories were believed to be less fair than other selection techniques. Similarly, Kluger and Rothstein (1993) found that applicants generally held negative opinions of organizations that used biographical inventories. Likewise, Stoffey, Millsap, Smither, and Reilly (1991) found that the use of biodata lowered applicants' job-pursuit
intentions. These findings, considered along with the fact that the U.S. government has long restricted the kinds of questions that can be asked on an application blank (Lowell & DeLoach, 1984), raise serious questions about the costs that may be incurred by the continued use of biographical inventories as selection tools.

**Personality tests.** The issue of perceived job-relevance of test procedure and invasion of privacy manifests itself as well in the context of personality tests. Research has shown that personality tests are sometimes valid predictors of job performance (Guion, 1991), although this depends greatly on the personality trait measured and on the characteristics of the particular job (Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Generally, however, applicants do not like personality inventories. In fact, many people react negatively to them (Ambrose & Rosse, 1993; Harland & Biasotto, 1993; Kravitz et al., in press; Rosse, Miller, & Stecher, 1994; Rynes & Connerley, 1993) and form negative opinions of the organizations using them (Smither et al., 1993). For example, in a large-scale survey of employees, Westin (1978) found that 44% of the respondents wanted personality testing banned. Not surprisingly, applicants selected by use of personality inventories are less likely to accept job offers than individuals selected by other means (Rosse, Ringer, & Miller, in press). In view of this negative picture, it should come as no surprise to find that managers are reluctant to use personality tests (Harris et al., 1990).

Despite these concerns, there may be something that can be done to enhance the acceptance of personality tests. Many personality instruments were originally designed for diagnosing personality disorders in clinical populations (for a review, see Guion, 1965). As a result, some of the questions may come across as invasive and offensive when used in nonclinical settings. If so, then it may be possible to revise offending items or to select only those that are relevant to occupational settings. Doing so may enhance the perceived fairness of personality screening. Some evidence suggests that this will indeed occur. For example, Jones (1991) discovered that test takers responded far more favorably when only work-related personality items were used in selection tests than when these were supplemented by unrelated items. The suggestion to limit the focus of personality tests is in keeping with the trend toward
using narrow, situationally explicit, personality variables in personnel testing (Guion, 1991). Of course, to the extent that items from established personality inventories are revised or omitted, it is essential to re-validate them to ensure that their predictive power has not been attenuated.

Reference checks. Reference checks are in widespread use (Harris et al., 1990) despite the fact that they do not have particularly high levels of statistical validity (except, perhaps in certain limited conditions; Knouse, 1989). Regardless, applicants do consider reference checks to be fair. A study by Rynes and Connerley (1993), for example, found that applicants preferred reference checks to other selection techniques. Additionally, in a study in which people were asked to assess their reactions to various selection devices Kravitz et al. (in press) found that reference letters were judged quite favorably.

Cognitive abilities tests. Cognitive abilities, or so-called "intelligence," tests are useful tools for predicting job performance (Wigdor & Sackett, 1993). However, several studies suggest that job applicants often reject them. Kluger and Rothstein (1993, Study 1) gave subjects negative feedback regarding their performance on one of four selection tests. Responses were especially negative among people who scored low on a test of cognitive ability. In a follow-up study the researchers found that the actual and perceived difficulty of the intelligence tests may have lowered test-takers’ perceptions of control and distracted them (Kluger & Rothstein, 1993, Study 2). Similar results also were obtained by Macan et al. (1994).

This is not to say that people’s feelings about intelligence tests are completely negative. For example, Rosse, Miller, and Stecher (1994) found that the inclusion of a cognitive ability test in a battery with a personality test actually improved people’s reactions toward the personality test. In addition, of the sixteen selection instruments evaluated by participants in the study by Kravitz and his associates (in press), cognitive abilities tests were ranked seventh—approximately in the middle of their list. Test-takers’ reactions also may depend less on the type of test and more on the particular test items. In support of this contention, Rynes and Connerley (1993) found that intelligence tests were evaluated more favorably when they included job-related
items than when they did not. Likewise, Smither et al. (1993) discovered that cognitive ability tests with concrete items were perceived more positively than those containing abstract items.

To conclude this section, many recent studies have demonstrated that certain characteristics can be incorporated into selection procedures to enhance their perceived fairness. Moreover, perceived fair procedures lead to a variety of beneficial personal and organizational outcomes. Clearly, research and theory on organizational justice holds a great deal of promise when it comes to identifying ways of enhancing people’s reactions to selection instruments.

Workplace Drug Screening

Although drug testing can be a valid predictor of work behavior, surveys have shown that people’s reactions to this practice are highly variable (for a review, see Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1993). Many individuals perceive drug screening favorably whereas others do not (Labig, 1992; Murphy, Thornton, & Prue, 1991; Murphy, Thornton, & Reynolds, 1990). Nonetheless, studies have documented at least some concerns regarding drug-testing fairness (e.g., Harris et al., 1990), although some other staffing methods are considered even less fair (Kravitz et al., in press; Rosse, Ringer, & Miller, in press; Rynes & Connerley, 1993).

These findings are of more than academic interest. Notably, Konovsky and Cropanzano (1991) found that those employees who believed that a workplace drug screening program was procedurally unfair also had lower organizational commitment, lower job satisfaction, higher turnover intentions, and lower assessments of their work performance by their supervisors. Generally consistent results also were obtained in a role-playing study conducted by Crant and Bateman (1990). To the extent that unfair drug screening procedures may interfere with an organization’s effectiveness, it is important for managers to recognize the characteristics of fair and unfair practices, and to promote the use of fair practices.

There are several possible reasons why diverse evaluations of drug testing are found. One possibility is that there are individual differences in people’s attitudes toward drug testing. Research by Crant and Bateman (1993) and by Rosse, Miller, and Ringer (in press) suggests that people who use illegal drugs tend to have more negative opinions of drug testing programs than
those who do not. This is in keeping with the self-interest bias in procedural justice perceptions to which we alluded earlier (cf. Grover, 1991).

However, as we have already discussed, self-interest appears to be only one determinant of procedural fairness judgments. Evaluations of drug screening also may vary because drug screening programs themselves are highly diverse. Any particular drug test may or may not have associated with it a variety of procedural safeguards (Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1993). Furthermore, even if these safeguards do exist, they may not be evident to the test-taker (suggesting that it is important for people who are behaving fairly to publicize their efforts; Greenberg, 1990c). For example, Tepper and Braun (1995) found that employees felt favorable toward drug testing procedures to the extent that they believed these procedures yielded accurate results (i.e., Leventhal's, 1980, "accuracy" rule was followed), and that leniency was shown to those who tested positively.

In another recent study, Cropanzano and Konovsky (1995) determined that drug screening was considered fair to the extent that the procedure contained elements of voice, advance notice, justifications, a grievance system, and when testing was conducted "for cause." (As mentioned earlier, all five of these process attributes except presence/absence of a grievance system interacted with outcome negativity.) Taken together, research suggests that drug testing can indeed give rise to perceptions of injustice. However, to the extent that the system is designed in a manner that incorporates appropriate procedural safeguards these concerns may be assuaged.

Organizational Image Management

Earlier, we discussed the use of social accounts as a means of legitimizing the behavior of individuals. Extending this line of thinking, we also can see that it is not only individuals who need to have their behavior justified as fair, but organizations as well (Gatewood, Gowan, & Lautenschlager, 1993). In fact, recent research suggests that organizations go through similar processes of image-maintenance—especially following actions that might be seen as unfair (cf.
Greenberg. 1990c). Although attention to this topic is fairly recent, some interesting findings already have emerged.

In a qualitative study Dutton and Dukerich (1991) examined the manner in which the New York and New Jersey Port Authority responded to the large number of homeless people congregating in their transportation facilities. Port Authority officials were concerned that these individuals constituted an obstacle for effective service delivery. As such, they took a variety of measures, many of which were subsequently criticized by the media. Among other things, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) were interested in how the Port Authority responded to these critiques.

Initially, officials denied engaging in some of the more controversial behaviors. However, as public outcry grew, the Port Authority's image further eroded in the public eye. As a result, the organization shifted its reactions from denial to a series of "legitimizing actions" such as making a capital investment in new facilities for the homeless, and forming a task force on the problem. One might say that the Port Authority partially acquiesced to its critics and began to address their concerns. Presumably, had denial been more effective as an impression-management technique, these other institutional changes would not have been initiated.

Another perspective on organizational accounts is provided by the work of Elsbach and Sutton (1992) in their study of two social-activist groups: The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) and Earth First!. ACT-UP and Earth First! members engage in many activities that are widely accepted as legitimate. Indeed, most people wish to assist AIDS sufferers and to protect the environment, or at least, believe that it is reasonable to do so. Nevertheless, in the course of pursuing these goals, members of these organizations sometimes engaged in actions that were perceived as illegitimate (e.g., the disruption of a religious service by ACT-UP members, and an injurious tree-spiking incident committed by members of Earth First!). The investigators were interested in how these two organizations could maintain a positive public image in the face of these questionable actions.
Elsbach and Sutton (1992) found evidence that these organizations actually anticipated the need to provide social accounts, and built provisions for doing so into their structures. This was done in two ways. First, ACT-UP and Earth First! engaged in "institutional conformity." That is, their visible structures and actions were consistent with the values and norms of the larger society. Few people, for example, would object to a group that provides assistance to AIDS victims or that educates people about ecology. (As such, these activities are much like the legitimizing actions observed by Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). Second, the organizations adopted a highly de-centralized structure. The roles of different chapters or spokespersons were separated from the rest of the organization. For example, Earth First! members went so far as to create an ad hoc group that engaged in tree-spiking. These two structural adaptations came in handy after an illegitimate events occurred.

Following controversial events ACT-UP and Earth First! were able to rely on their structures for help. For one, they could point to many legitimate activities in which they participated. This had a chilling effect on criticism insofar as any broad attacks on the organization would also constitute attacks on these favorable activities. Second, they were able to dissociate the organization from those individuals who performed the illegitimate activity. For example, ACT-UP has local chapters that operate in a relatively autonomous fashion. The overall organization simply attributed the attack on the church to the over-zealous New York chapter, thereby protecting its image by distancing itself from those illegitimate actions. Indeed, Elsbach and Sutton (1992) provide evidence that these accounts were effective at putting an end to the public censure.

In a more recent investigation on this topic, Elsbach (1994) studied the manner in which the California cattle industry responded to various allegations of wrong-doing. Her focus here was less on structure and more on the nature of the social accounts themselves. In particular, Elsbach (1994, Study 1) found that the accounts used by the maligned cattle industry took two broad forms. There were 

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happened, accompanied by explanations as to why the problem was not really so severe or why it was not the fault of most ranchers. (The analogous behavior on the part of individuals has been referred to as *justifications* by Tedeschi & Reis, 1981, and *techniques of neutralization* by Sykes & Matza, 1957.)

Each of these two forms of accounts could have one of two different types of contents. One content referred to characteristics of the institution, such as the legitimate goals pursued by ranchers. Another content referred to characteristics of the technology, such as the efficiency of modern ranching techniques. Combining form and context, Elsbach (1994, Study 2) identified four prototypical accounts:

- denial based on institutional reasons (e.g., there is no safety problem due to federal monitoring),
- denial based on technical reasons (e.g., cattle are handled compassionately because that’s what is profitable),
- acknowledgment, but explained by institutional reasons (e.g., grazing in a state park reduces fire hazards), and
- acknowledgment, but explained by technical reasons (e.g., enforcing a ban on growth hormones would not be economically viable).

All four of these prototypical accounts received at least some use. However, Elsbach (1994, Studies 2 and 3) found that acknowledgments did a better job than denials at maintaining the industry’s image. Additionally, accounts based on institutional characteristics were more effective than those based on technical characteristics. As one might expect, the form and the content of the account also worked together. The most effective explanation of all was an acknowledgment that something negative had occurred, but that explained the event in terms of an institutional characteristic of the industry.

Although research on social accounts at the level of the organization is still in its infancy, the work conducted thus far has considerable promise. Such research represents an innovative
application of organizational justice, as it moves from the level of the individual to the level of the firm as a whole. This leads us to wonder whether justice findings in other domains would generalize as readily across levels of analysis. Clearly, this represents a promising avenue for future inquiry.

**Informal Conflict Resolution**

Managers frequently are required to intervene in disputes between subordinates (for reviews see Dworkin, 1994; Kambanyay & Brett, 1994; Wall & Callister, 1995). When they do, they are said to be acting as "informal" third-parties, as compared to the "formal" interventions by judges and arbitrators (Kolb, 1986). Although there are many important considerations involved in making third-party interventions effective (Elangoovan, 1995), maintaining justice is one of the most important. Indeed, research has shown that managers who behave fairly resolve conflict more effectively than those who do not (Cropanzano, Aguinis, Schminke, & Denham, 1996; Kambanyayya, Brett, & Lytle, 1992; Kozan & Ilter, 1994). The role of justice in informal conflict resolution has a long history (see an overview, see Folger & Cropanzano, in press), although our discussion will focus only on recent contributions to this literature.

**How much participation do managers allow?** As we have already discussed, giving people voice in the procedures affecting them is likely to enhance their perceptions of the fairness of those procedures and the resulting outcomes. This generalization holds true in the domain of conflict resolution as well. For example, in a field study conducted in a school Rasinski (1992, Study 1) found that a large percentage of teachers preferred to resolve conflicts between students in a participative fashion rather than in a nonparticipative fashion. Likewise, in a role-playing study, Cropanzano et al. (1996) discovered that simulated disputants in the U.S., the Dominican Republic, and Argentina preferred that their supervisors intervened in a way that preserved their voice in the matter. Cropanzano et al.'s (1996) respondents also believed that participative procedures were more fair and more likely to alleviate future tensions than nonparticipative procedures. Finally, in a laboratory experiment Schoorman and Champagne (1994) gave
simulated supervisors negative information about their subordinates. Although this information harmed the supervisor-subordinate relationship, they found that if the two individuals openly discussed the problem, their relationship improved. This finding suggests that participation could act to strengthen the interpersonal ties between workers and managers. In view of such evidence, it should come as no surprise to find that practitioners widely recommend using participative interventions for most types of conflicts (e.g., Weeks, 1992).

Research has shown that the beneficial effects of participative conflict resolution practices are not limited to American samples. For example, in a study of Turkish workers Kozan and Iltar (1994) found that managers typically used a participative process in their conflict resolution efforts. Specifically, Turkish supervisors were most likely to mediate (i.e., let the two disputation speak freely, but reserve control over the decision to themselves) and facilitate (lower tension levels, but let the subordinates work through the problem). In addition, when the supervisors used these voice-oriented strategies, subordinates reported more favorable outcomes than when they did not use such tactics. Despite this, it is most common for American managers to intervene in an autocratic fashion (see Dworkin, 1994; Folger & Cropanzano, in press), although this can vary substantially depending upon the nature of the dispute (Shapiro & Rosen, 1994). In general, American managers tend to control both the discussion of the problem as well as the choice of a settlement.

Several studies shed light on the underlying reasons for this autocratic preference. For example, Sheppard, Blumenfeld-Jones, Minton, and Hyder (1994) interviewed managers concerning the manner in which they had settled recent disputes. In keeping with previous research, they found that autocratic approaches were preferred. Part of the reason for this had to do with managerial goals. When supervisors were concerned with the need for a fast, high-quality decision, they relied on an autocratic strategy. However, when quality and speed were of less concern, supervisors were more participative. In addition, Sheppard et al. (1994) also found that the major reason why American managers use autocratic tactics had to do with the way they frame conflicts. That is, they think of their conflict-resolution obligations as decisions that have
to be made, much as their other managerial tasks. Consequently, they make these decisions in much the same autocratic fashion.

Another reason why American supervisors tend to make conflict-resolution decisions autocratically is that they may not know any better. In an interesting experiment, Karambayya et al. (1992) had inexperienced MBA students and actual managers role-play a simulated organizational dispute. The subjects either were or were not granted formal power. It was found that if subjects lacked formal power, they did not intervene in an autocratic fashion, and were more participative. This was true of both MBA students and actual managers. However, among those individuals who were granted formal power, significant differences emerged. The inexperienced MBA students utilized autocratic tactics, whereas the more experienced managers used more participative strategies. Finally, regardless of the condition, the simulated disputants reported that the outcomes were fairer and more effective when they were given voice in the procedures than when voice was not allowed. These findings support the notion that supervisors learn from experience, initially using less effective, autocratic approaches and gradually learning to use more participative procedures. These findings lend cause for optimism about the potential effectiveness of efforts at training managers to enhance their dispute-resolution skills (Kolb, 1985).

Timing of third-party interventions. Closely related to the issue of participation in dispute resolution is the matter of timing. People in conflict with each other often prefer to resolve their disagreements by themselves (cf. Bergmann & Volkema, 1994; Rasinski, 1992). This enables both parties to control both the process and the outcome, and avoids relinquishing control to intervening authority figures. However, when a supervisor intervenes prematurely, control is stripped from the disputants. To the extent that disputants believe they did not have sufficient time to resolve their differences on their own, they are likely to believe that they were treated unfairly and to feel dissatisfied with those managers who stepped in too quickly. These ideas were directly tested by Conlon and Fasolo (1990), who examined disputants’ reactions to a
simulated conflict. As expected, a hasty intervention by informal third-parties lowered the disputants' perceptions of procedural fairness.

Third-party partisanship. When managers intervene in conflicts they typically are not dispassionate observers. They often have vested interests—sometimes, legitimate ones—in the way conflicts are settled. From the perspective of the disputant, however, these interests may introduce unacceptable bias into the decision making process. In other words, supervisors may be unable to provide the neutrality that Tyler and Lind (1992) maintain is important to procedural justice. As an obvious example, when the adjudicating third-party is affiliated with one of the disputants, justice is compromised. For example, several studies have found that when third-parties benefited from the outcomes of the settlements they made, disputants were prone to question the fairness of the process (Welton & Pruitt, 1987; Wittmer, Carnevale, & Walker, 1991).

As obvious as these findings may be, third-party affiliations also can have some unusual effects. In one experiment, subjects either did or did not observe a third-party chatting in a friendly fashion with the opposing disputant (Lind & Lissak, 1985). This friendly discourse was perceived to be improper insofar as it might bias the outcome of the decision. The effects of this type of impropriety depended upon the outcome that the third-party assigned. When the outcome was unfavorable, subjects responded very negatively, attributing the result to biased decision-making. However, when the outcome was favorable, subjects responded quite positively. The cordial relations between the third-party and their opponent served to lower the subjects' expectations of receiving beneficial outcomes. When these negative expectations were not met, disputants were very pleased. (This is akin to the augmentation effect in impression management demonstrated recently by Greenberg, 1996b).

These ideas were further tested by Conlon and Ross (1993). In two laboratory experiments they found that when a third-party was partisan, the nonaffiliated disputant lowered his or her expectations. This made settlements easier to achieve. In addition, favorable outcomes were evaluated positively inasmuch as these were substantially greater than imagined coming
from a partisan decision-maker. Conlon and Ross's findings (1993) suggest that partisanship is not necessarily harmful. To a large extent, it depends on the circumstances and the nature of the settlement. However, to the extent that it can be avoided and neutrality can be demonstrated, the tactic of manipulating expectations via displays of partisanship can be avoided in the first place.

**Layoffs**

As organizations have downsized and restructured their operations in recent years, layoffs have become a troubling fact of organizational life for millions of Americans (Richman, 1993), and experts predict that the hardships they endure will continue in the future (Cascio, 1995). Research in organizational justice appears to provide some valuable insights into ways of mitigating the negative impact of job loss on both victims of layoffs (those who lost their jobs) and survivors (those who remain on the job after others have been laid off) (for reviews, see Brockner, 1994; Brockner & Greenberg, 1990; Konovsky & Brockner, 1993).

**Layoff victims.** Several studies have examined the impact of various determinants of fairness on the reactions of layoff victims. For example, Konovsky and Folger (1991a) surveyed people who had been laid off from a variety of different industries. They found that formal procedures predicted victims' willingness to speak positively about their companies and to eschew government regulation of layoffs. Interestingly, however, neither social accounts nor benefits level (an index of outcome favorability) were associated with these outcomes.

However, in a more recent study, Greenberg, Lind, Scott, & Welchans (1995) found that the fairness of the social treatment people received as their layoffs were announced had a great affect not only on their perceptions of fairness, but also their interest in seeking legal damages against their former employers. Their interviews of a large number of laid-off people indicated that 40% considered initiating a lawsuit or an EEOC complaint. Some 23% actually talked to a lawyer or EEOC official, and 7% actually filed a suit or a complaint. Logistic regression analyses found that the strongest predictor of the willingness to consider legal action, or to actually take action, was respondents' perceptions that they were treated without dignity or in a disrespectful fashion at the time of their dismissal. In fact, whereas only 16% of those treated well thought
about suing, 66% of those treated poorly thought about suing. Additional evidence suggests that victims' reactions to layoffs depended on the degree of harm the layoff caused them: the perceived fairness of the layoff procedures predicted the reactions of victims who felt harmed by the layoffs better than it did the reactions of those who were less adversely affected. These findings replicate an identical reaction identified by Brockner et al. (1994, Study 1).

Layoff survivors. Considerable research also has examined the reactions of layoff survivors. As one might imagine, survivors do not respond positively to watching their coworkers lose their jobs, often arousing "survivor guilt." As we described earlier, Brockner et al. (1990) found that when a justification was provided for others' layoffs, survivors responded more positively than when an explanation was lacking. However, this occurred only under conditions in which survivors had a high need for information—that is, when individuals were uncertain about the process used to determine the layoffs and when these negative outcomes were important to them. Although social accounts are important, this is only the case when these accounts are believed to be true. Mellor (1992) examined survivors' commitment to their union following layoffs. The company blamed the job terminations on the union. Survivors who believed this account, expressed low commitment to their union when the layoff was severe. However, when the account was not believed or when the layoffs were less severe, commitment to the union was higher.

Brockner et al. (1994, Studies 2 and 3) also examined survivors' reactions to layoffs as a function of procedural justice, operationalized as advance notice of a forthcoming layoff, and outcomes, the level of layoff benefits provided. They found the expected interaction: Procedures were stronger determinants of employees' responses to layoffs when benefits were unfavorable compared to when they were favorable. These findings need to be considered in light of those obtained by Brockner et al. (1990). In each case, an aspect of procedural justice (be it a social account or advance notice) was an important predictor of reactions, but only when the outcome was severely negative (i.e., when the endangered job was important or the level of benefits was low). These findings provide strong support for the interaction model of justice described earlier.
They also send a clear message to organizations who are forced to layoff employees: To minimize negative reactions among survivors, conduct layoffs fairly (such as by fully explaining its need and by giving advance notice), and clearly elucidate that these practices were followed. Reaping the benefits of carrying out fair procedures frequently requires calling others' attention to them (Greenberg, 1990c).

Organizational Citizenship Behavior

To the extent that people are strongly committed to organizations they believe have treated them fairly, it follows that they would be willing to contribute to its well-being, even if this involves going above and beyond the call of duty. This is the idea behind organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB)—those helpful and supportive actions by employees that are not part of their formal job description. Examples include showing courtesy to others, being conscientious about work, being a “good sport” about doing extra work, and generally protecting the organization's property. Insofar as people may have only limited control over some of their work outcomes, and may be reluctant lower them in response to underpayment, work output may not be the most sensitive indicants of feelings of injustice (Greenberg, 1982). However, given that OCB is discretionary, and people are free to engage in them or to forgo them if they wish, these behaviors may be highly reactive to fair and unfair treatment (Greenberg, 1993d). Not surprisingly, considerable attention has been paid to understanding the relationship between justice and OCB (for a review, see Organ and Moorman, 1993).

As Organ (1990) and Reed and Kelly (1993) discuss, OCB is based on employees' notions of social exchange. When an organization treats individuals fairly, they are likely to reciprocate by exerting extra effort on the firm's behalf (cf. Organ & Konovsky, 1989). Empirical evidence suggests that justice, especially procedural justice, is related to OCB (e.g., Ball, Treviño, & Sims, 1994; Konovsky & Folger, 1991b). Some OCB studies have demonstrated this effect, although they have been nonspecific as to the type of justice involved. For example, Deluga (1994) found that a general measure of fairness was associated with several
aspects of OCB. Likewise, Konovsky and Organ (in press) found that a composite variable that they called justice/satisfaction predicted various OCB dimensions.

One of the earliest studies to examine different types of justice was conducted in a Taiwanese government ministry. Farh, Podsakoff, and Organ (1990) found that procedural justice was related to the altruism dimension of OCB. However, for the compliance dimension, procedural justice did not account for a significant amount of the variance above and beyond the effect of job scope. Extending the work of Farh et al. (1990) in an American sample, Moorman (1991) assessed five dimensions of OCB: altruism, courtesy, sportsmanship, conscientiousness, and civic virtue. Neither distributive justice nor formal procedural justice predicted any of these dimensions. However, interactional justice predicted all but civic virtue. Similarly, Lee (1995) also found that the social aspects of justice predicted all of these dimensions except civic virtue, but that formal procedures were related to OCB. Finally, Niehoff and Moorman (1993) obtained a mixed pattern. Formal procedures predicted courtesy, sportsmanship, and conscientiousness, although interactional justice was associated with only sportsmanship. Further muddying the waters, Konovsky, Elliott, and Pugh (1995) found that procedural justice was the better predictor of OCB in an American sample, whereas distributive justice was the better predictor of OCB in a Mexican sample.

The best summary that can be given at this time is that procedural justice is a better predictor of OCB than distributive justice (for Americans, at least). However, it remains unclear which particular components of procedural justice, structural or social, best predict which particular forms of OCB. The picture is further complicated by the possibility that procedural justice may be an indirect predictor of OCB. This possibility has been suggested by Konovsky, Elliott, and Pugh (1995), who found that procedural justice was correlated with trust in their survey of hospital workers. Trust, in turn, was associated with OCB. These findings call our attention to the possibility that procedural justice is only correlated with OCB by way of its influence on trust. This possibility is in keeping with the role of trust as a mediator of procedural justice identified by Brockner and Siegel (in press; Siegel, Brockner, & Tyler 1995).
Employee Theft

Our discussion of the link between justice and prosocial acts of organizational citizenship may be juxtaposed with an emerging literature on justice and the antisocial act of employee theft (Greenberg, in press). From the perspective of distributive justice, stealing company property may be understood as an attempt to re-establish equity between the parties involved in a social exchange relationship (for a review, see Greenberg & Scott, 1996). Specifically, in terms of equity theory (Adams, 1965), employees who believe they are receiving insufficient outcomes (e.g., pay) in exchange for their work contributions may effectively raise these outcomes by stealing, thereby redressing their perceived inequities with their employer.

Greenberg has empirically demonstrated this phenomenon in a series of studies. In the first, a quasi-experiment conducted in an organization, Greenberg (1990b) compared the theft rates within three manufacturing plants belonging to the same company. In two of these factories (comprising the experimental groups), all employees encountered a pay-cut of 15% over a 10-week period as the company’s response to a financial crisis. A third plant, with demographically similar employees, in which there were no pay cuts, served as the control group. Insofar as employees in the first two plants received lower pay than they had in the past, they were considered to have suffered underpayment inequity. To assess theft, standard measures of shrinkage were taken by agents unaware of the study. Consistent with equity theory, Greenberg (1990b) found that theft rates were significantly higher within the plants in which employees’ pay was cut than in the control group. These differences are particularly dramatic when one considers that theft rates were consistently low in all three plants both before the pay cut, and also after regular rates of pay were reinstated.

Going beyond this straightforward test of equity theory, this investigation also considered the social determinants of justice by examining the manner in which the pay cut was explained to the workers in the two experimental groups. Employees at one plant, selected at random, were given an elaborate and caring explanation of the need for pay to be cut (the adequate explanation condition). By contrast, workers in the other experimental plant were given limited information
about the need for the pay cut, accompanied by only superficial expressions of remorse (the inadequate explanation condition). The differences between these two plants was striking: Over twice as much theft occurred in the plant whose employees received the inadequate explanation compared to the plant whose employees received the adequate explanation.

These dramatic findings are limited by the confounding of two key variables—the amount of information presented about the reason for the pay cut, and the amount of sensitivity shown regarding the impact of the pay cut. To eliminate this confounding, Greenberg (1993a) independently manipulated these variables in a follow-up experiment conducted in a laboratory setting. Undergraduates were hired to perform a clerical task in exchange for $5 per hour, a rate shown in pretesting to be perceived as fair. After performing the task, a random half of the participants (the underpaid group) were told that they would be paid only $3. The other half of the participants (the equitably paid group) were told they would be paid the $5 promised.

As he announced the pay rate, Greenberg systematically manipulated the quality of the information used as the basis for establishing the pay rate, giving an explanation that was either extremely thorough and based on ostensibly verified facts (the high valid information condition) or one that was extremely incomplete and based on questionable facts (the low valid information condition). He also manipulated, via his remarks, the amount of remorse and concern shown for having caused the underpayment, demonstrating either great amounts (the high social sensitivity condition) or very limited amounts (the low social sensitivity condition). After treating the subjects in these manners, the experimenter left subjects alone in a room with an ostensibly unknown sum of money and invited them to take the amount they were supposed to take (i.e., $3 in the underpayment group and $5 in the equitable payment group). However, because the experimenter knew the exact amount of money left on the desk, he was able to determine precisely how much was taken. Amounts in excess of the stated wages were considered theft.

Consistent with equity theory, subjects who were equitably paid did not steal, whereas those who were underpaid did steal. In particular, the amount they stole was dependent upon the way they were treated. Subjects receiving high amounts of information stole less than those
receiving low amounts. Likewise, those treated with high levels of social sensitivity stole less than those receiving low levels. Furthermore, these effects combined in an additive fashion: Those receiving high amounts of both variables stole the least, whereas those receiving low amounts of both stole the most.

These findings suggest not only that pay inequity induces theft, but also that the amount of theft in which people engage depends on the nature of the interpersonal treatment they receive: Positive treatment (i.e., thorough information presented in a socially sensitive manner) at the hands of an authority figure lowers theft. People are interested in evening the score with those who have treated them inequitably, and use theft as a device for doing so—particularly when the source of the inequity shows little concern and remorse. When Greenberg’s (1993a) subjects stole the money they may have been attempting to make up for the underpayment they received at the hands of the investigator, or they may have been attempting to retaliate against the investigator by taking too much money. Indeed, both restitution and retaliation are possible responses to theft-induced inequities. Because taking more money than one is supposed to simultaneously advantages oneself and disadvantages the authority figure, it is impossible to distinguish between the restitution and retaliation motives for theft. Acknowledging this limitation, Greenberg (1994b) replicated and extended this study in a manner that made it possible to deduce subjects’ underlying motives for stealing.

The task subjects performed consisted of counting small round objects and packaging them into rolls so they could be easily counted. In one condition the objects were 25¢ coins (quarters). In another condition, they were similarly-sized objects—lithium batteries said to be valuable experimental prototypes. Subjects performed the task alone in rooms in which buckets of either quarters or batteries were put in front of them. Some subjects encountered an underpayment inequity as they completed the task: they were told that they would only be paid $3 for the half-hour’s work instead of the $6.00 they were initially promised. After this announcement was made, the experimenter left the room, but not before giving subjects three $1 bills. Subjects then completed a questionnaire while in the presence of the coins or batteries they were counting. As in
the Greenberg (1993a) study, the explanation for this surprising negative turn of events was either thoroughly explained or not thoroughly explained, and in a manner that demonstrated either a high or low level of dignity and personal concern. Because the number of batteries or coins in the bucket was known in advance (although subjects were led to believe otherwise), it was possible to determine if they had stolen anything. It was reasoned that any theft of the batteries could be interpreted as an act of retaliation insofar as it only would harm the company but be of no value to the subjects themselves. However, theft of the quarters would mutually harm the company while benefiting themselves (making the motive at least retaliation, but also possibly restitution). Thus, in this study, the items stolen were taken as cues to the underlying motives for the theft.

When the subjects were working with quarters, the results replicated those of Greenberg (1993a). That is, both information and sensitivity independently affected theft: When both were high theft was lowest; when both were low, theft was highest; and when one factor was high and the other low, theft was intermediate. However, when subjects were working with the allegedly valuable lithium batteries the only variable that affected theft was the amount of respect and dignity shown while explaining the inequity. When the level of dignity displayed was high, theft was low or nonexistent. However, when it was low, the level of theft rose considerably. By contrast, the amount of information presented about the reasons for the unexpectedly low pay had no effects on the stealing of batteries; the level of theft observed in this condition was quite low. These results suggest that the combined effects of treating people inequitably while failing to treat them with dignity and respect led them to retaliate against the source of their harm, the authority figure.

The sociologist, Kemper (1966) has referred to this type of retaliative behavior as reciprocal deviance—the deviance that results when an authority figure defaults on his or her obligations to an individual. In fact the acts of "striking back" observed here in response to an inequity, are conceptually consistent with the inequitable conditions Kemper (1966) identified as inviting reciprocal deviance. However, it is interesting to note that it was not just the inequity that triggered theft, but the inequity augmented by a lack of personal sensitivity. This combination appears to have added insult to injury, triggering an interest in retaliation. This is not to say that
the retaliation response is purely without benefit for the harmdoer. Although acts of reciprocal deviance may fail to redress an inequity financially, they may do so symbolically. That is, if one cannot directly benefit oneself, then at least one can derive satisfaction from knowing that one has harmed another who has harmed oneself.

Taken together, the Greenberg studies (1990b, 1993a, 1994b) suggest that it is not only the magnitude of the inequity that determines theft, but also the way that inequity is presented—that is, the treatment of employees. Further illustrating this point, Greenberg (1994c) administered a questionnaire to workers assessing their perceptions of various aspects of unfairness in their workplace. The respondents were approached as they recorded their “punch out” times on a piece of paper while the investigator surreptitiously noted the actual times they stopped in front of the clock. (A sign informed the workers that the time clock was being repaired, and directed them to record their names and “punch out” times on a form provided for that purpose. A large digital clock was placed where the time clock was usually found.) By comparing the actual “punch out” times with those recorded, a measure of time theft was created—the reporting of more time than actually worked. Although the actual amount of time theft was rather low, variance in this measure was significantly accounted for by responses to several questionnaire items. Two variables best predicted time theft: the amount of compassion shown by supervisors, and the degree of respect employers show for employees. By contrast, general measures of pay fairness were weaker predictors of theft. Again, these findings suggest that theft is associated with unfair treatment of an interpersonal nature. Uncaring, inconsiderate supervision is a key determinant of employee theft.

In summary, it appears that employee theft is more than simply an attempt to restore a mathematical balance between outcomes and inputs. Such inequities appear to be necessary for theft to occur, but may not always be sufficient. What needs to be added to the formula for predicting employee theft is improper social treatment—variously called social insensitivity, lack of dignity, rudeness, disrespect, or lack of compassion. Thus, whereas insufficient outcomes may stimulate awareness of inequitable states, it requires social insensitivity to this condition to trigger the theft response.
Conclusion

Our review of the recent literature on organizational justice has distinguished between various types of justice and has examined the relationships between them. We saw that fairness is an important determinant of a variety of important work outcomes, such as commitment, turnover intentions, and organizational citizenship behaviors. Especially consequential is the manner in which organizational justice theories have been applied to a host of managerial practices, including selection, theft-prevention, and conflict-resolution. When fairness is incorporated into these practices, beneficial outcomes accrue to both individuals and the organizations employing them.

If nothing else, our analysis demonstrates that justice is a common theme that cuts across all aspects of work life, providing coherence and unity to an array of organizational practices that otherwise might appear unconnected. This is not to say that fairness is the only, or even the most, important consideration in organizational practice. Our point is more modest—but only slightly so: Justice can be a consideration in virtually everything that an organization does because it is through its policies and procedures that a company defines its relationship to each employee. In other words, fairness partially determines how an organization and its members treat one another. It provides a framework within which individuals and institutions interact. This relationship, when characterized by fairness and mutual respect, is a healthy source of morale and productive behavior (Rosen, 1991). We believe that it is implicit recognition of this important point that has stimulated so much attention to matters of organizational justice in recent years. In a field lacking any established research paradigm or unifying theory, and only limited conceptual agreement, the maze of research on organizational justice has grown increasingly complex. Hopefully, by tunneling through this maze, our guided tour of the literature has convinced readers that the journey is worthwhile.
References


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Figure Caption

Figure 1. General form of procedure-by-outcome interactions for work-related attitudes (left panel) and self-evaluations (right panel).